

Indonesia's Defence Strategy in Anticipating the Us-China Competition in the South China Sea

Renny Setiowati ¹, Sundring Pantja Jati ², Mohammad Ali ³, Pujo Widodo ⁴,
Bambang Suharjo ⁵

^{1,2,3,4,5} *Indonesian Defence University*

Email: ¹ rennysetiowatibaru@gmail.com, ² spantjadjati@gmail.com,

⁴ pujowidodo78@gmail.com, ⁵ bambang_suharjo@tnial.mil.id

Abstract

The South China Sea become one of the conflicts epicentrum in 21st century. The South China Sea area includes waters and land located in an archipelago of two large islands, namely the Spratly and Paracel, as well as the banks of the Macclesfield River and Scarborough Reef which stretch from Singapore, starting from the Malacca Strait to the Taiwan Straits, on the one hand, Indonesia supports the prospect of peace in the South China Sea for economic development and domestic stability, Indonesian policymakers are worried about China's interpretation of the South China Sea claims, which also includes deposits of natural gas and other natural resources in it. On the other hand, Indonesia is committed to defending the rights of an archipelagic country that has been listed in UNCLOS 1982. To boost national sovereignty around Natuna Island and The North Natuna Sea, Indonesia's government deploy defence diplomacy that can be explained as a combination of diplomacy and defence effort. In terms of diplomacy, Indonesia supports any dialogue effort between claimant states that will be led to the adoption and codification of the code of conduct by every claimant state, so every confrontation in The The South China Sea could be shifted into constructive dialogue. On another hand, the synergy between various ministries, such as The Foreign Affairs Ministry, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and other related institutions also needed to bolster the effort of data exchange, cooperation, coordination and continuous surveillance toward suspicious activity in The North Natuna Sea.

I. BACKGROUND

At this time, The South China Sea (SCS) already become epicentrum or become centre of multiples maritime disputes which involved various countries in the 21st century. SCS region includes waters and land located within an archipelago of two large islands, namely the Spratlys and Paracel, as well as the banks of the Macclesfield River and Scarborough Reef which stretch from Singapore, starting from the Malacca Strait to the Taiwan Strait. Considering that, this vast area has often experienced successive domination by the traditional rulers of nearby countries, today, several countries, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, Vietnam, the

Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam, are involved in confrontational efforts to claim each other, over part or all of the territorial waters. Indonesia, which is not a claimant state, became involved after the PRC's absolute claim to the waters of the The South China Sea emerged in 2012.

There is a rivalry between the United States and China in the The South China Sea. The United States through a letter to the UN Secretary General dated June 1, 2020, strongly rejected China's claims in the The South China Sea and stated that China's actions in the The South China Sea had disrupted the freedom of navigation guaranteed by international law. China replied to the letter on 9 June 2020 and

stated that the US is not a State Party to UNCLOS and is not the arbiter authorized to oversee the implementation of UNCLOS. China asked the US not to take sides in the sovereignty dispute in the The South China Sea and asked the US not to cause problems in the The South China Sea by carrying out military provocations. On July 13, 2020, the United States announced the United States' position in the SCS. The United States reaffirmed its position expressed in a letter dated June 1, 2020. However, for the first time the United States stated that the United States aligns the U.S. position on the People's Republic of China's claim in the SCS with the Tribunal's decision. Since the decision of the LCS arbitration case in 2016, the United States has not provided a clear position on the arbitral award. The PRC Coast Guard Act early 2021 gave the Chinese coast guard the authority to take any action including the military in safeguarding the PRC's claims¹.

The United States considers China's actions to place defence equipment with capabilities and capacities such as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), which will be to control fishing and oil drilling activities in the waters of the South China Sea, coerce and intimidating other countries who participated in the dispute over the South China Sea with China, enforced an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) around the South China Sea, facilitate the presence and projection of China's military to the Western Pacific, and realize the ambition of becoming a hegemon for the Eurasian region. For the United States, China's dominance in the South China Sea means disruption to the United States economy. The South China Sea has commercial trade routes through which \$3.4 trillion worth of cargo passes annually. The US Ministry of Defence stressed that the South China Sea is an important part of US foreign policy because 80 percent of the oil needed by Japan, The South Korea and Taiwan passes through this route.

¹ Pribadi Sutiono, from interview "Indonesia's Defence Strategy in Anticipating the US-China Competition in the The South China Sea", August 12, 2021

Those principles will be continuing under Joe Biden's presidency, according to Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken².

Strictly stating the United States Indo-Pacific Command continues to support and legitimate the principles of supporting freedom of navigation protected by the United States, continues to carry out freedom of navigation (FON) regularly to ensure free movement in the region, believes China should rigidly comply with international arbitration provisions that said the country could not enforce unilateral claims to the exclusive economic zone stretching from Scarborough Reef to the Spratlys, referring to the Philippines' lawsuit over China's claims to the islands, as well as the United States' commitment to helping The Southeast Asian and other Asian countries deal with China's unilateral claims :

*"Five years ago, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention delivered a unanimous and enduring decision firmly rejecting the PRC's expansive The South China Sea maritime claims as having no basis in international law. The Tribunal stated that the PRC has no lawful claim to the area determined by the Arbitral Tribunal to be part of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. The PRC and the Philippines, pursuant to their treaty obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention, are legally bound to comply with this decision. The United States reaffirms its July 13, 2020 policy regarding maritime claims in the The South China Sea. We also reaffirm that an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the The South China Sea would invoke U.S. mutual defence commitments under Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty."*³

² Bonnie S. Glaser and Gregory Poling, "China's Power Grab in the The South China Sea, How to Build a Coalition to Confront Beijing," Foreign Affairs, August 20, 2021.

³US-China Strategic Competition in The South and East China Sea, Congressional Research Service, 4 August 2021

Beijing's claim to the South China Sea refers to the Allied peace treaty with Japan in 1951. In that treaty, then-Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai asserted sovereignty claims to the Spratly Islands and the Paracel. Following the dynamic that continuously happened in maritime international law, including the use of exclusive economic zones regulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China's claims to the islands and surrounding seas must be increasingly emphasized with the necessary codification of laws in 1992, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and Additional Zones of the People's Republic of China, which reaffirmed the content of the 1951 declaration but contained more specific language. Following this law, China issued a baseline for its territorial waters in 1996. In 1998, the NPC passed the law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of the People's Republic of China, under which it claims additional maritime rights beyond the powers contained in the 1992 law. With the newest set of laws, Exclusive Economic Zone not only covers or consists of Paracel or Spratly, but, when combined with the 1992 law on the territorial sea, it provides the basis for claiming maritime rights in the South China Sea. In April 2011, China confirmed this interpretation in a verbal note to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (the Commission or CLCS) by stating that the Spratly Islands are "fully entitled" to be part of China's territorial waters, EEZ and continental shelf⁴.

One of China's activities that also demonstrates the country's capacity to defend its claims, even with a confrontational attitude, comes in form of naval exercises or patrols which intended to send a message toward various factions that shown interest to strengthen their claim into this area, is considered a frequent display of military force, which has a significant impact on the

determination of security and strategic policies in its claims to the South China Sea area. For China, a mediation decision is not really necessary because the ongoing construction of artificial islands is able to give China an advantage in carrying out activities through a forward base to limit economic activities from other countries. The most striking is the Chinese government's rejection of policies on international arbitration. Arbitration is a way of settling a civil dispute outside the general court based on an arbitration agreement made in writing by the disputing parties in the area. Since the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in early 1995, ASEAN countries have intensified their coordination to anticipate developments in the South China Sea. In April of that year, the ASEAN–China meeting was held in Hangzhou, where the Manila Declaration of 1992 was reaffirmed and, in this forum, ASEAN countries agreed in one stance that the settlement of the disputes over the Spratly Islands must be solved and negotiated multilateral talks. This attitude also is strengthened at ARF meeting which happened in Brunei at July 1995. ASEAN countries considered the meeting with China to have brought significant progress, at least have succeeded in convincing China that a peaceful settlement through a multilateral approach was the best way to resolve disputes in the South China Sea.

The United States of America also conducts in a show of force through various patrol and joint operation. In 2020 only, The US Navy successively sent the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) CSG, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) CSG, the USS America (LHA-6) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and the USS Makin Island (LHD-8) ARG to the South China Sea throughout 2020. Specifically, the USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG sailed through the South China Sea on the way to paying a port visit to Da Nang, Vietnam. The USS Nimitz CSG and the USS Makin Island ARG transited the South China Sea en route to deployment to the Middle East. The USS

⁴Taylor Fraven, *China's Strategy in the The South China Sea*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 2015

Ronald Reagan CSG and the USS America ARG from the 7th Fleet were deployed to the South China Sea to conduct deterrence patrols⁵. The forming of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States pact or AUKUS, will also increase the risk of an open skirmish in The South China Sea. Australia, the UK and the United States (US) have announced the formation of a new Trilateral Security Partnership (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States/ AUKUS) on 15 September 2021 with the aim to enhance security cooperation including intelligence, quantum defence technology and the purchase of cruise missiles from three countries. There is a global concern that, this partnership is an effort made by the US to secure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and become the main guarantor of the rules-based order. As part of the partnership, Australia will receive assistance from the US for the procurement of up to eight nuclear-powered submarines. In this way, Australia can expand its range and security capabilities as these submarines can travel faster and are more difficult to detect than a conventional submarine fleet. These submarines can also dive for months and can fire missiles further even though the Australian Government has stated that Australia will not install nuclear warheads⁶.

On the one hand, Indonesia supports the prospect of peace in the South China Sea for economic development and domestic stability, Indonesian policymakers are worried about China's interpretation of the South China Sea claims, which also includes deposits of natural gas and other natural resources in it. On the other hand, Indonesia is committed to defending the rights of the puffed countries that have been listed in UNCLOS, but on the other hand, Indonesia has not yet finalized an

agreement regarding the coordinates that are the object of dispute between countries in The Southeast Asia. Jakarta initially placed border disputes in the area near the South China Sea as a top priority after the 1956 Djuanda Declaration, even before starting efforts to exploit hydrocarbon resources. However, in the area closest to the South China Sea, starting in 1969 and in 2010, only fifteen coordinates have been agreed between Malaysia and Indonesia, while EEZ negotiations are still ongoing⁷.

II. METHODOLOGY

In this study, the type of method used by the author is a descriptive qualitative method which according to David Williams (1995) as quoted by Lexy J. Moleong, research that uses a natural setting, naturalness in this study is built through interviews and interpretation of readings and documents that will later be used will form cause and effect. In qualitative research, the methods that are usually used are interviews, observations, and the use of documents. According to Creswell (2008) the definition of qualitative research methods is an approach or search to investigate and understand a symptom that comes from questions and problem formulation. To understand the central phenomenon, the researcher interviewed the research participants or participants by asking general and rather broad questions. Information is then collected in the form of words or text. The collection of information will become the facts that will be used to explain the research findings. From the results of the analysis, the researchers then describe it with the studies of other scientists made previously. The final results of qualitative research are stated in the form of a written report⁸.

⁵ The South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), *An Complete Report on US Military Operations in the The South China Sea in 2020*, March 12, 2021, pg.5-6

⁶ Pusat Penelitian Badan Keahlian Sekretariat Jenderal DPR RI, *Respons Indonesia Terhadap Kemitraan Keamanan Australia, Inggris Dan Amerika Serikat*, 17-23 September 2021, pg. 1

⁷Evan A Laksmana, *Drifting Towards Equilibrium : Indonesia The South China Sea Policy Under Yudhoyono*, Yusuf Ishak Institute, pg. 17

⁸Moleong, L.J. (2011). *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif Edisi Revisi*. Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya.

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Defence Policy

National defence policy in 2021 is the continuation of the state defence policy in 2020 which contains same vision and mission that will be used as a guideline to implementing national defence in 2020-2024. The realization of the vision and mission of state defence in 2020-2024 is realized by setting strategic goals and strategic goals that take place in five years. The first policy highlighted in Indonesia's defence policy is to maintain state sovereignty in land, sea and air areas, including in border areas. The state will boost the strengthening of land boundaries capacity, maritime boundaries as well as Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) and Air Defence Identification System (ADIS) to protect air sovereignty and sovereign rights through synergy between ministries and agencies. The embodiment of optimizing interoperability and improving infrastructure is needed as part of an early warning in the form of satellite-based remote sensing and monitoring vehicles in defence areas, especially border areas and the outermost small islands. Monitoring in real-time and interconnection between defence systems must be carried out continuously. From a regional perspective, strengthening Indonesia's position as a regional power in accordance with the concept of ASEAN centrality, increasing defence cooperation by prioritizing neighbouring countries with direct borders, countries in the Association of The Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Indo-Pacific region as well as countries which has defence cooperation with Indonesia, and strengthening maritime security cooperation through joint exercises and coordinated patrols on an ongoing basis in order to strengthen the regional security architecture, especially in the North Natuna Sea which is directly adjacent to the South China Sea and in the Sulu Waters, the Malacca Strait, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean.

Improving defence diplomatic relations through bilateral and multilateral cooperation is an integral parts of Indonesia's defence policy.

Strengthening defence and security cooperation with ASEAN countries and other countries in order to realize mutual benefit and beneficial relationships, build and strengthen defence capabilities as well as a professional TNI posture, enhance the defence industry, and also support diplomacy and foreign policy. Defence policies will work well through the TNI's posture that is strong and ready to face threats. The development of the TNI's posture takes place proportionally and effectively in accordance with the times. Strengthening the Integrated TNI Units (STT) for the outer islands of Natuna, Yamdena/Selaru, and Merauke with optimization by integrated sensors that directly supervised by Puskom TNI (*Command and Control Centre*) and the Army. Increasing the strength and capability of Kogabwilhan (*United Command for Defence Region*), II and III which are focused on being able to carry out effective control and effective occupation as a form of presence throughout the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the Pusinformar (*Maritime Information Centre*) of the TNI in charge of maintaining and enhancing maritime security through communication, coordination and cooperative collaboration in the field of gathering, providing and exchanging information, both between operational centre and national and international maritime information centre. Furthermore, the current government program is to increase the strength and capability of the Koopsus (*Special Operations Command*) TNI which is tasked with conducting special operations and activities. whose role is to support and succeed in the implementation of special operations in the national interest. Lastly, strengthening joint TNI exercises to improve interoperability capabilities supported by a network-centric warfare system by maximizing satellite technology to cope with modern warfare.

The development of the strength of the land-based weapon system, is one of the cornerstones in the implementation of national defence. For the defence of large islands, it will rely on the addition of territorial command

units, combat battalions, both infantry, cavalry, field artillery, air defence artillery, combat engineers, as well as air cavalry or Penerbad (*Army Aviation Unit*) and their supporting elements that are capable to operate in various terrains that exist in the Republic of Indonesia. Modernization of the weaponry of infantry battalions, cavalry, field artillery, and air defence artillery, as well as renewal of individual weapons so that old weapons can be used for reserve components during active periods. As well as the placement of air defence missiles on the islands of Kalimantan, Sumatra and Java.

The development of naval forces is implemented through continuing the program to upgrade the Indonesian Navy's warships in the form of frigates, corvettes, fast missile boats and patrol boats armed with guided missiles at a minimum distance of 150 km in the form of surface of surface missiles (SSM) anti-air missiles. or long-range and medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) as a unit weapon (force weapon) and short-range SAM as self-defence in accordance with the needs of basic supplies and submarines armed with missiles and torpedoes. Implement a program to fulfil and improve the capabilities of the selected mid-life modernization (MLM) through a cost and benefit analysis assessment to produce defence equipment system with high operational readiness and combat capability. Build maritime surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities covering the domain, air, surface and underwater by modernizing fixed and mobile surveillance systems including maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned surface vessels. Also, increasing base support capabilities by prioritizing the construction of port facilities, maintenance facilities, and logistical support facilities in line with the plan to procure warships with large dimensions and weights such as submarines, frigates, and Landing Platform Dock (LPD) vessels.

Air force development consists of modernizing Indonesian Air Force fighter aircraft equipped with air to air missile (AAM) and air to ground (AGM) missiles with a range of more than 100

km and other platforms to support national air defence (AWAC&S aircraft, MRTT aircraft), SAR helicopters, counter insurgency (COI) aircraft to act on low speed threats and transport aircraft, as well as the construction of GCI (ground control intercept) radar and passive radar as an integrated air defences sensor⁹.

Synergy between ministry also an important part for defence policy. One of the collaboration act regarding to strengthen sovereignty near The South China Sea is cooperations for law enforcement at sea with Bakamla and other Maritime Security Agencies. Bakamla is used as a focal point for the Indonesian government in the maritime security and safety sector. In Bakamla there are procedures related to how to prevent piracy, so that this can later become a reference for companies and ship captains as a procedural step for ships that are in locations far from the supervision or security of marine patrols. Considering that piracy and piracy are one of the most important transnational crime issues in the territorial waters.

Indonesia's Position in the South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea issues is inseparable from ASEAN, because the majority of countries in conflicts are mostly ASEAN member such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. These ASEAN member countries fight for their interests in the South China Sea, namely the area they believe is their sovereignty along with the natural wealth in it, and is directly adjacent to the South China Sea. Prior to the issuance of the Arbitral Tribunal's decision, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had carried out a systematic and massive campaign to garner support for its position against the Arbitral Tribunal. The PRC openly urges ASEAN not to issue a statement on the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal.

The intended Arbitral's decision which become controversy regarding to SCS claim is the claim of the Philippines to the People's Republic of China to the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal 1982

⁹*Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara Tahun 2021*, Kementerian Pertahanan

on January 22, 2013. The material of the Philippines' lawsuit to the Tribunal is not related to ownership of maritime features or maritime delimitation considering that the Tribunal is not authorized to adjudicate these two issues, but the validity of the PRC's nine dash line and whether the disputed maritime location or landmark is an island that has the right to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or only with low-tide elevation status which is not entitled to any zone. In a 497-page ruling, the court ruled that China's claims had no legal basis and denied China's historical rights in the South China Sea. The decision also clarifies that China's artificial islands on coral reefs in the region cannot be considered a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 12-mile territorial waters¹⁰.

China's position clearly rejects the decision, and the arguments raised in their diplomacy to defend domestic interests in the South China Sea include, among other things, that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have the authority to process the Philippines' claim because the lawsuit relates to the issue of sovereignty and maritime boundary delimitation, which UNCLOS does. prohibited from trial by this mechanism; The Tribunal has no authority to adjudicate these bilateral disputes without the consent of the PRC; The settlement of sovereignty disputes can only be resolved through bilateral channels not through third parties, forty countries have supported the PRC's position; The PRC did not respect the Tribunal's decision.

Indonesia's position on this issue includes:

a. Indonesia along with other countries have protested and do not recognize the existence of the nine-dash line on the PRC map because the drawing of this line does not follow the rules of international law and applicable international law of the sea. In this context, Indonesia sees this line as a problem for all countries,

especially the parties to UNCLOS and not merely a bilateral Indonesia-China issue.

b. In the Natuna waters, Indonesia has made the continental shelf border line with Malaysia in 1969 and has been registered with the United Nations. Indonesia has also issued an EEZ Declaration on March 21, 1980 (and registered it with the United Nations) which describes a maritime zone of 200 nautical miles wide from the baseline in Natuna. These two instruments were never protested by the PRC.

c. Indonesia does not agree with the PRC's use of atolls and corals in the South China Sea as the basis for compiling the nine dash line, but considers that Indonesia's closest point in Natuna, namely Cuaerteron Reef, is not adjacent to the disputed claim area between Malaysia, Vietnam and China¹¹.

Indonesia's Interests in the South China Sea

From the defence aspect, the claims of various claimant states are a challenge for Indonesia to defend its claims in the North Natuna Sea, as referred to in the United Nations Conventions on The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. With this legal basis which was later ratified, Indonesia has the right to sovereign to explore the natural data sources in it.

From the economic aspect, the economic potential in the form of fisheries and natural gas is very large. Based on information provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), the East Natuna Block contains potential oil in the range of 36 million barrels of oil and natural gas in place (Initial Gas in Place / IGIP) of 22 trillion cubic feet.

Regional stability is the key to the strengthening of the South China Sea as a centre of trade activity because the South China Sea region contains economic, political and strategic value as Sea Lanes of Trade (SLOT) and Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) which connects the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. If discussed in more depth,

¹⁰“Situasi Laut Cina Selatan Setelah Putusan PCA,” *Antaranews*, Rabu, 11 Juli, 2018. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/725837/situasi-laut-china-selatan-setelah-putusan-pca>

¹¹Gerald Theodorus, *Peran Strategis Indonesia dalam Penyelesaian Konflik Laut China Selatan dalam perspektif Stabilitas Keamanan Regional*, *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional*, hal 16.

SLOC is a maritime route between ports that is used for international shipping activities which include trade, logistics, and naval shipping. As an international shipping lane, the South China Sea is the main route for a third of the world's maritime trade. In addition, this route also directs the volume of maritime trade shipping transportation traffic such as crude oil with shipping volumes reaching 1,000 ships per day¹².

Strategies to Anticipate Conflicts in the South China Sea

Defence diplomacy is one of the first approaches that the Government of Indonesia uses to deal with various conflicting claims in the South China Sea, especially claims related to the Natuna Islands. The idea of further pushing the defence diplomacy narrative was floated in early 2015, coinciding with Beijing's increasing narrative in the face of claims by warring countries using historical texts authorized by the Chinese government to strengthen legitimacy over the region. In April 2015, exactly 6 months after Joko Widodo started his regime, the Indonesian Navy and the United States conducted joint exercises around the Batam Islands. In addition, Indonesia also announced plans to build more military posts in border areas to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the archipelago—especially in areas facing the South China Sea. Indonesia's Minister of National Development Planning, Andrinof Chaniago, said he was working with the Ministry of Defence to draw up a comprehensive defence plan to be submitted to President Joko Widodo. The second attempt to show commitment in defending sovereignty located around the South China Sea by President Joko Widodo was on October 6, 2016, when he chose to be absent from the 71st anniversary of the Indonesian National Army. Instead, the President attended

the joint exercise of the Indonesian National Army's air fleet and personally witnessed the scenario of taking control of important objects controlled by the enemy in the Natuna Islands. Followed by various posturing efforts in the form of assertiveness and the placement of military forces in areas that are part of the claims of the disputing countries, the results that can be expected are as follows: 1) Asking for clarification on the nine-dash line with 2 methods, namely clarification by China and clarification by the Tribunal; 2) Using the Summit as a discussion forum between ASEAN and China, this takes into account the interests of ASEAN who want a settlement with a multilateral forum; 3) Using bilateral dialogue, takes into account China's desire to straighten out disagreements over claims in the SCS; 4) Learn from the weakness of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) which is not binding on the parties, considering that the declaration is only a political document that does not have binding legal force, and does not have binding and enforceable sanctions; 5) Encouraging the implementation of a code of conduct that will be used by claiming countries as a guide for regulating cross-border and natural resource exploitation in disputed areas¹³

Indonesia's Defence Strategy in the South China Sea

Indonesia is committed to realizing defence diplomacy with aspects consisting of creating an enabling environment that allows countries that are incorporated as claimant states to meet and negotiate their differences related to adjacent claim areas, encourage to increase economic cooperation in the region, maintain free and active foreign policy, as well as law enforcement in the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For the first aspect, Indonesia is the initiator of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea

¹²Yuli Ari Sulistyani, Andhini Citra Pertiwi, *Indonesia's Responses toward the The South China Sea Dispute During Joko Widodo's Admininstration*, Jurna lPolitica, hal. 7

¹³Patrik Kristophe Meyer, *Indonesia Swift Securitization Of The Natuna Islands*, Asian Journal Of Political Science, Pg.8

(DOC) which is currently running. In the 2017–2019 time-frame, Indonesia succeeded in bringing together ASEAN and China to finalize a single draft of the South China Sea code of ethics negotiation text, entitled Single Draft China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiation Text which includes 5 focuses. These focuses are the geographical scope of the South China Sea, dispute resolution efforts, the obligation to cooperate in preserving the maritime environment, the role of third parties in the South China Sea, and the legal status code of conduct.

Economically, increasing economic activity in border areas can increase the government's legitimacy regarding sovereignty claims in Natuna. The government has established Natuna as a fishery economic centre through the Integrated Marine and Fisheries Centre (SKPT) referring to KM KP no. 51/KEPMEN-KP/2016 concerning Determination of Locations for Development of Integrated Marine and Fishery Centres in Small Islands and Border Areas. SKPT as an economic policy has proven effective in other locations that have implemented this policy before, such as Sebatik. the development of the Sebatik SKPT to make Sebatik a new economic centre in the Indonesian border region will move some economic activities (in this case the trade of fishery products) not only to Tawau (Malaysia) as the main market, but also to encourage the strengthening of new markets by creating opportunities to invite consumers. to directly buy fishery products in Sebatik. The exploration of cooperation opportunities that have occurred at SKPT Sebatik consists of shrimp and mud crab cultivation, in addition to being related to market opportunities for shrimp and mangrove crabs, as well as opportunities to overcome the problem of shortage of shrimp fry and no mangrove crab hatchery business. Strengthening human resources as a reserve component is part of national defence. For example, President Joko Widodo has distributed land certificates to 102 Natuna residents as proof of legal rights to land that has become the property of the Natuna community. In addition,

the Indonesian government also encourages fishermen from Java Island to sail in the Natuna Sea. As many as 470 fishermen have been willing to sail and capture the natural wealth in Natuna waters. With the activity in the North Natuna Sea, there will be increase of economic activity especially in maritime aspect such as fishing and sailing and also deter other countries to use EEZ for harmful activity, such as maritime patrol¹⁴.

Of course, the synergy between military and various ministries that related to maritime security issues will be difficult to run without a capable and strong military. The Indonesian Navy needs to carry out what is called a layered defence, which consists of defence before the enemy is able to enter the Indonesian EEZ and defence after the enemy has entered the Indonesian EEZ. For the first layer, maritime infrastructure is needed that is capable of carrying out tasks to increase economic development, equitable distribution of logistics, ease of transportation, and mobilization of national defence. Military bases are the main base of defence and the focal point of mobilization in the region. In addition, the military base also encourages the military to conduct more intense monitoring of the surrounding area, because it can carry out maintenance more frequently and reduce the potential for attrition. After all, the existing defence equipment system is poorly maintained. Then, public ports will make necessities commonly found in military operations such as rations and enable fuel oil to become more affordable and easier to find, even at difficult times such as armed skirmish. With efficient logistics operations, the military can ease the burden of supplies and equipment to cut waste, such as logistics transportation, movement—that is, the transportation and movement of goods—and at the same time increase the resilience or sustainability of troops on the

¹⁴Bayu Vita Indah Yanti, *Dinamika Kesepakatan Perdagangan Lintas Batas Antara Indonesia dan Malaysia dan Pengembangan Sentra Kelautan dan Perikanan Terpadu Sebatik*, Kebijakan Sosek KP Vol. 10, hal. 16

battlefield. The existence of an adequate port is not enough because it must be supported by adequate defence equipment. If necessary, one port can support different operations simultaneously, such as carrying out border patrols and decommissioning sea mines simultaneously. A navy that trains regularly and intensely can give the effect of confidence and deterrence in future diplomacy and negotiations¹⁵.

The synergy between military and maritime security agencies will result in protecting national sovereignty and also protecting that fisherman that could be endangered by various trans-national crime activity and also other countries military activity that could breach national sovereignty. In real-life implementation, The Fishery and Maritime Ministry (KKP) already has a systematic investigation and arrest procedure for illegal fishing crimes. However, when in the field and dealing with China's Coast Guard (CCG) ships, the KKP could not match the CCG's strength. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Navy is designed to have a police role to enforce the law, because in areas bordering other countries, the threat of being escorted by the coast guard or navy. The KKP can exercise its authority to operate up to Indonesia's EEZ, but must coordinate with the Indonesian Navy to obtain force support. If the Fishery and Maritime Ministry meet again with CCG in law enforcement operations against Chinese fishing vessels, KRI is ready to face the CCG when carrying out hostile acts or hostile intent against KP KKP¹⁶.

Exercises and operations that are carried out regularly must eventually produce what is called picture building. Picture building that being conducted during the strengthening of military capacity will capable to build an impression of the TNI as a competent and firm party in both War Military Operations (OMP) and Military Operations Other Than War

(OMSP). TNI as the national representative of national integrity and sovereignty must be able to show a gentle impression and be able to mediate in the ongoing conflict while at the same time displaying the impression of being a protector of sovereignty and the people in it. In his duties according to Law no. 34 of 2004, the TNI has main tasks which are divided into 2 types, namely Military Operations for War or OMP and Military Operations Other Than War or OMSP. In OMSP, the duties of the TNI AL are not specifically on war, assault, and the use of weapons, but have much wider scope in many aspects such as social, political and humanitarian. Through various humanitarian missions, as well as supported by reliable defence equipment, the picture-building efforts can give the impression that the TNI-AL is able to use its strengths in a humane way and support peace.

After carrying out defence diplomacy and mobilization that could be explained as deterrence to prevent criminal activity or border violation happened in the middle of SCS, law enforcement needs to be carried out so that violators of the sovereignty boundary in the South China Sea can observe if Indonesian law applies in the sovereign territory. BAKAMLA has many means to enforce the law on the high seas, the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and Automatic Identification System (AIS) is Bakamla's operational resources in patrolling. Fishing Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) is a form of surveillance system in the field of catching and/or transporting fish by utilizing satellites and transmitter equipment operated on fishing vessels to facilitate supervision and monitoring of fishing vessel activities/activities based on the monitored vessel position. monitored by the Vessel Monitoring System, the Fisheries Monitoring Centre in Jakarta or in the area of the Supervision Technical Implementation Unit (UPT). Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) is a tracking system that only provides information to ships carrying transmitters. Therefore, ships that do not have and other ships that are not equipped with a transmitter whose conditions have been set will

¹⁵Booth, K., 2014. *Law, force and diplomacy at sea*, 1st ed. New York: Routledge

¹⁶ Christine Anggi Sidjabat, *Sinergi Instrumen Kekuatan Maritim Indonesia Menghadapi Klaim China atas Laut China Selatan*, Universitas Pertahanan, pg. 15

not be monitored by VMS. Automatic Identification System or AIS is a system used by ships to share information between two or more ships. The information shared includes: (1). Vessel identity such as: which ship, IMO number, MMSI number, and call sign, (2). Position, speed and direction of ship movement, and (3). The ship's destination port. In the AIS system, data exchange takes place automatically by utilizing AIS devices installed on ships, with radio waves as the medium. In the framework of law enforcement in the territorial waters and jurisdiction, particularly in carrying out security and safety patrols in the territorial waters and jurisdiction of Indonesia, a Maritime Security Agency was formed. Based on Law Number 32 of 2014 the Indonesian Navy as the law enforcers as well as investigators while Bakamla only carries out security and safety patrols, law enforcement does not carry out investigations (not as investigators). Therefore, Bakamla and TNI need to work together hand in hand so they could escort ships that violates national sovereignty until reaching the seaside that is part of national sovereignty.

IV. CONCLUSION

The increasing escalation in the The South China Sea means that there is an increasing need for synergy between the military and ministries related to maritime affairs to maintain the sovereignty and safety of Indonesian fishermen operating in these locations. Establish a national defence and security management centre which is a forum for synergy between civilians and the military in the aspect of national defence whose task is to monitor, analyze, and respond to all national security threats that can be found in the territorial waters, especially Natuna and North Natuna Sea, as well as efficiently by merging and simplifying the authority of several civilian agencies, to be further handed over to the national defence and security management centre which will later be able to eliminate the

impression of overlapping authorities in the management of national defence and security¹⁷. Internally, the national defence policy is formed through the state's defence posture in order to deal with various forms of threats that exist in the exclusive economic zone. Indonesia has formed units in Natuna from the Army, Navy, Air Force to handle problems in the The South China Sea so that it requires a defence posture to activities carried out to anticipate conflicts that occur continuously in the The South China Sea¹⁸.

For diplomacy, strategic stages are needed to balance the influence of China and the United States. For example, the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment has prepared a maritime diplomacy document, in which it contains several element points where Indonesia can address issues, one of which is the The South China Sea. Hopefully this can become a joint guideline for a comprehensive maritime diplomacy process that is interconnected with each other, so that there is a common guideline for addressing the SCS issues, and foreign policy with America, China and other maritime matters.¹⁹

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¹⁷ Laksamana Pertama TNI Dato Rusman S.N , , from interview "Indonesia's Defence Strategy in Anticipating the US-China Competition in the The South China Sea", August 12, 2021

¹⁸ Brigjen TNI Haryadi , , from interview "Indonesia's Defence Strategy in Anticipating the US-China Competition in the The South China Sea", August 12, 2021

¹⁹ Sora Lokita, S.H., M.I.L, Assistant Deputy One of the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, RI, from interview "Indonesia's Defence Strategy in Anticipating the US-China Competition in the The South China Sea", August 12, 2021

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