

Diagnosis The Severity of The Syrian Conflict According to Michael S. Lund

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Abstract

The Syrian crisis is closely related to regional and international causes, although the factors that led to the activation of the current crisis are rooted in institutional slack that has marginalized large sectors of society, depriving them of effectively participating in political, economic and social life. There are also structural imbalances in the economic sector, and we also find an institutional imbalance represented in the weakness of political participation. We cannot ignore the security reasons that played a major role in igniting the Syrian situation and its crisis.

The Syrian crisis did not leave any opportunity for any segment of the Syrian society to find a few reasons for comfort and stability, as waves of displaced people are now crossing the borders of neighboring countries, and living in tragic conditions, and the killing machine is chasing them everywhere after their homes were destroyed, and in addition to that, ethnic cleansing has begun. It is taking place in several governorates in Syria, and with the increase in violence, civilians have fled from one place to another in search of safety for themselves, their children and the elderly, and their lives have become limited to waiting for humanitarian aid, including food and milk for their children. These events were not the result of chance, but came as a result of the accumulation of practices of several decades.

The 1st Topic

Syria from Stable to Unstable Peace

Syria's Unstable Peace (1920-1970)

The modern history of Syria arises from the secession of the eastern section known as Bilad al-Sham during the Ottoman period (Syria in the Arab world), after the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 into small states. These small entities were given according to the League of Nations "Mandate" system to Britain and France. With the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 named after the British and French diplomats, according to which the eastern region was divided into areas of British and French interests during the following French rule in Syria (1920-1946) and Lebanon (1920-1943), the French authorities stressed the

policies of (divide, tighten and rule) through Religious and ethnic line.

It separated Lebanon from the province of Syria, and created (Greater Lebanon) by adding the lands east of Mount Lebanon to the new entity. This decision created a demographic balance between Maronite Christianity and Sunni and Shiite Islam, creating a boycott state in which the loyalty of "most of the Lebanese people is not to the homeland but to their religious sects."

In 1938, the Turkish military forces entered the Iskenderun Brigade, "the northern coastal region of Syria on the Mediterranean" and expelled sectors of the local Arab and Armenian population, and then annexed the province to Turkey to be the 63rd province in the name of the Turkish province of Hatay, and the French authority agreed to include the Syrian province in order to improve Its

relationship with Kemalist Turkey, but Syria after independence constantly protested against that decision.

While the English and French desired small political entities to exercise effective control, the emerging nationalist movement emphasized the unity of the Arab people, and defined Arab nationalism on the basis of the common use of the Arabic language rather than the unity of the provinces of the Arabian Peninsula. Because of this shift towards cultural nationalism, Egypt and other countries The Maghreb was attracted to the ambition of the emerging nationalist movement, and when Syria gained independence in 1946, the state was very weak, unlike Lebanon. The National Pact that took place in 1943 between the Sunni Lebanese politician Riad El Solh and the Christian Maronite politician Bechara El Khoury allowed the building of a political system based on a shared political system. power between the various sects.

The various Syrian sects did not reach a similar formal agreement, and as a result of this situation, the politics after independence remained in the hands of traditional notables and landowners, in addition to the regional divisions in Syria such as the conflict between Damascus and Aleppo based on the struggle of political leaders, moreover, the exception of Popular sectors of active participation in politics made the post-colonial Syrian state a weak being. Between 1963 and 1964, Syria found itself repeatedly receiving political, regional and global pressure, and suffered covert interventions in its domestic affairs from the United States and its Arab neighbors.

Syria and Stable Peace (1970-2011):

First: Hafez al-Assad's Presidency (1970 - 2000)

On November 16, 1970, Hafez al-Assad led a military coup he called the "Corrective Movement" that removed the most radical wing of the Baath Party led by "Jdid" from power. Al-Assad was able to build a stable political system that allowed the Syrian state to become an influential regional player for the first time. In order to understand this transformation of the state and society, the economic and political factors must be interconnected. On the economic level, Syria began to rise as a rentier state in the early seventies due to the expansion of oil rents Strategic and political

rents, in turn, stemmed from high oil prices and improved relations with the wealthier Gulf Arab states, which allowed for the rapid expansion of the Syrian government sector.

Government sector workers enjoyed the privileges of benefiting from social insurances such as permanent guaranteed work, free health insurance, pensions to ensure old age, public transportation, social services, and some housing facilities. In addition, the state controlled the prices of basic commodities such as fuel, bread and some basic commodities. In the country, oil rents were used to provide price guarantees for agricultural products, allowing agricultural workers to contribute to a higher standard of living.

A remarkable shift occurred in Hafez al-Assad's reorganization of the political system in Syria towards a "palace style" of political power that replaced the early style of collective leadership. The new regime was characterized by the control of the president, who assumed the position of controlling all other institutions. Perhaps Assad was influenced here by the experience of Abdel Nasser. In Egypt he was successful in consolidating his power by assigning jobs to his senior officers while reserving for himself the exclusive right to political coordination.

Under the new presidential system, Syria became limited to the following main institutions: the president who bears the responsibility of the presidency, which deliberately blurred the borders, the army, and security services that operate independently of each other and without any internal institutional coordination among them, and the official state institutions that consist of a president The government and the ministers are assisted by Parliament, and other institutions embodying the system such as the Baath Party and other legitimate political parties affiliated with the National Front established in 1972, in addition to the Peasants' Union, the Workers' Union and similar groups.

Thus, the most prominent feature of the Syrian political system was the concentration of power in the institution of the presidency. The president is the supreme commander of the armed forces, controls the security services, and is the Secretary-General of the Baath Party. While the president's

political control was organized in the Syrian constitution of 1973, it is useful to note that The role has been characterized by formal and informal powers. The president can rule by orders and decrees and has the right to submit laws to Parliament. The government and the fourteen governors are appointed by the president and they are directly responsible to him. The government consists of the prime minister and a variable number of ministers. The chances of the president directly intervene in the industry Politics on a daily basis is not based on well-articulated presidential laws, instead laws are taken on the basis of consultations with aides and with urgently formed work teams, it follows that the president is free to shape the position according to his interests and exercises direct leadership when appropriate, while delegating authority In accordance with his will to other people who owed their position directly to him, Hafez al-Assad effectively focused his attention on foreign policy and defense while delegating the management of Syrian economic and other domestic issues. To close aides, he explained his options by specifying that he is "the head of state, not the head of the government."

Thus, Syria enjoyed a stage in which the rich Arab Gulf states wished to provide assistance to the Syrian state, the stage after the 1973 war with Israel, for example, but it also suffered from uncertainty, as the political and strategic quarter could disappear without sufficient time for preparation and caution, in addition to that. The Syrian leadership received important economic and military aid from the Soviet Union before, and more importantly after the 1973 war, in order to support the Syrian military doctrine with Israel in the military field.

Second: The End of Stable Peace to the Beginning of the Crisis:

The arrival of Bashar al-Assad to the presidency after the death of his father in office on June 10, 2000 confirms the fact that the dominant political elite did not want any open struggle for power between representatives of the old leadership generation. For any of his close aides in favor of allowing his son to reach the highest political position, the new president embodied a generational change, and an opening of the country to the impact of the new culture from the expansion of English

language teaching in the educational curriculum to the introduction of the Internet, and Western analysts after inheriting the Syrian presidential position meant that Bashar implements the demands of those in power Only in the existing system or not, however, it became clear that there was a real generational transfer of power as two-thirds of the sixty most important positions in the system had changed by 2003.

Once Bashar settled firmly in his position, his leadership style and his positioning strategy remained based on gradual and mixed change. With regard to domestic politics, he refused to undertake any major political reform attempts despite the increasing degree of media liberalization and the increase in civil society organizations calling for tacit openness. The Syrian society, as for the economic field, continued the gradual liberalization of the economy that had begun during the era of his father, despite the fact that the degree of economic liberalization increased remarkably after 2005, confirming the shift in the upper echelon of the Syrian political class towards an alliance with the new bourgeoisie. In foreign policy, Syria continued to belong to the axis of resistance with Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar supported Arab nationalist demands such as support for Palestinian rights and demanded Israel return the Syrian Golan Heights, and he also explored opportunities to improve relations with the United States and the European Union, although this effort struggled. The fact that U.S. policymakers have continued to focus their efforts to enforce pro-Israel as an icon of American culture in the Rejecting any real Arab and Syrian grievances.

In order to analyze Bashar's presidency, the first part of this section explains the stage with the historical sequence, and the last section of this section summarizes the outcome of his policies in the economic field, and what is related to the reform of the Syrian political system. With regard to the approach to the historical sequence, the presidency can be divided into the following stages:

1. The transitional period from the moment he assumed the presidency until the United States led the process of occupying Iraq (2000-2003).

2. The first phase of continuous external pressure when the United States threatened to change the regime from abroad (2003-2005).
3. The second phase of continuous pressure in which Syria was forced to withdraw its military forces from Lebanon in 2005.
4. The short stage of the direct challenge of the axis of resistance during the border war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006.
5. The increasing transition of the Syrian regime towards economic liberalization during the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2005-2010).
6. The stage between the beginning of the so-called (Arab Spring) and the emergence of the general protest movement in Syria (2010 - March 2011).
7. The rapid deterioration in the internal Syrian political situation starting in March 2011 with the beginning of the Syrian uprising and the results of the regime's continuous attempts to respond through attempts at political reform and repression.

In order to summarize the economic situation, one needs to emphasize that the state's decision to protect its core audience from the effects of inflation was not sufficient to protect civil peace. The liberal government reformers led by Abdullah al-Dardari have been trying to spread the message that maintaining the public value of this financial aid is too costly, and arguing that the desired recovery and social safety net should replace the existing system. The real development on the ground is the promotion of cuts without prepayments. Appropriate, and when one interprets these developments, he must be fully aware that this policy is still within the framework of the Quarterly State in particular, that the liberal reformists were politically under control, and quietly left the stage.

The 2nd Topic

Syria from Crisis to War

The Syrian crisis is distinguished from others by its various regional and international dimensions. At the regional level, there are actors whose organic interests are linked to the Syrian crisis, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, and some Iraqi factions, and others who have interests in worsening it further and prolonging the conflict at the head of those

states, Israel, which wishes the failure of the Syrian state, its elimination, and its expulsion. From the equation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and others who got involved in the crisis for sectarian Sunni-Shiite reasons, it turned into a proxy war on Syrian territory, the most prominent of which are Iran and Turkey.

There are also countries that have intervened to ensure their proximity to the issues of the region and to prove that the world order has changed and there are new actors on the international scene besides the United States of America, these countries represented by Russia and China. The following is a review of the most important reasons that led to the development of the Syrian crisis, at the level Inside Syria, at the regional and international levels.

Internal Causes:

The Syrian crisis began with some protests calling for political and economic reforms even before it turned into a popular uprising after that. The first drop of blood events got out of control. Blood is the food of revolutions. The Syrian crisis turned into a war of a bloody, multilateral armed conflict. One side was unable to resolve the situation in its favor. There are many internal reasons that led to the development of the crisis, most notably:

First: Political Reasons for the Development of the Crisis:

Like the coming of the Baath Party in 1963 to power, he reduced the political life of the party only. There was no political opinion of the citizen or the right to object to the political situation of the country. There is no participation from the various sects of the people in the leadership of the country, and there are no real elections or the transfer of power. The Baath Party political life is in its orbit, and then the Assad family became the controller of political life.

The central and subsidiary state institutions were dispatched, including ministers and general managers, and the doors to employment and employment were opened in the civil administration, productivity and service, according to relations of kinship, lineage, friendship, nepotism and loyalty, and under the supervision of the security services.

The state of emergency that was imposed since 1963 after the Baath Party took power, and the exclusivity it produced, led to the exclusion of the various active political forces on the Syrian scene; Which led to the death of party and political life in Syria.

With the suspension of the emergency law by the Assad regime, it held a conference that included the opponents in Damascus and was broadcast live, and the People's Assembly agreed to allow more opposition parties, and in the same context Bashar al-Assad modified the conditions of more than 300,000 Kurds who remained stateless for more than 50 years ago, however, these steps were met with rejection by the opposition groups, as these political changes came at the wrong time and were long overdue, and the opposition adhered to the fall of Assad, and announced this in a large demonstration in Hama after the security forces withdrew from it, and large sects and even women participated in the demonstration .

On the other hand, the opposition failed to formulate any strategy to confront the great challenges facing the Syrian people, or solutions to spare the Syrians' blood, and for several years it was linked to a basic demand, which is Assad's stepping down from power as the only entry point for any negotiations. Any leadership or leadership that enjoys the unanimity of the Syrian people and has dominated the opposition coalition, fragmentation and fragmentation, and an atmosphere fraught with competition and rivalry.

The International Working Group* on Syria reached on June 30, 2012 in the Swiss city of Geneva, "a phased campaign for the transfer of power in Syria and called for the formation of a government of national unity, and obligated the opposition to nominate actual representatives to it to work on implementing the transitional plan and start a comprehensive national dialogue, and throw the Geneva Accord To find a radical solution to the crisis afflicting the country, there was no mention of whether the Syrian president will play a role in resolving the crisis or not.

In the absence of any tangible results of the Geneva negotiations, it became clear that both the regime and the opposition are clinging to their conditions and there is no vision or solutions to stop the

bloodshed, and everyone waited for regional and international agendas imposed from outside or through consensus among the pivotal countries in the region. During the negotiations, he insisted the opposition delegation insisted on Bashar al-Assad's exit from the political scene in its entirety as the only option before the start of the transitional phase, while the other party stressed the start of the transitional phase and the formation of a national unity government that includes the regime, and opposition figures to hold legislative and presidential elections in which Assad has the right to run; Hence the fruitless negotiations continued. No common ground leading to the formation of Syria's future, or a strategic vision that would achieve security and peace for the Syrian people, crystallized from it.

Second: Economic Reasons for the Development of the Crisis:

It is clear that the crisis that afflicted Syria, although its most prominent title is the people's demand for their freedom and dignity, but there are deep roots in the economic reality in Syria.

Life is divided into two parts in Syria, one part owns everything and is represented by Assad and his family and those around them, and the other part suffers from poverty. Bashar al-Assad has adopted neo-liberal economic policies that have allocated state-owned institutions for the benefit of a small elite at a time when the vast majority of the Syrian people suffer under the shadow of A dictatorial regime, whoever objects is imprisoned.

The increase in fuel prices in 2008 led to great anger in the farmer's sector. Then came the dry seasons between 2007 and 2009 to show the extent of neglect of agriculture and the inability of the system to confront this problem.

The economic situation in Syria deteriorated before the outbreak of the crisis, and this was accompanied by the control of the rich classes, through their partnerships with the regime's family, over the economic and commercial sectors in the country. And their partners are owners of funds that control the economic sector.

The length of the crisis, and its continuous expansion, affected the economic situation. Many sectors of workers, employees and merchants

became concerned with achieving change after they tended to be neutral or support the authority. The length of time also led to the entry of new sectors into the conflict after they felt that there was no hope for the continuation of the authority. This was reflected in the decline in the popularity of the authority on the one hand, and the increase in discontented groups on the other hand.

With the development of the crisis, the financial burdens of the regime increased, and these burdens became greater than the size of the Syrian budget due to the purchase of weapons on the one hand and the provision of living requirements on the other.

Regional Causes of the Development of the Crisis:

The developments of the crisis imposed important differences in regional and international positions on the way to deal with the axes of the crisis. Over time, this difference turned into a complete contradiction that was reflected in the course of the crisis until it reached an open conflict at home in which some parties played an important role, and others overlapped by proxy. These regional powers were experiencing a reality experienced by all Syrian groups and their regional surroundings, including internal fighting, a civil war that spread to all parts of Syria, and a sectarian war that divided the region between Sunnis and Shiites, and for this we shed light on the influence of regional powers in the course of the development of the Syrian crisis by clarifying the positions and roles of the regional actors towards armed conflict.

First: The Role of Iran and Hezbollah in the Development of the Crisis:

The parties to the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis are promoting in the media that they are a symbol of steadfastness and resistance against imperialism. This concept developed with the beginning of the Syrian crisis in the context of the alliances that emerged from the crisis between the countries of the region and the major powers, which developed in the context of the competition of regional powers to extend influence. And regional control, and led to the division of the region into two camps: the camp of resistance and the inclusion of Iran, Syria, the Lebanese Hezbollah, some Iraqi factions, the

Palestinian resistance factions, and the moderation camp, which includes Turkey and some Arab countries.

The axis of resistance in this context stems from considering what is happening in Syria a foreign conspiracy in cooperation with elements inside Syria. Not only to overthrow the regime, but to change the political and security equations and balances in the region in favor of the United States and its allies, and Hezbollah considers that the most important goals of this conspiracy is to dismantle and abort the resistance forces in the region.

With the beginning of the crisis, Hezbollah dealt with it with media support, and after the successive defeats of the regime forces, the party announced in 2013 its participation in military operations, so the party fought alongside the Syrian regime forces, and the regime forces began to advance over the opposition forces due to the superiority of its allies, especially Hezbollah and Iran, in Late 2013 to mid-2014, then the regime and Hezbollah retreated again due to the depletion of the Syrian army and the increase in defection rates and desertion from its ranks. The plans of the opposition, as well as Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen had an impact on this retreat; As Iran's support was dispersed, instead of focusing on one front, which is Syria and the financing of Hezbollah, the right-wing front was launched and the financing of the Houthis also formed a burden on the Iranian economy, which has been suffering for years due to international sanctions.

But Iran, with its support for the Assad regime, whether by diverting and arming Hezbollah or sending groups of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Syrian territory to carry out combat or training missions, is sending a message that any initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis must pass through Tehran, and that any disregard for it will lead to The failure of these initiatives, and any Western or regional military action against the regime in Damascus will face a violent reaction from Iran, because Syria is the bridge to Iran's regional expansion.

Although the partnership between Damascus and Tehran is a strategic partnership rather than a mutual cooperation between two countries, there is a great ideological contradiction, Iran is an Islamic republic ruled theocracy, and the Syrian regime is a

Baathist secular regime, the common hostility to Saddam Hussein in the eighties, and fear of the United States. The United States and Israel are all reasons that helped to strengthen the relationship between them, and there is no doubt that Iran is deeply concerned about the geopolitical effects in the event of a regime change in Syria, as the overwhelming majority of the Syrian population are Sunni Arabs, so fear of the fall of Assad and the arrival of a sectarian Sunni regime hostile to Shiite Iran. And biased towards hostile regional powers, especially Arab countries, all of these factors prompted Iran to strongly support Assad.

Iran has supported the Syrian regime financially, pumping tens of billions of dollars to support and protect the regime from falling. It also ensured the continuation of pumping oil to Syria in large quantities, and supported it politically; As Iran has harnessed all its diplomatic relations and media capabilities to defend the Syrian regime, because it believes that what is happening is a conspiracy targeting the regime, which is subjected to dialects from terrorist and takfiri groups. Providing the Syrian regime with all kinds of weapons, in addition to the presence of members of the Revolutionary Guards in Damascus. According to reports, Iran is leading the battles and directing the Syrian regular army.

One of the most important repercussions of Iran and Hezbollah's interference in the Syrian crisis is the faltering of the entire negotiation process and political settlement. The continuation of violence and counter-violence was the most important reason for the failure of settlement efforts, as well as the spread of extremism on the borders. Due to the exodus of migrants, the increasing influence of jihadist groups on the borders, and due to the regime's inability to control its borders, sectarian violence and jihadist ideology moved to the neighboring countries of Syria, and the Syrian crisis turned into a complex regional crisis.

Second: Israel's Role in the Development of the Crisis:

Since the start of the demonstration's movement in Syria, which quickly turned into a popular revolution, Israel has shown great interest in the developments of its events and the possibility of its success. Damascus occupies a central place in Tel

Aviv's calculations; Israel has fought several wars against it in the midst of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it occupies a part of its lands that Syria has been demanding to restore. Moreover, Syria is a pivotal country in the Arab Mashreq, and it has close relations with Iran, Hezbollah and some Palestinian organizations, and has the ability to influence in the development of events, especially in the Fertile Crescent.

Israel's strategy in dealing with the Syrian crisis included two options:

1. The first option: the fall of Assad, and if this option is supported by Israel, it will result in a set of results that are in the interest of Israel, including removing Iran from Syria without a military, political or economic confrontation, and then rearranging papers related to weakening the regional role. In addition, the fall of Assad will cut off the military expansion of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which will affect the strength of the resistance and the security situation in general in Lebanon.

2. The second option: is for Assad to stay, and if this option is supported by Israel, it will be due to the fear of the arrival of a hardline regime that will succeed Assad, demanding the right to the occupied Golan Heights, and it will be the start of military operations against the Israeli presence. Experience over the past decades has proven that it can Israel reach understandings with the Syrian regime on the grounds of common interests on the most sensitive Arab issues, even if the public and official positions of the Syrian regime were the opposite, for example: the first Israeli war on Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization, where the verbal understanding between Israel and Syria was based on Syria's commitment to neutrality.

Also, regime change in Damascus will not change the Syrian position on the Palestinian issue from the Israeli point of view, even if the Syrian regime changes. Any new authority will derive its legitimacy through anti-Israel and support for the Palestinian cause.

The political and military position of Israel towards what is happening in Syria is summarized as follows:

The Israeli keenness not to engage publicly in what is happening in Syria, while watching the field situation from afar, and expressing concern about what is happening. The simplest example is the statements of the Israeli Prime Minister after striking the town of Khan Sheikhoun with missiles loaded with sarin gas, which killed hundreds of children and women, especially the positions of politicians and public opinion within Israel are divided: one swears with Bashar's fall because of the advantages that this has, as we mentioned, undermining the Iranian and Hezbollah role in the region, and the other swears with it remaining. Unconventional weapons are in the hands of the resistance in Lebanon, which poses a threat to Israel's security.

Israel has used Ghada's tools to achieve its goals in the Syrian crisis, such as the humanitarian tool and the provision of medical and humanitarian aid that it grants to some of the Syrian opposition factions close to the Golan, as well as the chemical diplomatic tool, as well as obstructing the arming of the opposition. It also tried to communicate with Russia about not providing Syria with anti-ship missiles, as Intelligence cooperated with regional and international security services to exchange information, and it built a wall reinforced with electronic devices extending along the border in the Golan region, and mines were planted in the region and reinforced with military aircraft and snipers, and it sent soldiers training all the time next to the Golan to prevent any destabilization of security by fundamentalist groups.

In addition, Israel sometimes used military strikes as it relied on the principle of deterrence in the Israeli strategy to influence the decisions of the Syrian Parties hostile to it, and prevent them from initiating an attack on Israel, so it launched several operations on the borders and in the Syrian depth.

Israel sees four possibilities for the end of the Syrian crisis:

1. The fall of the regime and the emergence of an alternative regime, torn apart by several factions that are jostling over a destroyed state and scorched earth.
2. The fall of the regime as the civil war continues without a strong central government.

3. The president resorted to the coast, and announced the establishment of an Alawite state, while the battles between the Syrians continued.
4. The status quo remains, that is, the president will remain and the war will continue for a long period.

Israel wants the failure of the Syrian state, whether by prolonging the conflict inside Syria and exhausting the conflicting forces, so that it maintains military superiority in a way that does not pose a threat to it, or by dismantling Syria into small Alawite, Kurdish, and Sunni mini-states to ensure Israeli superiority over those mini-states.

At the regional level, Israel is trying to play a role that preserves its political, economic, and security interests in the region. It has exploited this crisis to pressure regional actors such as Iran by working diplomatically to undermine its role in Syria, and monitor the supply of weapons to Hezbollah. It has also supported the Kurdish separatist movements as a pressure card and weakening the center Turkey's strategic situation in the region, especially since the Kurdish file is the most painful file for Erdogan's regime.

We cannot ignore the economic benefits that benefit Israel from the Syrian crisis, the most important of which is the seizure of gas from the Arab countries bordering the Mediterranean and the start of exporting it to Jordan and Egypt, after the latter had been exporting gas to Israel for ten years, and finally European countries announced Its commitment to proceed with the implementation of the pipeline project in the Mediterranean Sea*.

International Reasons for the Development of the Crisis:

International reactions to the Syrian crisis varied, as the world is one system that is affected by and affects every event in any part of it, in addition to the interest that plays a vital role in managing the international parties to the crisis, and regardless of the details and interests, it must be recognized that the Syrian crisis is one of the most important factors Which confirmed the change of the international system from unilateralism to pluralism in the pattern of the international system, and these repercussions were nothing but dire consequences for the Syrian people, and these forces were one of the reasons for complicating the crisis.

First: The role of the United States and the West in the development of the crisis:

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, Western countries and the United States have taken positions in support of it, and this crisis has coincided with the negotiations of the Western powers and the United States to reach the nuclear agreement with Iran; What made the calculations of the completion of this agreement overlap with the calculations of the Syrian crisis, so Western policy towards it seemed hesitant at times, negative at other times, and reluctance to interfere with any ground combat forces.

The beginning of the crisis was also accompanied by Washington's withdrawal of its forces from Iraq, in implementation of Obama's electoral promise. In addition, the United States of America and most European countries were going through an economic crisis; The priority for them was their country's internal problems, and these justifications are not sufficient to explain the West's hesitant stance towards the crisis. The Obama administration was criticized as leading the Western camp in any international moves after more than 1,400 civilians were suffocated due to the use of sarin gas by the Syrian regime in Eastern Ghouta, Obama's agreement with Putin on the Assad regime's chemical disarmament came as a way out of Obama's predicament, as he avoided military involvement and involvement in Syria.

After the chemical deal, the American discourse focused on the necessity of holding Geneva 2, at the earliest date to resolve the crisis peacefully, but Geneva 2 failed as did Geneva 1, and with this reluctance and the indecisive position of the United States and with it European countries, this led to the spread of extremist jihadist groups across Syria The United States began to covertly fund some opposition groups, but not significantly and effectively; The Obama administration did not want the total collapse of the Syrian regime's apparatus.

With the growing role of those extremist jihadist groups, especially ISIS, the US administration announced in 2014 public intervention in the crisis, and the Syrian opposition was trained and supplied with weapons to confront ISIS terrorism, and it launched several military operations against ISIS, and it was agreed with Russia for military

intervention to weaken terrorist groups. That during 2015.

On April 4, 2017, the Khan Sheikhoun massacre occurred, as a result of the bombing of one of the axes of Syrian times, the Khan Sheikhoun area, with sarin gas. Accusations were leveled in the western circles of the Syrian government, and these statements were met with a kind of recklessness by the Syrian regime and its allies. Damascus had previously announced the disposal of all chemical weapons after the events of Eastern Ghouta, and the reaction did not take long to respond to the Khan Sheikhoun massacre. The Security Council failed to pass a resolution, US President Trump instructed the US Department of Defense to launch a limited military strike on the Syrian regime, and indeed a missile strike was directed at Khan Sheikhoun Airport, which resulted in heavy losses for the Syrian Air Force, through which the US President achieved several goals that exceed the declared goal of the strike. missiles, the most important of which are:

1. Punish the Assad regime and prevent it from using chemical weapons again.
2. President Trump appeared as a decisive president after his predecessor Barack Obama refused to move towards a chemical attack in Eastern Ghouta in August 2013, despite warnings given to the Assad regime, not to cross red lines.
3. Trump has restored his country's role as the world's policeman, and has strengthened the American role in the Middle East, which has greatly retreated in favor of the growing Russian role in Syria, after the Russians took control of the Crimea, which belonged to Ukraine.

Hence, the hesitation in the Western position - the United States of America and the European Union - has exacerbated the severity of the crisis, and even after the intervention and support by arming some opposition groups, the situation worsened even more. The parties, and it is not allowed to have a group superior to the others, until Syria becomes a failed, fragmented and fragmented state, but the crisis began to spread to neighboring countries, and then developed through the large waves of refugees in the heart of Europe.

Second: The role of Russia and China in the development of the crisis:

As for the Chinese role, when looking at direct Syrian relations in kind, we find that these relations, which date back to 1955, have no effective value according to traditional standards. The volume of trade exchange between the two countries amounted to about \$2.48 billion (out of a hundred billion dollars representing the total volume of Arab-Chinese trade) in 2010, and China is currently ranked first in Syria's trading partners with up to 6.9% of the total Syrian trade compared to 3% for Russia Federal.

Therefore, Syria has not been a commercial magnet for China, and although China has remained cautiously neutral regarding the region, its position on the crisis reflects its growing discomfort with what it sees as a US policy aimed at blocking its access to energy sources in the Middle East, as well

as the actions of the United States In the Pacific Ocean, which threatens China's national security, it will become more and more difficult to remain neutral in light of the deterioration of the situation in Syria in the future.

The common positions of China and Russia towards the Syrian crisis are to use the veto to stop any decision taken against Assad. Flying planes over the city of Aleppo and a complete cease-fire there.

The use of the veto by both Russia and China is considered an obstacle in the way of any peaceful settlement of the Syrian crisis. To protect the regime and the interests of some parties in the Middle East, they are indifferent to the crimes committed against the Syrian people, not only by the regular forces of Assad, but also by extremist groups. Which is increasing in strength and control over the Syrian territories, with every delay in the peaceful solution of the crisis.

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