

# Britain's Position On The Intrusion Into The U.S. Embassy In Iran And Its Implications 1979-1980

M.M. Kareem Mohammed Salih <sup>1</sup>, Prof. Dr. Wassan Saeed Abboud Al-Karaawi <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1,2</sup> University of Baghdad, College of Arts, Department of History.

## Abstract

This research deals with Britain's position on the storming of the American embassy in Iran and its repercussions from 1979-1980, as it talks about the official British position on this incident, especially since Britain has stood by the United States of America in this crisis as it is its important ally, and at the same time Britain tried to use Quiet diplomacy with Iran to preserve its great interests in the latter, but this did not prevent the tension of Iranian-British relations during that period.

**Keywords:** American hostage crisis, Britain's position.

## Introduction

Britain is one of the major countries that has enjoyed great influence in Iran since the nineteenth century, and it has preserved its interests in Iran throughout that era, but what happened in the change in the political system in Iran after the fall of the Shah's regime in early 1979, Britain tried by all means to preserve On its great interests in Iran, it used a calm and balanced policy in Iran during the new political regime's assumption of power in Iran after the Iranian revolution in the mentioned year.

The events of the storming of the American embassy in Iran on November 4, 1979 came to threaten British interests in Iran significantly, especially after Britain stood by the United States of America in that crisis, which threatened British interests in Iran, especially since the new strict regime at the beginning of its rule was Britain and the West are seen as colonialists and robbed the country's experts for years.

In order to shed light on Britain's position on the storming of the American embassy in Iran

and its repercussions during the years 1979-1980, this research was chosen, which includes three main axes, the first included the storming of the American embassy in Iran in 1979 and the British reaction, while the second axis talked about Britain's position on imposing economic sanctions on Iran after the storming of the US embassy, while the third axis studied the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in 1980 and the British position.

The research relied on many and varied sources, foremost of which are unpublished British documents, as well as Persian, foreign and Arabic books, as well as Arabic letters, Arab and foreign periodicals and newspapers.

## Britain's position on the storming of the American embassy in Iran and its repercussions 1979-1980

### First: The storming of the US embassy in Iran in 1979 and the British reaction

The British government found it very difficult to deal with the new rulers in Iran,

and whatever (relative) progress made by British diplomacy through its contacts with the leaders of the interim government headed by Mehdi Bazargan, the Shah's desire for asylum in the United States of America brought about an important turn in the course of politics. The situation became more complicated when the American administration on October 22, 1979 allowed the Shah to enter a New York hospital for the purpose of treatment, and the news that followed the arrest of an Iranian student by the British police for accusing him of assassinating the Shah's nephew in Paris, the matter which caused a great uproar in Iran and negative reactions among Iranian politicians, especially Khomeini, who considered it a challenge to the will of the Iranian people.

Subsequently, the American embassy in Tehran was attacked on November 4, 1979 by a group of Iranian students who stormed the embassy building, and took approximately 53 American employees as hostages, accusing them of spying and working to abort the revolution, calling on the United States of America to extradite Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. To Tehran for trial, this incident provoked great reactions among the international community. The British government represented by its Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced its government's strong denunciation of the intrusion process, and demanded the Iranian government to intervene immediately and expedite the release of the hostages as soon as possible, usually this flagrant violation of international law.

A day after the incident, the British Embassy in Tehran promptly notified the British Foreign Office of its fear that Iranian students would do a similar act against its embassy there. Then the embassy spokesman followed him up with a reprehensible statement in which the Iranian government was reluctant to assume its responsibilities to protect foreign embassies and consulates, especially since these measures fall on the government of Tehran and its obvious duties in accordance with diplomatic norms and laws, which prompted the Iranian government to

send reinforcements and additional forces from the police and the Revolutionary Guards to protect The British Embassy in Tehran.

After the resignation of Mahdi Bazargan, Khomeini issued an order in which he assigned the Islamic Revolution Council to manage the affairs of the country and prepare the requirements for holding new elections. Therefore, the Revolutionary Council proceeded, according to Khomeini's commandments, to come to elect the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the fall of the monarchy, then the new president begins assigning a new prime minister to form a government based in its work on what was approved by the new Iranian constitution.

The British Embassy in Tehran was attacked on November 5, 1979 by a group of revolutionaries, but they quickly left after that, justifying this by searching for weapons, but the British Ambassador to Iran Graham was of the opinion that the real reason for the guards storming the building was to search for some missing Americans who were not in the American embassy in Tehran when it was seized during the storming process, and one of the revolution's leaders stated that Khomeini issued orders and instructions to end the storming process.

The hostage-taking incident set a dangerous precedent in diplomatic norms, as this incident was considered the first of its kind in the Middle East, with an entire embassy being held hostage, and most countries indicated that this operation was a flagrant and direct violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.

For his part, Graham, the British ambassador in Tehran, expressed his dissatisfaction with the Iranian government's not serious measures, accusing it of not wanting to end the crisis, and Graham believed that the aim of the Iranian government's slow measures was to show the inability of foreign governments to defend their embassies in front of revolutionaries eager to punish the great powers. Which controls the wealth and economic resources of Iran and confiscates

its sovereignty and prevents it from obtaining its independence .

The British government found it difficult to deal with a revolutionary regime that did not have sufficient experience in the diplomatic field, which prompted it to take a quick action, which was to ban its citizens from traveling to Iran, and the British government indicated that this measure was not politically motivated, but rather a precaution, aimed at preserving the lives of British citizens after the events in Tehran, on the other hand, the British Embassy in Tehran explained in a telegram to the British Foreign Office on November 12, 1979, that most of the attackers who imposed their control on the American embassy were not students, and they had no ties with The Iranian Tudeh Party , but that does not mean that the matter is not welcomed by the Soviets .

For its part, the British government has tightened its procedures towards Iranian citizens and students studying in the United Kingdom, in an attempt to exert pressure on the Tehran government for the release of the American hostages, as the Heathrow Airport authorities in London tightened their procedures in checking the residence data of a large number of them. On November 13, 1979, the airport authorities prevented a large number of Iranian expatriates from entering their lands, and the matter often came to the point that the British authorities attacked the Iranians with profanity, describing them as "savages", and beat them before deciding to return them to Iran.

Despite the measures taken by the British government regarding the American hostage crisis, the British position on the ground was reluctant to take any firm stances, as London was deciding to wait in taking fateful decisions, due to the strategic and economic importance of Iran to Britain, as the Foreign Ministry called The British embassy in Tehran urged its diplomatic efforts to keep the bridges of communication with Iran open, because of Britain's long-term interests in Iran, in addition to that if Iran seceded from the West, it would be vulnerable to Soviet influence and control .

As a result, on November 13, the American and British warships began long-scheduled maneuvers in the Arabian Sea, south of Iran, and US Defense Department spokesman Thomas A. Lambert said that canceling the maneuvers or keeping them away from Iran had not been considered. Despite the crisis in Tehran and the possibility of interpreting the exercise as a show of force, and in these exercises, which bear the code name Bacon Compass, the United States of America possesses nine ships led by the aircraft carrier Midway, with up to (75) aircraft, while Britain owns (10) ships commanded by the light cruiser Norfolk and armed with missiles, and Pentagon officials said this was also a long-term, no-notice alert intended to test Army units' ability to respond quickly to an emergency.

Faced with this insistence and the variables caused by the crisis, the British government tried to follow a somewhat balanced policy with the two parties to the conflict to preserve its economic and political interests in Iran. Despite its declarations of support and solidarity with the United States of America in the hostage crisis, it was trying to reach a diplomatic solution Through it, it can maintain its relations with the United States of America to stand up to the revolution in Iran, so US President Carter praised the efforts of the British government in support of the United States of America in the issue of hostages, and this came through the letter sent by Thatcher to him on November 14, 1979, expressing at the same time He hoped that Britain would put more pressure on the Tehran government by inciting world public opinion against Tehran, and reducing the number of British diplomats there. However, Britain tried to maintain contacts with Iranian officials and deal with the issue in a pragmatic manner to preserve its economic and political gains in Iran, which are rooted in More than a century and a half .

In mid-November 1979, the US administration issued a set of unilateral sanctions against Iran . The United States of America, and also called on the Iranian Embassy in Washington and other consulates in the states (San Francisco, Houston,

Chicago and New York) to reduce the total number of its diplomats from (160) to (35) employees, with (5) employees from each consulate, and ( 15) At the embassy, moreover, on November 19, Carter had a telephone conversation with Thatcher in which he asked the latter and other members of the European Union to reduce the number of staff at their embassies in Tehran, and to inform the Iranian government of their deep concerns about the hostage crisis. Thatcher told Carter that the British government continued to continually reduce the staff of their embassy in Tehran, and with no diplomatic representation of their own, the Americans relied on the Swiss as their main channels of communication with the Iranians. The warning announced by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev on November 19, 1979, in which he warned Western powers against any intervention in Iran, would be considered a threat to Soviet national security, which is linked to a common border with Iran, which at that time reaches about 2,500. km, and at the same time warning against repeating the scenario of the Anglo-American coup against Mosaddeq in 1953 , as it raised the fears of the British government, which it also considered the beginning of the rapprochement between Iran and the Soviet Union, so Thatcher felt that any rapprochement of this kind would pose a danger to the interests of the West in The Persian Gulf region and Iran, and suspicions increased after Thatcher's phone call in June 1979 with Alex Kosyhin, the Soviet prime minister, who assured her that Moscow had a special economic base inside Iran through the implementation of Soviet industrial projects in exchange for Iranian gas, to form These projects are an important factor for the Soviet economic expansion in Iran, and that this cooperation will greatly mitigate any expected shortage in energy production, which was a limiting factor for Soviet investment before the revolution .

This time, the American administration continued to exert pressure on the Iranian government through legal and diplomatic channels. On November 19, 1979, Thatcher announced that when the United States of

America wished to go to the Security Council to obtain more powers under Chapter VII (the chapter in the United Nations Charter relating to With sanctions), Great Britain will be its first supporter , and at the same time, the International Court of Justice in Lahadi issued its ruling based on the complaint submitted by the American administration on the 16th of the same month, where the court strongly condemned in its decision the process of holding American hostages in Tehran, usually a violation International laws and norms, and contrary to global peace and security, at the same time holding the Iranian government fully responsible for preserving the lives of the 53 American hostages.

Despite the efforts made by the British government and its supportive stance for the United States of America in its crisis, this did not prevent London from continuing to communicate with the Iranian government, as John Moberly, the Assistant Undersecretary of the British Foreign Office responsible for the Middle East, met on October 19 The second 1979 Iranian Chargé d'Affairs in London (Ali Afrooz), as Moberly made it clear during the meeting that he did not intend to address the hostage crisis due to the clarity of the British position on it, and to focus only on issues of common interest, in particular the process of trade exchange between the two countries. On the other hand, Afrooz affirmed that Iran has the desire to start resuming trade exchanges between Iran and Britain. Afrooz assured the British side that the Iranian government had taken serious steps against the rioters who had caused damage to the British Embassy in Tehran. Afrooz also defended Khomeini and his adherence to Islamic ideology, but he made it clear that the latter could look In the differences and outstanding problems between the two countries according to the pragmatic context, in return for the British authorities' commitment not to grant members of the former regime (followers of the Shah) Entry visas to the United Kingdom, otherwise the chances of cooperation between the two countries will vanish .

As a result, the British Embassy in Tehran decided, starting from November 24, 1979, to

work on reducing the number of its employees, as it was reduced from (60) to (24) employees, but it is important to point out that this reduction in the number of employees was taken after The British government noticed a decline in the level of trade exchange between the two countries by (75%), but the British government tried to invest it politically as it was in line with the desires of the American administration as a means of pressure on the Iranian government, and the British government's decision to reduce the level of its diplomatic representation had been taken since The fall of the Shah, as Britain began to reduce the number of Britons present after the revolution from (1200) thousand to (300) people only, and it is natural for the reduction in the number of its employees and subjects because there is no longer what requires them to stay .

In the same context, the British Ambassador to Iran Graham praised the European support for the United States of America and the collective work of the European Union countries in light of the revolutionary and unstable conditions in Iran, and also praised the experience of cooperation between the embassies of the European Commission in Tehran, which gave a great impetus to coordinating efforts and political and diplomatic work. The collective known as "political cooperation" , and this was more evident when the group of European ambassadors residing in Tehran invited the Iranian Foreign Minister Abul-Hassan Bani-Sadr (12 November 1979-19 November 1979) at the end of November, asking him to state the position of the Iranian government From the betting crisis, his response did not go beyond the limits of diplomatic norms, as he replied that although the Iranian government cannot control every Iranian, the occupation of the American embassy has given the government an opportunity to ensure respect for other diplomatic missions in the future .

Despite the arrival of the United Nations Fact-Finding Committee to Tehran on December 1, 1979 to verify the conditions of the detainees, the Iranian government did not

have the desire to comply with the calls of international powers wishing to end the crisis by peaceful means or the means of pressure exerted by the United States of America and its allies Westerners, Washington began to increase its pressure on the London government to take more effective decisions to compel the Iranian government to release the hostages it is holding, as Washington believed that the London government should take the decision to completely close the British Embassy in Tehran , but Graham refused that, arguing, That this procedure will leave us without any means of diplomatic action, and in this case we will leave our nationals and our commercial interests unprotected, and the field will remain open for the Soviet Union to control Iran and station it for a long time. In addition, once we withdraw from Iran, we will find it very difficult to return to it again. .

On the other hand, the British government decided that its dealings with the Iranian side should be on a pragmatic basis to preserve its interests. Since mid-December 1979, the British Foreign Office began its consultations with Ambassador Graham on the need to prepare a new plan to reduce the number of (27) employees of the British Embassy in Tehran. Only an employee, as well as the ambassador, to the lowest possible level, and Graham indicated that the reduction process would be possible because it was commensurate with the volume of trade exchange between the two countries, which declined greatly during this period. In addition, Graham was of the opinion that it was unwise to expect any progress in Political relations with Iran in light of this unstable atmosphere , he also stressed that Britain's entry into an economic war with Iran, it would be naive to expect it to provide protection for our nationals and our embassy in Tehran .

Despite the differing positions among the European Union countries regarding the hostage crisis, Carter expressed his satisfaction with the measures taken by the diplomatic bodies of the Union after the visit of Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State to the European Union on December 16, 1979,

through which he sought To urge it to cooperate with the United States of America and to exercise commercial pressure on Iran as a tool for the release of the American hostages, but the British position was not decisive in severing their commercial relations with Iran, so the British government followed the method of indirect action to slow down trade in Iran, such as delaying the delivery of spare parts and other things. Goods as an indication of dissatisfaction, i.e. their response was lukewarm but not negative .

The British government tried to follow diplomatic methods to reach solutions that help end the crisis, as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher promised US President Jimmy Carter that Britain would do everything possible to persuade the Iranian authorities to release the American hostages unharmed, and Thatcher added during her visit to Washington On December 18, 1979, she made it clear to Carter and the American people that Britain shares their pain and will do everything in its power to end this crisis , for his part, Graham met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi to discuss ways out of the current crisis, and the latter announced that what happened in The US embassy in Tehran was separate from the Iranian government's policy and outside its control, adding that these actions contradict the goals and principles of the policy of the Islamic Revolution, but Kharazi's opinion was not in line with reality, but on the contrary, as it corresponded to the ideas and visions announced by Khomeini in More than one occasion, with his recent continued refusal to work in accordance with diplomatic standards agreed upon by the international community, and once again his refusal to establish any relations with the United States of America Supporting the Shah and standing against the Islamic Revolution, describing it as "the Great Satan" .

At the end of 1979, Thatcher made clear, during her visit to the United States of America on December 18, 1979, and her meeting with President Carter, to reaffirm her unwavering support for Washington in the

hostage crisis, and added, addressing Carter, "We are your friends, we support you, and there should be no mistake in this." The British government decided to refrain from increasing its purchases of Iranian oil and stopped arms shipments to Iran during this period. at the United Nations .

### **Second: Britain's position on imposing economic sanctions on Iran after the storming of the US embassy:**

The actions of the Iranian students (American hostage-takers) aroused great condemnation from the international community. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced the British government's position of solidarity with the United States of America. On December 19, 1979, Thatcher pledged to American President Jimmy Carter that if he decided to seek to impose United Nations sanctions, Britain will be the first to support him , while the Iranian liberal forces have supported their discontent with the brutal violations committed by the students, indicating that they are inconsistent with diplomatic agreements, expressing their absolute rejection of the way to deal with consulates and diplomatic missions and the necessity of providing them with the necessary protection, as This incident marked the beginning of the decline of the role of the Iranian liberal forces, especially after the resignation of Mehdi Bazargan and his government, which was met with a state of frustration and disappointment by the British government, which felt that in this atmosphere of renewed revolutionary impulsion, political action would be limited, and the work of the diplomatic mission in Tehran is fraught with risks in defending its interests, after power has been concentrated in the hands of the Revolutionary Council dominated by Khomeini. The ideology is hostile to everything foreign.

In a related context, the American administration presented London with a serious proposal to continue pressure on the Iranian government. This came during the meeting that brought Cyrus Vance with Thatcher on the sidelines of her visit to Washington, after he expressed his

appreciation and the appreciation of the American people for Britain and its efforts to free the hostages, Vance called on the British government to agree to the freezing of Iranian assets in London, which is one of the most important financial centers in the world, but Thatcher promised such a move would be too severe for Tehran, and would affect the banking system around the world, as well as the British government would have to Issuing a new law that gives it legal powers to implement this proposal, knowing that this matter will take some time, which will allow the Iranian government to withdraw all their assets before implementing the decision, which angered Washington due to the reluctance of Britain and other Western countries, and this indicates something, it indicates that There was no Western consensus to take an appropriate response to the Iranian government.

The result appears to be secret diplomatic assistance from the British government, and a polite refusal to get involved in economic sanctions against Iran. (Bank of England), clarifying the effects that will have on British financial conditions in the event of a freeze on Iranian assets, the governor's response was that even if the freeze was possible, there would be economic consequences against any move in this direction, if Britain took any action against a country Another country with whom it had no direct conflict, this would lead to great risks for the United Kingdom as the banking center of the global financial system, which would lead to it losing the confidence of other countries in the sterling area as a reserve currency, and it would have to withdraw its financial assets elsewhere, and that Such measures must take into account the danger to British subjects in Iran.

British Foreign Secretary Carrington was careful to specify London's position on the sanctions that the United States of America wanted to impose on Iran. While the Americans saw the option of sanctions as a viable option to end the crisis, the British Foreign Office viewed them as harming its economic interests and the lives of its citizens who are still working in Iran, as Sir Nicholas

Henderson (1979-1982), the British ambassador to Washington noted that the British had their doubts about further economic sanctions against Iran, and Henderson added that the British did not feel that the boycott or embargo against Iran What is not universally adhered to will work, moreover, Henderson said, the British might have to pass special legislation to enact the ban, and British courts might thwart any effort to pressure Tehran by freezing the banks, especially after the Central Bank of Iran has already succeeded in a lawsuit One court in London rescinded a temporary injunction on his money here, which he had obtained from an American bank, and the British government was of the opinion that these penalties, if they were unequivocally applied, would It may lead the Iranian government to take measures that harm British commercial interests in Iran .

The British government rushed to take urgent measures to reduce the number of its staff in Iran before the UN Security Council held its session prepared to discuss the American hostage crisis, as Carrington recommended on December 27, 1979 the departure of (9) other employees, and the retention of (7) employees except the ambassador, and work Develop the necessary plans to evacuate the remaining (7), and the embassy in Tehran also warned the British expatriates, who number 200, about the inability of the embassy to provide the minimum level of service in the event that economic sanctions are imposed in the near future against Iran, and it is important to point out that That these measures did not represent an official separation in diplomatic relations, as it was directed by the British Foreign Office that the nature of the reduction for the British was not in fact a severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but rather a temporary withdrawal of representation due to the low level of trade exchange between Britain and Iran, Because of the changes imposed by the conditions of the revolution . Although Graham clearly complied with the British Foreign Office's decision to reduce the number of staff working in the British Embassy in Tehran, he was of the opinion

that these steps should be patient and wait for the outcome of the Security Council session, because the Iranians do not want to see Western embassies leave Iran, and may be on the A greater willingness, after all these pressures, to make more serious efforts to protect it, and to reach solutions to the betting crisis. This opinion was shared by the former ambassador in Tehran Parsons when he spoke about United Nations resolutions to impose sanctions on the government of Tehran , as he indicated that the Security Council Resolution numbered ( 461), which was adopted on December 31, 1979, and as expected only condemned hostage-taking, but did not refer to the imposition of international economic sanctions on Iran after the Soviet Union's veto, as expected, and this is what Sir Nicholas Henderson pointed out Earlier, he doubted the Soviet Union's cooperation with Western powers by issuing a resolution imposing sanctions on Iran , and said that they could thwart any joint effort to prevent food or other goods from reaching Iran through a trade embargo.

The Security Council resolution was a disappointment to the American administration, and Carter criticized the position of Western European countries on the crisis, saying: "Those who were asking for protection from us, became worried about allying with us" and demanding us to negotiate with Iran, but they often refuse to exercise any Pressure on her to reach a formula of understanding to end the crisis, which prompted the British government to take a number of measures that it wanted to express its supportive position for the American administration. The Iranian diplomatic mission in London and the curtailment of its diplomatic work, if we know that the Iranian mission consists of (16) diplomatic employees and (13) non-diplomatic, and work to urge the European Union countries to take the same measure , but Graham had another opinion, as He says that any reduction in the staff of the Iranian diplomatic mission in London is likely to be seen as a case of hostility against Iran, and after submitting the proposal to Thatcher she decided to postpone any proposal for the time

being against the Iranian embassy in London

. In the same context, the Defense and Foreign Policy Committee of the British Cabinet held a meeting chaired by Margaret Thatcher, and during the meeting the idea of discussing the application of economic sanctions was raised, and what are their repercussions on British-Iranian relations. A binding international will not be effective on the ground, and will not have an actual effect that helps end the hostage crisis, and this rejection came after the American proposal submitted to the British government in the early 1980's, which provided for the application of sanctions on a voluntary basis .

It seems that the American administration had a perception, since the beginning of the crisis, that the support of the Western powers was only diplomatic, but we can exclude from it what Britain did, which was clearly supportive of the Carter administration, and although the support was not completely compatible with the administration's directions However, it was positive, and came in line with the pledges that Thatcher made to the US administration in its support until the release of the hostages.

### **Third: The failed attempt to rescue American hostages in 1980 and the British position**

The Islamic Revolutionary Council, which was entrusted with running the country during this sensitive stage, tried to expedite the elections in order to avoid any political vacuum that would drag the country into reprehensible consequences. Indeed, the elections took place on February 25, 1980, which were characterized by intense competition between the candidates. Most segments of Iranian society voted to elect the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and out of (20,857,391) who are entitled to vote, (14,152,902) cast their votes in the presidential elections. After obtaining (10,709,330) votes with a percentage of (75.70%) of the votes, then the elections were approved by Khomeini, so that Abul-Hassan Bani Sadr would be President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who was entrusted with the

presidency of the Islamic Revolution Council and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) ).

The election of Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr represented the beginning of a change in the structure of the political system in Iran, especially after it was relatively accepted by the British government and the American administration, but Graham asked the British government to wait by sending a congratulatory message to the new Iranian president for not arousing British public opinion. And the American, especially since the crisis of the American hostages and the British detainees in Iran has not yet been resolved, but the British Prime Minister found it necessary to exchange congratulations with the new president, so Thatcher sent a very short message stating, "Your Excellency: Please accept my sincere congratulations on your election or as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

The British government believed that Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr was a figure representing the moderate Islamic trend in Iran, although he was close to Khomeini and a member of the Revolutionary Council, but he was more extremist than Mehdi Bazargan, and this was represented by presenting his political ideas that he aspires to implement His propositions were represented through his books such as "A Society without Classes" and "Islamic Economy," which he wrote before the revolution. Trends of the revolution .

In the midst of these circumstances, the Iranian parliamentary elections began on (March 13 - May 10, 1980), and after the completion of the voting process, the results showed that the Islamic Republican Party won the majority of parliament seats, through which they obtained the right to restrict the powers of the President of the Republic in accordance with Article (78) of the section II of the new constitution of 1979 .

The American administration expressed its dismay at the policy of the European Union, including Britain, regarding the hostage crisis, and the futility of diplomatic solutions and the restraint that the British government and the rest of the European Union were calling for. Thatcher and former Labor leader

James Callahan expressed concern during the House of Commons session on 15 April 1980 that Carter might take military action against Iran, and Thatcher said, "Any contemplation of that would be a very big step indeed." However, this did not prevent the British government from taking precautionary measures to protect its embassy and its employees in Tehran in the event of any military action by the United States of America, or any measures or sanctions that may be taken by the European Union, and that this may lead to the closure of the embassy in Tehran Therefore, the British ambassador in Sweden had to approach the Swedish government to obtain its approval to open the British interests section at the Swedish embassy in Tehran (to look after British political and economic interests). friendly there) and after the British made sure that Sweden had not withdrawn its mission in Tehran, regardless of the decisions of the European Union and others .

On April 24, US President Carter approved a secret rescue mission, where (6) EC130 planes and (8) U-S-S Nimitz helicopters took off towards the eastern front of Iranian territory, and during its entry into the Iranian depth, severe dust storms obstructed two planes The helicopters, and the engine of a third plane stopped, which led to the failure of the attempt, and consequently it was forced to land, and it became very difficult for it to continue to accomplish the task entrusted to it , and the Americans participating in the operation were flown from Iran .

After the failure of the military operation, a tremendous sense of helplessness was generated within the Carter administration, and the US Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan noted in his memoirs, saying: "There was nothing left for us to do. Diplomatic pressures, economic sanctions, negotiations, and finally military action, and it seems that our options have been exhausted, and the feeling of helplessness that was heavy on us, but we felt relieved after we tried everything. At the same time, some Iranian politicians questioned whether the London government had prior knowledge of this operation,

pointing out that the reduction in the number of embassy staff was a clear evidence of the British government's complicity, but the latter rejected these accusations, but it was a sign of more concern for the future of the British presence in Iran.

The recent events that took place in Iran and the subsequent accusations of the British government's involvement with the United States in the failed "Eagle Claw" operation led to the emergence of a major rift in British-Iranian relations, and that was when an armed group on April 30, 1980 consisting of six armed from the Members of the Arab Revolutionary Front in Arabistan stormed the Iranian embassy building in London, and detained (26) people, including the chief of police guarding the embassy, (2) correspondents of the British B.B.C. channel, and a number of diplomats. And the embassy's employees, and the attacking force imposed a complete siege on the embassy, while Thatcher began to follow the situation moment by moment and work to report events first-hand on the official British television screen in a strong desire to reveal to the world Britain's position against all forms of terrorism .

On the following day, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Sadeq Qutbzadeh, announced its absolute rejection of the demands of the attacking force, at the same time blaming the British government for everything that happens to Iranian diplomats in London. However, the British government, in turn, reassured the Iranian side when Thatcher announced That the lives of the hostages will be among the priorities of their governments, expressing at the same time that they stand firmly against any conspiratorial force trying to aggravate the situation in the world and threaten international peace and security .

In the same context, the Iranians doubted that the British government created this crisis in an attempt to compel and pressure the Iranian government to release the American hostages. Economic sanctions on Iran, although these suspicions did not have any material evidence to prove Britain's involvement in this, which generated a state of public mobilization against British policy

towards Iran. Thousands of Iranians went out in demonstrations denouncing British support for the American administration, so the crowds headed towards the British and American embassies, chanting "Death to Britain" and "Death to Thatcher." However, the Iranian government quickly imposed a security cordon around the perimeter of the British Embassy in Tehran, warning the demonstrators against any An attempt to control or seize the embassy, because this will further exacerbate the situation .

Margaret Thatcher also sent a letter to Iranian President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, delivered by Secretary of State Carrington, in which he said: "I would like you to know my deep personal concern about the situation at the Iranian Embassy in London, and that what happened constitutes an act of terrorism and a violation of the immunity of diplomatic personnel, expressing hope that Reaching quick solutions to end the crisis, and I assure you that we will remain in constant contact with your government."

The hopes of the United States of America to achieve any progress in releasing detainees through diplomatic action were dashed, and the measures taken by the Security Council that clashed with the Soviet Union's use of its veto in the United Nations did not work, and no significant progress was made, but it was able to To obtain broad international support for its cause, and before the expiration of the deadline set by the Security Council for Iran to release the hostages, which ends on May 18, 1980 the countries of the European Community began to study Carrington's proposal consisting of two stages to help secure the release of the hostages, as Carrington sought to urge The other European Community governments are prepared to impose full trade sanctions if the hostages are not released within the time set by the Security Council, and they (the nine countries) pledge to strictly adhere to the current arms embargo on Iran, and will move to reduce the size of their diplomatic missions in Tehran And the number of Iranian diplomats accredited to the capitals of the European Economic Community, and although these measures do not amount to the

support that President Carter was calling for, some British officials believe Neon said that the European Economic Community's decision, which the US government can live with, and will take other measures to show European condemnation of the continued hostage-taking .

It seems from the above that Britain has stood firmly with its ally the United States in the hostage crisis and at the same time was cautious in its dealings with the Iranian regime to achieve its interests in Iran.

### Conclusion

After addressing Britain's position on the storming of the American embassy in Iran and its repercussions from 1979-1980, the following conclusions were reached:

The storming of the US Embassy in Iran on November 4, 1979 was an important political event in addition to a number of crises that have taken place in Iran since the fall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's rule in January of the same year and the taking over of power by the new political regime that announced the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran after that.

Britain had great strategic interests in Iran and was not satisfied with the case of the storming of the American embassy, especially since it is an ally of the United States of America. In addition, Britain was aware that the storming of its embassy would take place after that, and this is what actually happened a few days after the storming of the American embassy.

At a time when Britain was seeking to preserve its interests in Iran, it used a balanced and strong diplomatic policy in dealing with this crisis, so as not to lose everything in Iran. Britain supported the United States of America in imposing economic sanctions on Iran following the storming of the American embassy. Which led to Britain losing some of its interests in Iran.

After the United States attempted to free the American hostages in Iran by Operation Eagle Claw, and that operation failed, Britain supported that operation and thus that support

led to tension in the Iranian-British diplomatic relations, which negatively affected the status of the Iranian embassy in London when it was attacked by some Iranians opponents in Britain.

### References

1. The National Archives of The United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth office Documents:
2. T.N.A, Fco, 8/3378, Attack on the British Embassy 5 November Department 1979, The Head of Chancery of Tehran to Head of Middle East Department, 26 November 1979.
3. T.N.A, Fco, 8/3378, Attack on the British Embassy, 5 November from British Embassy Tehran To Fco, Assurance of Their Highest Consideration 6 November 1979.
4. Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, The From Hastage Crisis, A Chronology of Daily Development Library of Congress, 1981.
5. Mohammad Reza Saidabad, Iranian – British Relations Since 1979, A Thesis Submitted Fir The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Unpublished), The Australian National University, 1998.
6. Mohsen Mojtobati, The Links of Iran and Bertania Az 1979 to 2014, Certainly the Right to Be Authorized by Hoyt, Kar Shanasi Arshad, Political Science, Danshekdah Social Science, Daneshkah Between Mellal Imam Khomeini, Khordad 1395 A.M.
7. Elaf Abdul-Hassan Abdullah Al-Sabbagh, Abul-Hassan Bani-Sadr and his role in Iranian politics 1933-1981, unpublished master's thesis, College of Education, University of Karbala, 2016.
8. Batoul Kazem Ghazal, Tudeh Party and its Political Role in Iran 1963-1979, unpublished MA thesis, College of Basic Education, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2016.
9. Latifa Muhammad, American Hegemony over the Security Council in Imposing Economic Sanctions “Iran Case Study”, an unpublished master’s thesis, Faculty

- of Economics (Department of Economics and International Economic Relations), Aleppo University (Syria), 2013.
10. Maan Ibrahim Jabbar Shallal, The Special Immunities of the Diplomatic Mission Headquarters in the Light of the Vienna Convention, unpublished Master's thesis, Faculty of Law, Middle East University, Jordan, 2012.
  11. Ahmed Falih Hussain Al-Jubouri, Internal Political Developments in Iran (1981-1989), Al-Kitab Press for Publishing, Baghdad, 1st Edition, 2019.
  12. Ahmad Falih Hussain al-Jubouri, The Government of Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr in Iran (February 25, 1980-June 22, 1981), a study in internal politics, Dar al-Sadiq Publishing, Babel, 1st edition, 2018.
  13. Asaad Haider, Days with Imam Khomeini and the Beginnings of the Revolution, Dar Al-Farabi Publishing, Beirut, 1st Edition, 2020.
  14. Turki Al-Hamad, and history will remain open, the twenty most prominent political figures in the twentieth century, Dar Al-Saqi Publishing, Beirut, 1st Edition, 2002.
  15. Raed Rahim Muhammad Al-Shaibani, The Effects of the Diplomatic Envoy's Exceeding His Duties Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Al-Halabi Human Rights Publications, Beirut, 1st Edition, 2014.
  16. Cyrus Vance, Difficult Choices, The Arab Information Center (SAE), Beirut, 2nd Edition, 1980.
  17. Shebehr Zabih, The Story of the Iranian Revolution - a neutral narration of the diaries of the Iranian revolution, translated by: Abdel Wahhab Alloub, The Supreme Council of Culture, Cairo, 1st Edition, 2004.
  18. Shaker Kasrani, Iran: Political Parties and Personalities (1890-2013), Riad Al-Raees for Books and Publishing, Beirut, 2014.
  19. Abdel-Fattah Ali Al-Rashdan and Muhammad Khalil Al-Mousa, The Origins of Diplomatic and Consular Relations, The Scientific Center for Political Studies, (Amman - Jordan), 1st edition, 2005.
  20. Abdel Aziz Muhammad Sarhan, The Law of Diplomatic and Consular Relations, "An Analytical Study in International Jurisprudence and the Provisions of the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions, Cairo, 1986.
  21. Akab Yousef Al-Rikabi and Haider Ali Khalaf Al-Akaili, Reagan and Iran, US Policy towards the Iranian Revolution 1981-1989, Volume 1, Part 2, Adnan Publishing House and Library, Baghdad, 1st Edition, 2020.
  22. Muhammad Abdullah Al-Azzawi. Bazarkan and the difficult labor: a study in the struggle for power in Iran, the New National House, Damascus, 2010.
  23. Musa Muhammad Al Tuwarish, Democratic Development in Britain 1066-1901: Lessons in Patriotism and the Peaceful Building of Democracy, Adnan House for Printing and Publishing, Baghdad, 1st Edition, 2013.
  24. Nizar Al-Tamimi, A Struggle in Tehran, The Road to Wilayat al-Faqih and the American Hostage Crisis, Dar Qandil for Publishing and Distribution, Baghdad, 1st Edition, 2018.
  25. Homa Katouzian, The Persians of Iran in Ancient, Medieval, and Modern Times, translated by Ahmed Hassan Al-Muaini, Jadawel Publishing Center, Beirut, 1st ed., 2014.
  26. Luman Ali, British Diplomacy and The Iranian Revolution 1978-1981, London. 2018.
  27. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Flais Merkouris, Treaty Interpretation and The Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties: 30 Years on, London, Boston, 2010.
  28. Ralf E. Dowling, He Iran Hastage Crisis, Print Journalism's Role in The Reagan Revolution, Compleitive Paper in Rhetoric and Public Address Western Speech Communication Association Convention, Kalifornnia, 16-20 February 1990.
  29. Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Threat To The Persian Gulf Prepared of The

- Security Conference on Asia and The Pacific (SECAP), Kalifornia, 1981.
30. Margaret Thatcher, *The Path To Power*, Publishers Harper Coilirs, London, 1995.
  31. British Diplomatic Oral History Project, Jane Barder Interviewing Sir Anthony Parsons at home in Devon. On 22nd March 1996.
  32. John H. Lorentz, *Historical Dictionary of Iran*, Second Edition, (U.K), 2007.
  33. The National Archives, *The Cabinet Papers 1915-1981*, Catalogue, CAB 24/256.
  34. Hassein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran (1962-1982)*, London, 1984.
  35. Tore T. Peteren, *Anglo- American Policy Toward The Persian Gulf 1978-1985*, UK, 2015.
  36. Ahmad Reza Bardiar, *Islamic Republican Chabbagah of Iran in Davit foreign policy*, Engelstan (an Islamic coup d'état 1400 m), Published by Dansgan Khwarizmi, Tehran, 1399 m.
  37. Chemisebil, Chalesh Grogan, Gerry Sall, 1358 A.M., translated by Seyyed Amin Abbas Qoli, Amir Ker Publications, 1381 A.M.
  38. Hussein Asif, *The Prohibition of Iran Shekt Ye Siyasat*, Dar Faqnus Publications, Tehran, 1384 A.D.
  39. Saeed Jabri, Nashb and Nizar (Rouzhai the first Islamic coup), Omid Publishing, Tehran, 1375 A.M.
  40. Ferna Rakhwa Tavakoli, *Gahshmar*, Chap Som, Tehran, 1832 A.M.
  41. Kourosh and Karimi Ayadi, *Hoshtak*, Engelstan, Tehran, publications that visited outside Iran, Tehran, 1832 A.M.
  42. Masoumeh Ebtekar, *harness*, corrected by Fariba Ibtihaj Shirazi, Etilat Publishing, Tehran, 1395 A.M.
  43. Tawfiq Najm, *Russian-Iranian Relations and their Impact on Strengthening the Effectiveness of Iran's Regional Policy towards the Arab Gulf Region since 1979*, Anbar University Journal for Legal and Political Sciences, Vol. (6), No. (11), University of Anbar, 2016.
  44. Alaa Razak Fadel Al-Najjar, *The British Position on the Iranian Revolution 1979*, Orak Journal for Human Sciences, Volume (11), No. (1), University of Al-Muthanna, 2018.
  45. Muhammad Aziz Muhammad, *The American hostage crisis in Tehran and its impact on British policy towards Iran November 4, 1979 - January 20, 1981 (a historical and documentary study)*, Journal of Egyptian Historical and Civilization Studies, Issue (9), Cairo, 2020.
  46. Fakhreddin Soltani, *Foreign Policy of After Islami Revolution*, Faculty of Human Ecology, Journal of Politics Lawm Vol.3, No.2, University Putra Mulaysia, September 2010.
  47. Ali Asher Shem, *Iran and Golsh (Inglis links)*, Fasnameh Contemporary History of Iran, Sal (8), Shamara (4), Tehran, 1375 A.M.
  48. James R. Millar and Others, *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, (U.S.A.), 2004.
  49. Paula K . Byers and Others, *Encyclopedia of World Biography*, Vol.3 Second Edition, United States of America, 1998.