

ADAPTIVE-CREATIVE PRINCIPLE OF ART CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSEHOLD SPACE

¹Rashidova Mashkhura

¹PhD. Associate Professor, Tashkent Institute of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Abstract

This article reveals the essence of the adaptive-creative principle in the system of culture in general and in art design, in particular. As well as intellectual and aesthetic development of reality presupposes, first of all, adaptation to the realities of reality in order to transform it, which reveals the adaptive and creative nature of such development. In this aspect, the issues of expanding the subject of modern aesthetics, the difference and unity of technical and artistic, art and craft are analyzed.

Keywords: social life, civilization, arts, artistic and technical means, aesthetic culture.

Introduction

The process of cultural development is considered not as a change of adaptive activity, but as a transition from biological adaptive activity to adaptive, which has a qualitatively new level and character in society. In this aspect, various approaches to the definition of aesthetics are analyzed. The humanistic problems of design as a manifestation of the adaptive-creative principle are substantiated.

In connection with the special consideration of the genesis of culture, the first question that we would like to touch upon concerns what determines the systemogenesis of society. This question relates directly to the problem of the meaning of the adaptive approach to evolution from the animal state to the human one. This problem has hardly been discussed in the scientific literature as deeply as it deserves. Without considering the adaptive mechanisms of human society, it's very genesis and the process of developing a qualitative special type of life activity turn out to be completely incomprehensible and devoid of real scientific grounds. Moreover, this concerns such a problem as the development of aesthetic reality in the aspect of art construction we are

considering. The adaptive-creative principle should not be understood within the framework of the usual biological adaptation to new conditions, which is carried out through a genetically determined morphological restructuring of animal organs or changes in their specific behavioral reactions. Human ancestors, thanks to a combination of appropriate skills acquired in the course of previous biological development, on the one hand, and various kinds of stimulating environmental conditions, on the other, took a different path than animals. The survival of the hominid ancestors turned out to be directly dependent on their ability to develop new ways to meet the needs for food, shelter, protection, hunting, etc.

Under the current conditions, there was, apparently, only one sufficiently effective and promising way that could provide protection from predators and extraction of the necessary means to maintain life, improving such types of skills as a herd lifestyle and the ability to manipulate various objects. Only thanks to the systematic use of natural tools (sticks, stones, bones) in the process of emerging cooperative activity, our ancestors, who were on the verge

of extinction, were able to ensure success in hunting the surrounding animals, many of which surpassed them in their physical characteristics and survive in the struggle for existence.

Among the most important factors determining the effectiveness of the use of tools is the convenience of their use, as well as their specific specialization. Natural objects found in nature did not always possess the necessary qualities. Therefore, they required processing. Initially, this was done by natural organs; later surrounding objects began to be used for this purpose. The very objective logic of human ancestors gradually pushed them to the need to use a special kind of tools specifically designed to create hunting tools and other items (for processing hides, digging roots, etc.). But such tools, as a rule, did not exist in a ready-made form and required preliminary processing, purposeful and systematic production impact.

This stage in the life of our distant ancestors with good reason is considered a turning point. It was he who marked the process of transition from the animal state to the human and potentially carried a new quality. From this moment, completely different patterns gradually come into force in the relations of living beings with the environment, among themselves, as well as in the organization of activities and life itself. It was at this stage that the necessary conditions were created for the development of culture as a fundamentally new way of activity of these beings.

As noted in the introduction, the assumptions of technological determinism lead to a dead end in the study of the genesis of social life, just like the assumptions of idealism. This can be overcome not by shifting the emphasis from the elements of spiritual culture to the elements of material culture, but as a result of developing a fundamentally different research attitude. This attitude should be based on the analysis of all social practice and the allocation of a certain unit of this structural series.

The allocation of material production activity as a genetically primary element, and a decisive factor in the development of social life, and the

development of culture as a specific unique way of its functioning and development implies, in particular, its correlation not with consciousness, as one of the universal mechanisms of this method, but with various types of spiritual production. Nevertheless, the process of hominization should be considered not as a change of adaptive activity of production, but as a transition from biologically adaptive activity to adaptive, which has a qualitatively new level and character in society. Despite the fact that society as a special adaptive system has recently become the object of close attention in the world literature, this problem is still far from being solved. The task is precisely to find the distinctive adaptive properties of society, reflecting its belonging to a qualitatively new type of organization of material systems.

The most important feature of the human as an adaptive system is that the adaptive effect is achieved here as a result of a constant adapting, transforming effect on the environment in the process of human activity. By “adaptive impact” on the environment, in this case, we mean not any change in the environment that occurs, for example, as a result of the processes of movement during hunting, animal games, but a special transformation of the objects of their influence, in the course of which these objects are appropriately divided and combined according to certain genetically and extragenetically developed programs of activity of these animals. About the potential abilities of animals to adaptive influence, i.e. adapting the objects of this impact to their needs is evidenced by the diverse activities of insect communities (termites, bees, and ants), the “hydrotechnical” structures of beavers, and the construction of nests by birds, monkeys, and many other examples. But, the adaptive activity of animals is highly specialized, representing a system, as a rule, of genetically programmed stereotyped actions.

Method

The article effectively uses such methods as logic, structure, analysis, modeling, as well as research by a number of scientists.

Discussion

The emergence of human culture has led to a fundamentally important result – the decisive overcoming of narrow species specialization and the universalization of the adaptive human impact on the environment. E.Markaryan's remark is true that “although culture is supra-biological in nature, it is organically coupled with the properties of the biological constitution of people whose self-preservation function it is designed to carry out” [1].

He further writes that adaptability always presupposes a certain corrective activity of the system in relation to the external environment caused by changes in the latter [2].

It is important to take into account the sources of change, because they can be processes occurring independently of the behavior of the system under consideration, or caused by its own actions. If in the early stages the first source of changes in environmental conditions prevailed, then as the social process progressed, people increasingly had to adapt to changes made to the environment by themselves.

It should be noted that the fulfillment by culture of its general adaptive function does not mean that all phenomena related to it actually perform this function, since the development of culture is associated with the manifestation of destructive principles.

It will be illegal to confuse the concepts of “adaptability” and “optimality”, since not every specific way of society's adaptation to the environment is optimal in given conditions.

The tendency to identify adaptability and homeostaticity, that is, the focus on maintaining a given structure of systems, is also unjustified [3]. It seems, in particular, erroneous to assert that any adaptive behavior is directed against the new and tends to return the system to its original state. This statement

contradicts the very idea of the evolution of life as an adaptive process by its nature [4].

The property of adaptation is expressed in the ability of the system to establish a correspondence between itself and the conditions of the external environment for the purpose of self-preservation. Therefore, in some cases, the remaining reactions to the impact of the environment do not violate the structure of the system and practically come down to its maintenance (homeostatic behavior). In others, these reactions can lead to significant structural changes.

In human society, the noted forms of adaptive activity are achieved through the means of culture, and, above all, such of its specific regulatory mechanism as the mind. S.Lem identified two types of regulators of life processes: the “regulator of the first type”, based on hereditary transmission of information, and the “regulator of the second type” – the brain, whose action is based on learning and creating “problem models of situations” [5].

Continuing the logic of such reasoning, we can say that the emergence of humanity has led to the creation of a “third type regulator” – social consciousness. This regulator is also based on learning, but the models of activity created by it are no longer based on individual, but on collective experience, fixed not only in the behavior of individual individuals, but also thanks to special sign systems, and in the life of the whole society.

Culture always, in all epochs, for different regions, nations and nationalities reflects the level of knowledge, experience aimed at changing and transforming nature and the environment. In the material and spiritual culture, as in a mirror, people's ideas about beauty, their high aesthetic ideals are reflected. Therefore, culture necessarily includes an aesthetic aspect.

While emphasizing the special importance of spiritual activity for culture, we do not detract from the importance of material, productive activity, although there is a tendency to reduce culture only to the spiritual sphere [6].

Aesthetic culture in general and the aesthetics of everyday life in particular are considered by us as a special cross-section or a specific side of all manifestations of material and spiritual culture. It is not only known and assimilated by a person, but aesthetically evaluated by him, experienced emotionally. It also implies the historically developed ability of people to aesthetically evaluate the processes and products of culture and the human activity included in it, in accordance with the human ideals of a particular epoch.

Aesthetic activity, included in the composition of material and aesthetic culture, is the method, means, form of spiritualization of the spheres of work and life through the integrated use of all aesthetic, art and technical means available to modern man. It went beyond the citadel of art and began to be recognized as a real fact in all manifestations of real life.

The expansion of the subject of aesthetics is currently becoming a practical and theoretical problem and a task that requires a new philosophical understanding and the development of scientific approaches. After all, it is now impossible not to recognize the most important spheres of human existence, in which a person realizes himself as a person: this is work, life, environment and communication. The exit of aesthetic activity beyond art into the sphere of social production, where this activity provides the richest material for setting and solving traditional aesthetic problems at a new level, such as aesthetic attitude and its structure, aesthetic value and aesthetic taste, artistic idea and meaningful form, the relationship of artistic and technical, utility and beauty, etc.

Such an understanding of the expansion of the subject of modern aesthetics allows us to establish what kind of aesthetic potential culture has in general. At the same time, we consider aesthetic phenomena not in their static state, but in a dynamic one, that is, in the process of their formation and development.

The expansion of the subject of aesthetics automatically leads to the search for a new definition of art as a form of social

consciousness and aesthetics as a science of aesthetic development of reality. In this aspect, aesthetic culture appears, first of all, as the aesthetic potential (property, value, attitude, development, etc.) of various fields of culture, primarily those that have reached the highest degree of development in the proper technological and aesthetic sense.

Usually the term "aesthetics" is defined as the science of the essence and patterns of aesthetic development of human reality. But in this case, the definition is not perfect, since the aesthetic is defined here through the aesthetic [7].

Based on the etymology (origin) of the word, aesthetics should be defined as a theory of sensory cognition and perception. And, for example, I. Kant just used this term exclusively in this sense [8]. Clarification of the meaning of this word, apparently, is not out of place, since today it is quite difficult to give an appropriate definition of aesthetics.

What about the theory of beauty?

But modern aesthetics is mainly interested in works that are indifferent to beauty and even give preference to the terrible and ugly (avant-garde, cubism, postmodernism, etc.). But aesthetics cannot be limited only to the products of human activity, leaving aside the problem of natural beauty. In addition, the very concept of "work of art" is far from unambiguous. Indeed, today we make a pure aesthetic judgment about many works whose creators never intended them, strictly speaking, as a work of art.

So in any religious art, faith is expressed first of all, and not an aesthetic intention, when an artist is a believer, his intentions are not mainly artistic: the feelings that he tries to evoke are of a religious order, and he seeks not so much to create a work of art as to evoke a feeling divine. Thus, to the extent that modern aesthetics is interested in what is called "sacred" art, it pays attention to works created by artists for whom the very idea of art did not exist.

However, if the artist can be a mediator for the sacred, his mediation is not the same as that of

the priest, with the exception of the Greeks, whose poets acted as theologians. To a certain extent, the artists of the Muslim Renaissance can also be attributed to them. So even in religious art there is something that makes it related to all art and affects our aesthetic sense, even when the religious meaning is indifferent to us. Therefore, it may be worth returning to the definition of aesthetics through sensuality or sensitivity? Moreover, in modern philosophy it is precisely this specificity of the manifestation of the aesthetic that is emphasized.

Aesthetics (from the Greek “Aesthētikos” – feeling, sensual) is a philosophical science that studies two interrelated circles of phenomena: the sphere of the aesthetic as a specific manifestation of a value attitude to the world and the sphere of art activity of people [9].

What is aesthetic, then, is the sensibility to that side of things which allows them to be regarded as works of art, even if they were not conceived as such by their creators. After all, anything, be it a sacred or utilitarian object, or even an elemental creation of nature, like a flower or a landscape, can be considered as a work of art, provided that style appears in it. It is the style, more than beauty, that indicates the nature of the work to which modern aesthetics is sensitive. To the question: “What is art?” We tend to answer, “That by which form becomes style”.

But to say that a work has style is, in essence, simply to recognize its originality and specificity. To call a work of art “style” is to give a name to the central problem of aesthetics, which is precisely to determine what is specific to a work of art.

The problem of defining a work of art is, first of all, the problem of defining art itself. In the past, usually before the development of industrial civilization, the term “art” had a much broader meaning than it does today. This vagueness in the definition of the concept reflects the real non-differentiation of human labor itself. Indeed, it is only in modern society that the division of labor becomes so deep that it makes it possible to clearly distinguish

between individual forms of human activity (for example, technology and art).

In a craft civilization, art means productive activity in general, so it is not easy to distinguish between a craftsman and an artist. Indeed, there is barely a technical division of labor in handicraft production. The craftsman most often performed the entire set of operations leading from raw materials to the finished product. The result of his work was not only what is called in the industry a “product”, that is, a purely utilitarian item bought and sold in the field of trade. The handicraft product was at the same time a work in which the individuality of the master was expressed, leaving the imprint of his personal skill and talent on the product.

Of course, the discussion about the beauty of handicraft products and the love with which they were created is not only a hackneyed topic, but even a reactionary one: after all, in the name of the bygone handicraft past, they are trying to discredit industrial production, although industry has shown itself incomparably more capable than handicraft production to satisfy human needs. It must, however, be recognized that by favoring the consumer, industry deprives the producer of the opportunity to express himself in his work. An industrial product is the result of a huge joint activity of a large number of people; here the technical division of labor assigns only an insignificant and impersonal role to each performer of a separate operation. In contrast to the inexpressive and purely utilitarian fate of an industrial product, a handicraft product, be it a Greek goblet or an Oriental carpet, is both a work of art and a utilitarian object.

But what does the statement mean: “handicraft production allows the artisan to express himself in the work”? After all, we, as a rule, do not even know the names of the authors of masterpieces of ancient and medieval art. It is usually emphasized that handicraft production elevates the craftsman to the level of an artist. But with the same justification it can be said that it reduces the artist to the level of a nameless and despised artisan. Indeed, in the conditions of a craft civilization, an artist is

obliged to serve a religion or a ruler – whether he builds or decorates a religious building, whether he delights the life of a nobleman, his art turns out to be only a means to achieve the goal to which it is subordinate.

Conclusions

Thus, the main function of a work of art is by no means an expression of the personality of its creator, for the meaning of a work follows from an intention higher than the sphere of art. As a result, the craft civilization does not distinguish the craftsman from the artist. This is explained not only by the handicraft nature of the creation of a work of art, but mainly by the fact that the very function of art here is alien to a purely aesthetic ultimate goal. It can even be said that it is utilitarian if the useful is actually “good for something” and thus “liked only as a means” [10].

In the handicraft period of the history of social production, the artist is not as different from the craftsman as to avoid the contempt with which the "servant" arts have been surrounded since the time of the Greeks.

It is significant that St. Thomas Aquinas was apparently no more sensitive to the beauty of cathedrals than Plato was to the beauty of the Acropolis. Plato was looking for patterns of beauty in beautiful bodies and beautiful deeds [11]. He saw beauty only in nature and in morality, but not in art, which he severely condemned, since he believed that a person with his imperfect creations never reflects the perfection of the idea that lies in any object or phenomenon [12].

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