

## The Sustainability of Papua and West Papua Special Autonomy Fund (SAF) in Asymmetric Decentralization

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### Abstract:

The research aims to analyze the management of Papua and West Papua's Special Autonomy Fund. It has to be managed sustainably to improve the welfare of the people. The research is carried out to provide policy recommendations and exit policy strategies in increasing the effectiveness of special autonomy funds, which need to be taken by the government during the transition period until post-2021. Researchers will analyze the progress of the implementation of SAF during the period 2010-2019, economic development, and regional welfare in the study. The research uses mix methods by giving more priority to descriptive qualitative or sequential qualitative analysis. Primary data were obtained from the opinions of academics, policymakers, and local governments, through field surveys and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). Secondary data were obtained from literature studies, the state budget, and the regional budget, and the indicators of welfare, economic, education, and health. It starts from the planning stage of central and regional data collection, continued with data analysis, and, finally, the preparation of the final research report. The results of the study show that there are still many problems in the management of SAF. There is no horizontal and vertical accountability of financial and policy decisions. The efficiency and effectiveness of SAF allocation, which is mainly intended for education and health, are still too low. The results of the study are expected to be used as input for policymakers and implementers of SAF policies to improve the health and welfare of the community.

**Keywords:** Budget, Management of the Special Autonomy Fund, Papua Province, and West Papua Province

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Every region in a country has different governments and regulations from other regions (Bache & Jones, 2000; Kaldor, 1970). The existence of regional autonomy allows each region to regulate its region, as long it does not conflict with the law (Briffault, 1996; Butt, 2010). The implementation of regional autonomy grants broad, real, and responsible authority to the regions. It is implemented through the regulation of the fair distribution and utilization of national resources and the financial balance between central and regional governments (Brodjonegoro & Asanuma, 2000; Brown, 2009; Siddiquee, Nastiti, & True, 2012).

The management of regional autonomy must be carried out effectively, efficiently, responsibly, transparently, and openly (Lodge, 1994), by giving broad opportunities to the community (Casey, 2018). Local governments need to pay attention to several aspects, namely: (1) regional financial management, and budgets, which occupy a central position to develop the capabilities and effectiveness of local governments (Alexeev, Avxentyev, Mamedov, & Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2019; A. Nasution, 2017); (2) a healthy bureaucracy, with entrepreneurial insight and spirit (Hofman, Kaiser, & Schulze, 2009; Shah, 2006) (Maravic, 2009); (3) the principle of propriety in government that is inseparable

from ethical and moral obligations, and culture, both between the government and the people, between institutions, or government officials, and third parties (Kolthoff, Erakovich, & Lasthuizen, 2010); (4) the community participation in the development process so that the local government gets guidance on the needs and desires of the community (Lopate, 1970; Mehrotra, 2019; Ornstein, 1983).

In the era of regional autonomy, the relationship of authority between the central government and provincial, district, and city governments, or between provinces and districts and cities, is regulated by laws that take into account regional exclusivity and diversity. The constitution requires different arrangements for each region that has a special and diverse style (Gustafsson & Scurrah, 2019; Suhardi, Husni, & Cahyowati, 2019). The legal policy on decentralization implies the adoption of asymmetric decentralization. It emphasizes the specificity, privileges, regional diversity, and unity between indigenous and traditional law communities and traditional rights that are further regulated by law (Efriandi, Couwenberg, & Holzhacker, 2019; Lele, 2019; León, 2012).

Asymmetric decentralization includes political, economic, fiscal, and administrative decentralization. It does not have to be uniform for all regions of the country, taking into account the specificities of each region (Isra, de Villiers, & Arifin, 2019; Tan, 2019). The adoption of asymmetric decentralization policies is a manifestation of the effort to enforce privileges (Bammarny, 2019; Gagnon & Garon, 2019; Popelier & Sahadžić, 2019). The concept already exists in the practice of state administration in Indonesia, namely the existence of several regions with special autonomous regions, such as Papua & West Papua Provinces (Brodjonegoro & Ford, 2014; Haryanto, Lay, & Purwoko, 2018; Tomsa & Setijadi, 2018). The province has received special treatment in the form of special autonomy due to the conflict

between the two regions and the central government regarding natural resources (Widjojo, Elizabeth, Al Rahab, Pamungkas, & Dewi, 2010). Special autonomy for Papua and West Papua, in principle, is in the form of granting special autonomy funds as compensation to the two provinces to join the Republic of Indonesia (Augustine, 2015; Arie, Ilmar, Maskun, & Bakti, 2017; Warokka, 2013).

The provision of SAF for the Provinces of Papua and West Papua always invites various discourses, even pros, and cons, inside and outside the Indonesian state (McGibbon, 2004; Salle & Van Burg, 2019; Widjojo et al., 2010). The issue developed into various political implications (Cahyaningsih & Fitriady, 2019; Dale, 2019; Morin, 2016; Singh, 2017). Practitioners consider the SAF to be a cooperation contract between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the people of Papua. It can be interpreted that the people of Papua and West Papua will determine their destiny after the end of the SAF (Augustine, 2013; Cahyaningsih & Fitriady, 2019; Drake, 2019; Druce, 2020; Sumule, 2004).

The provision of a large SAF is a concern for many parties. As a consequence, the government must allocate a specific budget each year in the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (Resposudarmo, Mollet, Raya, & Kaiwai, 2014). SAF Papua and West Papua Provinces, which is amounting to 2% of the ceiling of the National General Allocation Fund (DAU), is the main concern for most people from an economic perspective. The amount of DAU is 20% of the total of the State Budget, so it can be concluded that the SAF given to the two provinces is respectively 2% of the total State Budget.

Ironically, the use of SAF, in Papua and West Papua, for a decade still has not brought prosperity to the people in the provinces (Salle & van Burg, 2019). The size of the fund managed adds to the problem of poverty dan underdevelopment.

Development impacts have not yet provided significant benefits (Brooks, 2019; Faoziyah & Salim, 2016; Katharina, 2019). SAF also has not been able to reduce poverty and underdevelopment in almost all regions of Papua and West Papua, which are far from the principle of welfare (Iek & Blesia, 2019). It is certainly not in line with the objectives of autonomy. The autonomy should not only carry out democracy, but also encourage the development of the initiatives to make decisions, which relate to the interests of the local community (Ladner et al., 2019; Sturm, 2019), and to improve their destiny (Evans, Flores, & Larson, 2019).

Researching the allocation of SAF is not as easy as imagined. Once SAF is brought to the court, then the sentiment of mistrust of the people towards the central government will arise again (Brooks, 2019; Silo, 2016). It can lead to separatism. On the other hand, there are still many shortcomings in the use of SAF. Also, many suspect that SAF is closely related to budget politics (Patashnik, 2000; Rubin, 2019). In other words, regional elites sometimes take priority in getting the funds under the pretext of ensuring that there is no separatism in the easternmost provinces of Indonesia (Aspinall, 2003; Berman, 2019).

## 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### The Concept of Decentralization

Decentralization is a concept that shows the transfer of authority from the central government to the lower level government to manage its territory (Faguet, 2014; Rodden, 2004; Talitha, Firman, & Hudalah, 2019). The aim is to realize the welfare of all levels of society by bringing the efficiency and effectiveness of service functions closer (Alonso & Andrews, 2019; Ghuman & Singh, 2013) and participation of the public (Moonti, 2019; Morales, 2019; Soenyono, 2017). Decentralization shows a vertical building of a form of state power (Bardhan, 2002; Schragger, 2010). It drives the process of democratization in solving local problems

with all the potential and creativity of the region (Hao, 2020; Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, & Tomaney, 2016). Decentralization also aims to strengthen national integration (González, 2016; Takao, 2019). It means that decentralization shows a vertical structure of the form of state power (Bardhan, 2002; Schragger, 2010). In the practice of governance, decentralization can be different in one region in many countries (Katorobo, 2005; Kauzya, 2005; Wehner, 2000). The experience takes place both in the form of a decentralized unitary state and in the format of federation arrangements (Lele, 2019; McGarry, 2007).

In the context of Indonesia, decentralization has become part of the national government system in the form of regional autonomy policies (Bell, 2001; Brodjonegoro & Asanuma, 2000). The governmental system is regulated in the policy of law number 23 of 2014 concerning the Regional Government (Suhardi et al., 2019). The new policy replaces the old one that is no longer following the development of the situation, state administration, and demands for the implementation of decentralization (Shuardi, Adolf, Husni, & Cahyowati, 2018). The decentralization policy is accompanied by fiscal policy to support the successful implementation of decentralization. The existence of Law Number 33 of 2004, concerning Financial Balance Between Central and Regional Governments, supports the success of the policy (Kadir, Kuswardani, & Isnaini, 2019).

Decentralization benefits heterogeneous societies (Keating, 1992a). Minorities can be more actively involved in politics through decentralization (Most & Kourtikakis, 2019). It provides opportunities for minorities to maintain the culture (Keating, 1992b; John Loughlin, 2007), to build interethnic coalitions (J. Loughlin, 2000), and to unite fragmented countries (De Rynck, 2005).

The benefits of decentralization can be used to deal with the resistance that produces

negative impacts, including fears that autonomy is a step for secession (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2019; Sorens, 2004). Also, concerns from the majority leader that they might lose voice support, by strengthening ethnic minority identities to secede (Bauböck, 2019; Cederman, Hug, Schädel, & Wucherpfennig, 2015; Flamand, 2019; Gunes, 2019; O'Driscoll, 2017). Therefore, if the central government still has full and absolute power over the region, then that power cannot be exercised optimally by the region (Butt, 2010; Feltenstein & Iwata, 2005; Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2008). As a result, the goal of the state to realize the justice and welfare of the people will be difficult to realize (Parekh, 2019). With the current global development, the system of the absolute power of the central government in a unitary state can no longer be implemented (Convery & Lundberg, 2017; Schulte & Schulte, 2020; Siroky & Cuffe, 2015).

In conclusion, decentralization promises more efficient development and encourages development towards a bottom-up approach (Holanda Maschietto, 2016; López-Santana, 2015). Also, decentralization can increase competition among local governments to spur regional economic growth (He, Zhou, & Huang, 2016; Kuncoro, 2016; Tang & Huhe, 2016) and to increase the delivery of public services at the local level (Common, Flynn, & Mellon, 2016; Efriandi et al., 2019). However, several studies show that decentralization can have several adverse impacts, such as reducing the quality of public services (Grote, 2002), increasing regional disparities (Ezcurra & Pascual, 2008; Wasim & Munir, 2017), and resulting in more corrupt governance. (Changwony & Paterson, 2019; Shon & Cho, 2020).

Decentralization takes several forms, namely:

#### a. Symmetric Decentralization.

The application of symmetric decentralization is carried out equally in granting central government autonomy. There is no difference in performing the various roles and functions that have been decentralized without regard to the physical, ethnic, and cultural aspects in the administration of local government (Erk, 2018; Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998; Vickers, 2011). Symmetric decentralization is generally applicable and applied in all regions in a country (Fleurke & Willemse, 2006), usually applied to countries that have controlled political stability and are not in the potential for separatist conflicts (Arthur, 2018; Flamand, 2019; Stjepanović, 2012). It means that symmetrical decentralization is based on the assumption that all provinces have the same conditions. This assumption was taken by the central government to facilitate a system of regulation and political pressure (Bolton & Farrell, 1990; I. K. Nasution, 2016).

#### b. Asymmetric Decentralization

The pattern of incomparable government regulation has many names in the world of political science. It is called asymmetrical decentralization, asymmetrical devolution (Lloyd & McCarthy, 2018), asymmetrical federalists (Lapidus, 1999; Wiltshire, 2020), or asymmetrical intergovernmental arrangements (LeÓN & Orriols, 2016). Asymmetric decentralization arises from disappointment over the application of symmetric decentralization, which causes pluralism and many social conflicts, both vertically and horizontally. It is the reason why the symmetric decentralization policy must be reviewed.

Asymmetrical decentralization in its development is the application of special authority that is only given to certain regions in a country, which are considered as alternatives to resolve the problem of relations between the central government and different local governments. Ultimately

it is possible for stronger national unity because specific problems can be resolved peacefully and agreed by all parties (Chien, 2010; León, 2012; Sacchi & Salotti, 2014; Tan, 2019). Through the asymmetric decentralization, certain regions within a country are given special powers that are not given to other regions (Harris & Reilly, 1998).

The asymmetrical decentralization is commonly applied in areas that do have large potential differences and experience extraordinary inequalities that can trigger turmoil. Asymmetrical decentralization approach and implementation have at least two benefits (Hannum, 2011), namely 1) as a solution to the possibility of ethnic conflict, or other physical disputes. For example, Hong Kong is part of the sovereign territory of China. China, however, gives significant powers to Hong Kong in the political, legal, and economic fields. 2) as a peaceful democratic response to the problems of minorities whose rights have so far been ignored.

### **Papua and West Papua Special Autonomy Fund**

The special autonomy fund for the Provinces of Papua and West Papua is the implementation of Law Number 21 of 2001, concerning Special Autonomy, which was later revised to Act Number 35 of 2008, which mandates the granting and allocation of special autonomy funds to the Provinces of Papua and West Papua. The provision of SAF is an implementation of asymmetric decentralization (Golem & Perovic, 2014; Oommen, 2006). It is a decentralization state policy with special treatment. Also, in the context of implementing special autonomy, additional infrastructure funds have been allocated. The amount of the additional infrastructure fund is agreed between the Government and the Parliament. Its use is prioritized for funding infrastructure development.

The SAF formula is the equivalent of 2 percent of the national DAU ceiling for 20 years, the use of which is primarily intended

to finance poverty alleviation, as well as education, social, and health funding. The government disbursed SAF, the amount of which was based on the needs and availability of APBN funds to reduce development disparities in the regions, alleviating poverty, and equitable distribution of education, which is the implication of the implementation of special autonomy. The distribution of SAF is done so that the region can regulate itself. The granting of special authority is expected to improve the community's economy to realize justice in the management of regional products, increase community welfare, and empower human resources.

The distribution of fund allocations between one province and another varies. For Papua, following the mandate of Law Number 21 the Year 2001 regarding Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua, 70 percent is allocated to the Province of Papua and 30 percent to the Province of West Papua. For Papua Province, around 80 percent is allocated to districts/cities, and provinces use the rest. While West Papua, around 90 percent, is allocated to districts/cities and the rest is used by provinces. The use of SAF in Papua and West Papua Provinces is prioritized for funding education and health.

### **Governability**

Governability is a concept that explains the conditions of public dissatisfaction with government and democracy in Europe, America, and Japan, which at that time occurred because of the weakening of the functioning of democratic government institutions (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975). The weakening is what they call a crisis of governability, where the democratic machinery continues to operate, but the ability of individuals who operate the machine, to make decisions, tends to weaken (Cheung, 2013; Nasr, 1992; Yuval-Davis, 2012).

The governability model is the ability of a government to manage its main tasks and functions (Lele, 2012), in which the state can function effectively and efficiently without

ignoring democratic principles (Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2016; Kooiman, 2010). Governability is related to the implementation of solid and responsible development management, which is in line with democracy and the free market. It is implemented to avoid misallocation of scarce investment funds and to prevent corruption, both politically and administratively, to carry out budgetary discipline, and to create legal certainty and political atmosphere for growing entrepreneurial activities ( Bourgon, 2007; Thompson, 1995). The implementation of good governance can make the government develop and establish the principles of professionalism, accountability, transparency, excellent service, democracy, efficiency, effectiveness, and the rule of law that can be accepted by the whole community (Bourgon, 2007).

Governability is a two-sided concept. Emphasis on governability can be placed on two sides, namely on society or on those who hold power (Bevir, 2007; Fetus, 2007). The dualism concept leads to a functional approach because it expresses the question of governability in two ways, namely the effectiveness of government policy and the approval of the community. The effectiveness of government policy in governing concerns efficiency and legitimacy so that the failure of governing is overcome by a functional approach that is its involvement in policymaking (Kooiman, 2010).

This concept is not only fulfilled by terms or rules but also methods, approaches, theories, and science. It explains all matters that are related to the will to improve the technical aspects of the problem and the orientation of the basic values, which are adjusted to the main objectives of a government. Any arrangement that does not provide an opportunity for possibilities will form a necessity (Escobar, 2007).

### **Effectiveness of Regional Financial Management**

Effectiveness is a concept that is very important for the government to carry out an activity or program related to the existing budget. The ability to realize effectiveness illustrates the success of the government in achieving its goals. Measuring the effectiveness of a government is not a simple matter (Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989).

Effectiveness is the success of an organization in achieving its goals through the preparation of appropriate programs and clear division of labor. The use of existing human resources and available infrastructure enables the optimal functioning of a work program (Brooks, 2019; Kwon, 2003, 2013; Wunsch, 1991).

Effectiveness in regional financial management is the completion of activities on time and within the available budget. It means the achievement of planned goals and objectives (Halim & Kusufi, 2007). Based on the description, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of regional financial management occurs when (1) the completion of activities on the specified time, (2) the completion of activities is within the predetermined budget limit, and (3) the achievement of the goals and objectives set. Effectiveness is achieved if the utilization of certain amounts of resources, facilities, and infrastructure that is consciously determined beforehand can produce some goods and activities that they carry out (Gibson, Ivancevich, & Donnelly, 1996; Siagian, 2003).

In addition to being reviewed from the principle of benefits, the effectiveness of regional financial management can also be viewed from the principle of accountability to the public (Skawirska, 2014). The points put forward to examine the effectiveness of regional financial management, among others. 1) a comprehensive, transparent and comprehensive set of competencies and responsibilities of the organizational structure involved in the financial management of local government units, 2)

easy access to current, reliable information, and access to natural systems for managing information existing, 3) effective, clear and understandable accounting, reporting, analysis, and financial valuation systems, 4) effective systems for monitoring the activities of local government authorities and organizational units, 5) access to necessary training and support advice for management and local government employees.

### 3. METHOD

The research method was carried out by linking the results of the qualitative method by conducting in-depth interviews with

selected key informants with specific considerations, FGDs, and literature studies. Data collected in this study are primary data obtained through interviews with informants and field reviews. Secondary data was obtained from relevant institutions, namely the Regional Apparatus Organization (OPD), the Ministry of National Development Planning Agency, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) related to the budget preparation process. The composition of the resource persons is as follows:

Table 1. Research Resources for the Province of Papua

No.	Institution	Number of Respondents
1.	Head of the Papua Province Regional Development Planning Agency	1
2.	Civil Apparatus of State Government of Papua	3
3.	Papuan People's Representative Council	6
4.	Cenderawasih University	3

Table 2. Research Resources for West Papua Province

No.	Institution	Number of Respondents
1.	Governor of West Papua Province	1
2.	West Papua Regional Development Planning Agency	1
3.	West Papua People's Representative Council	4
4.	Papua State University	2
5.	West Papua Community Leaders	4

Stages of research carried out by way of 1) preliminary study to obtain an overview of issues arising from the issue of the termination of the SAF law in 2021. 2) stages of data collection at the national level by conducting in-depth interviews and focused discussions involving speakers at the central level, especially within the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, Bappenas, LIPI, and the Regional Representative Council by triangulating data (check-recheck-cross check). The results of

data collection at the national level are also an input for the deepening process at the data collection stage at the regional level. 3) the stages of data collection at the regional level by conducting in-depth interviews and focused discussions involving speakers from the Provinces of Papua and West Papua, including Members of the DPRD, Bappeda OPD, as well as from academics conducted data triangulation (check-recheck-cross check). The last stage is 4) the stage of data analysis by categorizing data based on the

activities of the management of special autonomy funds. The results of this analysis will be the basis for drawing conclusions and recommendations.

## 5. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Distribution of Special Autonomy Funds

Law Number 21 of 2001 and its amendment, Law Number 35 of 2008, mandates the policy of distribution of funds in the context of special autonomy, namely the SAF, which is equivalent to 2% of the ceiling of the National General Allocation Fund (DAU). The above policy is intended to finance education and health. In its management, there is an obligation to make funding allocations in the field of education by 30%,

the health sector by 15%, the people's economy sector by 20%, and the basic infrastructure sector by 20%. Besides, there are additional funds for infrastructure in the context of implementing special autonomy, the amount of which is determined based on the Provincial proposal. This fund is mainly intended to finance infrastructure development. The fund is intended so that in at least 25 years, all cities, districts, districts, or other population centers can be connected to quality land, sea or air transportation. The provinces of Papua and West Papua are expected to be able to carry out their economic activities well and profitably as part of the national and global economic system. The amount of the SAF fund is:

Table 3. Acceptance of SAF Papua

Year	General Allocation Fund (Rp.)	Additional Infrastructure Fund	Total SAF (Rp.)
2002	1.382.300.000.000	-	1.382.300.000.000
2003	1,539,560,000,000	-	1,539,560,000,000
2004	1,642,617,943,000	-	1,642,617,943,000
2005	1,775,312,000,000	-	1,775,312,000,000
2006	2,913,284,000,000	536,374,689,000	3,449,658,689,000
2007	3,295,748,000,000	750,000,000,000	4,045,748,000,000
2008	3,590,142,897,000	330,000,000,000	3,920,142,897,000
2009	2,609,796,098,000	1,470,000,000,000	4,079,796,098,000
2010	2,694,864,788,000	800,000,000,000	3,494,864,788,000
2011	3,157,459,547,550	800,000,000,000	3,957,459,547,550
2012	3,833,402,135,000	571,428,571,000	4,404,830,706,000
2013	4,355,950,048,000	571,428,571,000	4,927,378,620,000
2014	4,777,070,975,000	2,000,000,000,000	6,777,070,975,000
2015	4,940,429,880,000	2,250,000,000,000	7,190,429,880,000
2016	5,395,051,859,000	1,987,500,000,000	7,382,551,859,000
2017	5,615,816,931,000	2,625,000,000,000	8,240.816.931,000
2018	5.580.152.407.000	2.400.000.000.000	7.980.152.407.000
2019	5.808.230.158.000	2.824.446.537.000	8.633.676.695.000
<b>Total</b>	<b>67.029.220.952.400</b>	<b>17.163.732.252.000</b>	<b>84.192.951.205.400</b>

The table above shows an upward trend in SAF from year to year. SAF accumulation until 2019 is Rp. 84,192,951,205,400. The

funds include infrastructure funds with a total of Rp.67,029,220,952,400 and general allocation funds of Rp.17,163,732,252,000.

Table 4. Acceptance of West Papua SAF

Tahun	General Allocation Fund (Rp.)	Additional Infrastructure Fund	Total Amount
2008	-	680.000.000.000	680.000.000.000
2009	1.118.484.600.000	600.000.000.000	1.718.484.600.000
2010	1.154.942.052.000	600.000.000.000	1.754.942.052.000
2011	1.353.196.948.950	600.000.000.000	1.953.196.948.950
2012	1.642.886.629.000	428.571.429.000	2.071.458.058.000
2013	1.866.835.735.000	428.571.429.000	2.295.407.164.000
2014	2.047.315.954.000	500.000.000.000	2.547.315.954.000
2015	2.117.327.091.000	750.000.000.000	2.867.327.091.000
2016	2.312.165.083.000	862.500.000.000	3.174.665.083.000
2017	2.406.778.685.000	875.000.000.000	3.281.778.685.000
2018	2.408.937.478.000	1.600.000.000.000	4.008.937.478.000
<b>Total</b>	<b>18.428.870.255.950</b>	<b>7.924.642.858.000</b>	<b>26.353.513.113.950</b>

In 2008, the Province of West Papua was declared a new autonomous region. Since then, West Papua has received SAF funding. During 11 years of granting special autonomy funds, West Papua Province received funding of Rp.26,353,513,113,950, - including infrastructure funds in the amount of Rp.7,924,642,858,000, and general allocation funds of Rp.1,8,428,870,255. 950.

Seeing the current conditions, the effectiveness, purpose, and target of using SAF are still far from expectations. Data from the Indonesian Government Statistics Agency (BPS) revealed that in 2010 the Papua Province Human Development Index was 54.50%. Eight years later, in 2018, Papua HDI only increased by 5.56% to 60.06%. For the Province of West Papua, in 2010, the figure was 59.60 and rose to 63.74% in 2018, an increase of 4.14%. This HDI achievement is even smaller than some provinces resulting from the division and is still far below the 2018 National HDI, which reached 71.39%. Other BPS data shows the number of poor people in Papua Province is 26.55%, and West Papua is 22.17%. This number places Papua and West Papua as the provinces with the highest poverty rates in 2019, above the national average of 9.22%.

In addition to the above indicators, SAF funds always experience an increasing trend every year. In general, SAF in 15 years rose by 290.57 percent from Rp. 1.38 trillion in 2002 to Rp. 21.4 trillion in 2020. But on the other hand, community welfare indicators, such as poverty levels, only decreased slightly in the same time frame. Therefore, this SAF is indeed worth dissecting to measure its effectiveness. Moreover, the distribution of these funds will end in the year 2021.

The existence of great authority is expected to be the solution for the people who have been marginalized by development. Various development issues emerged as if they were the unresolved problems. Some people believe the policy cannot improve the ability of local government to serve, to develop, and to empower the community.

#### **Effectiveness of SAF Road Infrastructure Management**

The infrastructure sector has a dual influence on the regional economy, namely the direct effect and the indirect effect. Its direct effect can be seen in employment absorption by encouraging production in other related sectors, increasing per capita income, and so on. While its indirect effects are very

widespread, both in the short and long terms, such as spurring the increase in investment, move production in tradeable sectors, reduce poverty, inequality, inflation, and others. In short, the infrastructure sector is the most important and strategic enabler factor in the regional economy and is the first order condition to stimulate economic growth.

SAF aims to reduce inequality in development, provide broad authority, provide broad protection and opportunities for society, prosperity, and prosperity. The implementation of the special autonomy policy is expected to accelerate development in the fields of education, health, poverty, and infrastructure, so that it can be aligned with other regions in Indonesia, given the geographical and political region is still lagging.

Provision of infrastructure funds provided by the central government is intended so that at least within 25 years, all provinces, districts/cities, districts, or other population centers are connected with quality land, sea or air transportation. The community can carry out its economic activities well and profitably as part of the national and global economic system. The construction of national roads in the Papua-West Papua Province from 2015 to 2018 has reached 1,982 km. The 1,982 km of roads that have been built consist of 791 km in 2015, 477 km in 2016, 345 km in 2017, and 369 km in 2018. Meanwhile, for road maintenance during the 2015-2018 period, it is targeted to reach 14,367 km. The 14,367 km of roads consists of 2,933 km in 2015, 3,625 km in 2016, 3,969 km in 2017, and 3,840 km in 2018.

The community also hopes that the construction of other infrastructure in the form of housing construction for the community, the provision of clean and potable water, the provision of electricity, and providing good road access in the

village, to carry out activities and facilitate economic access for the village community to the district and city.

### **Education and Health Levels related to SAF**

Education is one of the priorities of the regional autonomy program. SAF allocates 30% for education. The HDI level should also go up with not a small allocation of funds. In reality, the HDI level of Papua and West Papua Provinces is still ranked the lowest. According to local population data, 75% of the indigenous population did not have access to proper education, 50% had never received a formal education, or did not graduate from primary school, 22% only graduated from primary school, 10% graduated from high school, and 2% graduated from university in 2010.

The education fund included in the SAF is mostly only used to build school buildings physically, but it is not accompanied by an increase in the quality of education. Many schools were built, but teachers and other educational support were not available. Another thing that causes the low quality of education is the geographical situation in which some regions are mountainous. Lack of access to education places has made people reluctant to continue their education. Papua is the province with the lowest HDI level in Indonesia. The HDI rate in 2016 was 58.05, far below the national HDI level of 70.81. In 2017, the HDI increased by 1.05 to 59.09, while in 2002, the HDI figure could break 60.1. From the data, it can be concluded that the education fund on special autonomy has not been used effectively. Oversight of the Supreme Audit Agency concluded that each additional special autonomy fund of Rp. 1 million only increased HDI by 0.000001521. The effect is very small, close to zero. In other words, the additional SAF did not have a significant impact on the increase in HDI.




Figure 1. Comparative Human Development Index (HDI) of the National, Provincial of Papua and West Papua

The Audit of the Supreme Audit Board of the Fiscal Year 2016 shows that the Papua Public Health and Social Security programs are not synergistic so that the Provinces of Papua and West Papua lose the opportunity to use a special autonomy fund of at least Rp. 33 billion. It is because the Provincial Health Office is not careful in conducting studies and analysis related to the synergy of the implementation of the Jamkesmas and Jamkespa programs.

Despite progress, child mortality is still a significant challenge. For every 1,000 live births, 27 newborns die in the first month of life, and 115 die before reaching the age of 5 years. Increasing women's access to sexual and reproductive health services is very important. There are less than one in four adult women and adolescents aged 15–49 years, whose family planning needs are met with modern contraceptive methods in 2015, and 58 percent of births are assisted by skilled birth attendants. The level of access is lower for mothers and children in rural areas. Continual efforts are needed to achieve and maintain high immunization

coverage. In 2015, 52 percent of infants received the recommended three doses of DTP vaccine, and nearly 70 percent of infants received measles vaccination.

#### Poverty in the Province of Papua and West Papua

Indrawan et al., (2019) and Sumule (2003) describe that, first, 74.24% of indigenous people live in remote areas with limited access to transportation infrastructure and facilities, or even none at all. Second, approximately 80% of the population is in poverty and poor conditions in terms of agricultural production, economy, education, health, and technological mastery. Third, most indigenous people live below the poverty line. Fourth, there is almost no quality road connecting one city with another, especially that commonly used by local people to market their products, to obtain an adequate income. Fifth, the prices of consumer goods in Jayapura are, on average, 45% higher than elsewhere in Indonesia (Waimbo & Yuwono, 2012).




Figure 2. Percentage of Papua and West Papua Poverty

The above table illustrates the percentage of poverty in the Provinces of Papua and West Papua from 2010-2019. In 2010 the rate of poverty reached more than 36.8%. It can be interpreted that the people of the two provinces are below the poverty line in the poverty index in Indonesia. From the data, it can be seen that the poverty percentage trend from year to year is decreasing. In 2010-2019, the percentage of poverty decreased by 1.02%, while a significant decrease of 6.42% occurred in 2008-2012, the rate of poverty decreased very dramatically. If you observe the development of poverty levels during 2013-2017, poverty continues to decline, even though in 2015 it rose by 0.6 points. Poverty reduction can be accelerated again to 27.76% until 2017. In other words, the Provinces of Papua and West Papua have succeeded in accelerating poverty reduction by approximately -0.94% per year during the 2013-2017 period.

In 2019, the poverty reduction trend will decrease by 3.12%. However, poverty alleviation programs are still mostly in the form of direct assistance, not capital assistance. Direct aid was only used for daily shopping with consumptive community conditions. Villagers dominate the

proportion of poor people. The percentage of villagers below the poverty line is almost 80%. It is because there are practically no quality roads that connect one city to another, especially those commonly used by local people to market their products and to obtain adequate income. However, it should be noted that until now, poverty in the Provinces of Papua and West Papua is still the highest in Indonesia. For this reason, more innovative policies are needed to accelerate poverty reduction in the future further.

#### Impact of SAF on the Economy

One of the successes of an area in carrying out economic development is to change its economic structure from an extractive economy to a manufacturing economy, namely the processing of semi-finished and or finished goods. Extractive economies are economic behaviors that carry out the business of extracting, extracting, or processing the wealth provided by nature, where the results taken from nature are not processed or not cultivated again. The extractive economy is more concerned with the company's maximum profit without regard to sustainable development.




Figure 3. The Economic Structure of Papua Province in 1995-2017 (%)

The implementation of special autonomy, which began in 2001 until now, has not maximally increased the contribution of the manufacturing industry sector in the regional economy, including in lifting the agricultural sector, which absorbs more business opportunities and jobs for the poor. The redistribution of value-added to the services and construction sectors caused a downward trend in the contribution of the manufacturing and agricultural industries from 2006 to 2018. Both sectors controlled the GRDP of Papua and West Papua Provinces at around 19.21% per year during the period 2006- 2017, while the agriculture sector fell to 13.23% per year. The manufacturing industry was only 2.15% per year for the same period.

The addition of the Regional Revenue Budget since the implementation of special autonomy has caused government consumption to increase very high, where the increase is more focused on the sectors of education, health, and infrastructure services. In the future, there needs to be a strong integration between the three strategic sectors with the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, so that the multiplier effect of increasing government consumption on these three strategic sectors will have a more significant impact on

agricultural development and manufacturing industries.

## 6. CONCLUSION

SAF of Papua and West Papua Provinces have an outstanding impact on the education, health, economy, poverty, and infrastructure sectors. But the effect is not significant considering that growth is prolonged. It is caused by the government's institutional system that has not worked effectively and efficiently both in the quality and quantity of existing human resources. Also, SAF is not distributed to the community properly. As a result, the community does not understand the use of the fund. The active role of the population is highly expected in the special autonomy.

The regional government still expects SAF because more than 50% of the regional gross income is income from special autonomy funds. If revoked, it can feel an economic imbalance that will occur in the area. The Provincial Governments of Papua and West Papua hope that the special autonomy fund will continue. If continued, the granting of the special autonomy fund needs to be revised because it does not give full authority to the regional government to implement the special autonomy law. Also, there is no explanation of how the central government and regional governments face

dilemmas, such as how to exercise authority in the form of mining, foreign affairs, education, health, economic affairs and accommodate community proposals.

The central government must amend regulations regarding special autonomy funds at all levels if continued. Also, evaluation and monitoring must continue to be carried out from various layers in both the central and regional governments. The transparency of the special autonomy fund must be carried out by the regional government so that the local community is aware of the use of the special autonomy fund. It is because the community is also an evaluation tool for the special autonomy fund.

The time of disbursement of special autonomy funds by the central government also caused the ineffective absorption of special autonomy funds. Because the special autonomy fund disbursement is done in stages, but at the last step, the payment is always close to the end of that year's budget period, or December each year. The conditions cause the special autonomy fund cannot be optimally absorbed by the regional government.

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