

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE HANDLING PUBLIC COMPLAINTS INDICATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN CENTRAL JAVA-INDONESIA

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Abstract

In the context of handling public complaints indicating corruption, collaborative governance between APIP and APH is one of the strategies needed by the government so that the handling of corruption cases is more comprehensive to find out whether the issue is an administrative error or there are indications of elements of unlawful acts. The purpose of the study was to explore the implementation and inhibiting factors of APIP and APH collaborative governance in the context of handling public complaints with indications of corruption in Central Java Province, the collaboration theory of Ansell and Gash (2008), and to analyze the inhibiting factors with the Government of Canada theory (MacDonald, 2008). This research method is the es descriptive qualitative method. The research locus was conducted in Central Java Province. Determination of informants with purposive sample data sources was obtained from APIP and APH sources in Central Java Province. Data analysis was carried out stages of data reduction, data presentation, and draw concluding results of the study found that although there were collaboration results, the implementation did not go through a collaborative process such as no face-to-face dialogue (joint forum) with stakeholders for collective decision making, commitment to the process and mutual trust were not optimal, and lack of shared understanding and no role. Facilitative leadership in the collaborative process. It was also found that ten inhibiting factors for collaboration can be categorized into 2 (two) aspects, namely aspects of the Organizational Environment (cultural, institutional, political, regulatory, and economic interests) and Aspects of the Collaborative Process (commitment, trust, coordination, communication, and resources). This study also proposes an effective collaboration implementation model in handling public complaints with indications of corruption.

Keywords: collaborative governance, collaboration dimensions, handling public complaints

Introduction

Corruption is known as an extraordinary crime or an extraordinary crime. According to Lubis, corruption in Indonesia is endemic, systemic, and widespread (Kurniawan, 2009, p.116). The broader impact of corruption disrupts the economy and state finances. In addition, corruption also hinders development and includes violations of the social and economic rights of the community. Rose-Ackerman (2010) defines corruption as the abuse of power by

bureaucrats to enrich themselves and their groups. Meanwhile, Hughes (2010) defines corruption as a failure in the performance of the public sector due to bureaucrats seeking personal gain. Some experts define corruption as the abuse of authority in government positions for personal gain (Bagashka, 2014). Furthermore, Klitgaard (2012) explains the reasons for corruption to occur in bureaucrats (government), namely (1) the government has monopoly rights over the public sector, (2) the

government has discretion in articulating the law, and (3) the lack of accountability from the government (as referred to in Rahayu; Juwono, 2019, pp. 264-265). The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)

(2021) reported cases of corruption in Indonesia for 11 (eleven) years, namely from 2010 to 2020; it had handled 761 cases.

Table 1.1. Corruption Cases Based on Agencies 2010 – 2020

Agency	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Jumlah
DPR and DPRD	7	2	6	2	2	3	15	9	4	7	0	57
Ministries/ Agencies	16	23	18	46	26	21	39	31	47	44	17	328
BUMN/ BUD	7	3	1	0	0	5	11	13	5	17	13	75
Commission	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Provincial government	0	3	13	4	11	18	13	15	29	11	13	130
District/city government	8	7	10	18	19	10	21	53	114	66	48	168
Total	40	39	48	52	58	57	78	68	85	145	91	761

Source: <https://acch.kpk.go.id/id/statistik/tindak-pidana-korupsi>

The KPK data above shows for 11 years from 2010 to d. 2020 has handled 761 corruption cases, with the most cases based on agencies in Ministries/Institutions, as many as 328 points or 43%. The next is in the ranks of local government agencies

(provincial/district/city) as many as 298 cases or 39% (see table). This shows a high potential for corruption cases in the regions that must be handled, not only by the KPK but also by law enforcement officials in the areas.

Table 1.2. Corruption Cases by Region 2010-2020

NO	REGION	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
1	Central government	20	21	18	26	18	16	29	38	32	55	27	300
2	Java	11	14	10	29	20	6	44	46	86	28	21	315
3	Sumatra	6	2	15	12	8	24	20	21	56	38	30	232
4	Sulawesi	1	2	5	1	2	2	2	3	5	3	6	32

5	Maluku							1		5			6
6	Borneo								9	10	16	6	41
7	Bali					2	2		1				5
8	Papua	1				4	7		2		2	1	15
9	Kepulauan Sunda Kecil				2	4		3		5	3		17
10	Malaysia								1				1
11	Singapore	1											1
	TOTAL	40	39	48	70	58	57	99	12	19	14	91	967
									1	9	5		

Source: <https://acch.kpk.go.id/id/statistik/tindak-pidana-korupsi>

KPK data for the past 11 years shows that the handling of corruption cases by region is mainly on the island of Java as many as 315 people or 32%, the next are corruption cases in the central government, as many as 300 people or 31% and the island of Sumatra as many as 232 people or 24%. Seeing the most corruption cases in Java shows that the local government system with regional autonomy powers without strict supervision can affect the occurrence of corruption in the regions as the theory of crime according to Klitgaard.

The identification of patterns of corruption cases in local governments based on the results of the KPK study (2019) refers to court decisions that have permanent legal force (*Eintracht*) or in the legal process as follows: (1) patterns of corruption in the forestry, land, spatial planning, mining, and mining sectors. And oil and gas; (2) the pattern of corruption related to the legislative function, budget function, supervisory function, and policy in the Regional House of Representatives; (3) the pattern of corruption in the procurement of government goods/services; (4) the pattern of corruption in the field of civil servants; and (5) the pattern of corruption in the village fund sector. The crime pattern is mapped according to mode, sector, actor, financial loss, time, and region, including how corruption hinders public services.

The number of corruption cases in Indonesia has become a severe concern for the government because it has the potential to hinder development. The Minister of Development Planning/Head of Bappenas at the International Business Integrity Conference on December 4, 2018, in Jakarta, conveyed the results of an empirical analysis that investors from countries that already have international conventions on anti-corruption (e.g., 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions) tend to reduce investment in countries with high levels of corruption. Thus, national corruption cases in Indonesia will disrupt economic performance (Bappenas, 2018).

One of the efforts so that economic performance runs optimally is the need for synergy between the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP) and Law Enforcement Apparatuses (APH) in preventing corruption so that the economy and national/regional development can run well. ICW (2018) explained in its 2018 Case Action Report recommending a synergy between state audit institutions, inspectors, and law enforcement officers regarding potential state financial losses due to corruption cases. This synergy is necessary to improve the performance of prosecution of corruption cases by law

enforcement officers. Hadilatih (2018) analyzes collaborative governance strategies in Corruption Eradication and preventive, detective, and repressive system. The study results explore one method that can be used to determine government policies to prevent and eradicate corruption by applying the concept of Collaborative Governance. The research recommendation is a Collaborative Governance strategy in eradicating corruption by paying attention to the structured collaboration between government, private, and community institutions.

In Indonesia, one of the efforts to handle corruption runs optimally is the need for synergy between the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP) and the Law Enforcement Apparatus (APH). The economy and national/regional development can run well. The synergy in the collaboration between APIP and APH is based on Article 385 paragraph (2) of Law no. 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government. As a follow-up to Law no. 23 of 2014, the central government has signed a Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Home Affairs, the Attorney General, and the Head of the National Police Number 700/8929/SJ, Number KEP-694/A/JA/11/2017 and Number B.108/XI/2017 dated 30 November 2017 concerning Coordination of APIP and APH related to the Handling of Public Reports or Complaints in the Implementation of Regional Government. All Regional Heads then followed up the Memorandum of Understanding, Heads of Prosecutors and Police Heads at the regional level, both provincial and district/city, including the Central Java Provincial Government and District/City Governments in Central Java.

The style of collaboration between APIP and APH is in line with the Agranoff &

McGuire (2001) model with a Top-Down style approach. This style emphasizes the control of the central government vertically over regional governments as well (Islamy, 2018, p.17). There is a debate about realizing the national program through local government in this style. Therefore, the decisive aspect of this top-down style is voluntary compliance and the suitability of local government programs in implementing central government programs.

According to Agbodzakey (2012), collaborative governance is expected to solve complex problems collectively by involving key stakeholders and alternatives for top-down management, policymaking, and implementation. (Thomson & Perry, 2006) collaborative governance is a way to solve critical social conflict problems between diverse stakeholders, formulate regional development plans for environmental protection policies through creative, deliberative, and mutually beneficial self-organization among stakeholders (Ali, Islamy, Supriyono, & Muluk, 2013). O'Leary & Vrij (2012) define collaborative governance as facilitating and implementing involving multiple organizations to solve problems that cannot or cannot be easily solved by the organization itself. Eugene Bardach describes a more specific goal of collaborative governance (2001), namely as a form of joint activity by two or more institutions that work together to increase "public value" rather than having to work alone (Astuti, 2020, p.38). In general, it is explained that Collaborative Governance is a process that involves various relevant stakeholders to promote the interests of each agency in achieving common goals (Cordery, 2004; Febrian, 2016; Hartman, Hofman, & Stafford, 2002).

Many factors influence the success of Collaborative governance itself. Schottle, Haghsheno, and Gehbauer (Astuti, 2019, pp. 84-87) conclude that the most influential factors are willingness to compromise, communication, commitment, mutual trust, and exchange of knowledge information, sharing of knowledge, and desire to reduce risk jointly. So if these factors are weak, it will hinder the implementation of collaboration. The Government of Canada said that collaboration was hampered due to cultural factors, institutional factors, and political factors.

Although normatively, collaboration has been regulated from top-down regulations at the central and regional (local) levels, the partnership in handling public complaints with indications of corruption by APIP and APH in the regions has not been effective. The initial problems encountered in the areas were the absence of APIP and APH dialogue forums, exchange of information, building trust, and commitment to handling cases of alleged corruption complaints.

This study explores the implementation of APIP and APH collaborative governance in handling public complaints with indications of corruption in the regions and the inhibiting factors of this collaboration. By using cooperative governance theory from Ansell and Gash (2008). This research resulted in an alternative collaboration model between APIP and APH based on collaborative governance theory in handling public complaints with indications of corruption.

Method

The research was conducted with a qualitative approach. Based on the statement of L. J. Moleong (2006); Welch & Patton (1992) suggest that qualitative research is data collection in a natural

setting, using natural methods and carried out by naturally interested people or researchers. A similar opinion was also expressed by Finlayson (1995) in Moleong (2006) by stating that qualitative research uses a scientific background to interpret phenomena that occur and are carried out by involving various existing methods. The location of this research is in Central Java. In-depth interviews with multiple stakeholders collect data handling public complaints with indications of corruption, such as the regional inspectorate, police, and prosecutors. After the data is collected, an analysis process or interactive model technique is carried out with a data collection cycle, data reduction, and data presentation and conclusion (Huberman, 2009). In this way, various problems can be identified that cause the lack of optimal collaboration. This research produces a model for handling public complaints with indications of corruption through a collaborative governance approach.

Results and Discussion

1. APIP and APH Collaboration Process

The collaboration process variable is the core of the collaborative governance model. At the same time, the initial conditions, institutional design, and leadership are presented as supporters who make essential contributions to the collaboration process. Ansell and Gash (2008) identify the collaboration process as a cycle consisting of face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to the process, shared understanding of the vision, mission, and problems.) as well as intermediate outcomes.

The results of the research on the collaboration process are found as follows:

a. Face-to-face dialogue

In the collaboration process cycle, good communication is needed to negotiate in

reaching an agreement (face-to-face dialogue). Communication is an essential medium that stakeholder actors must build. In the collaborative process of handling public complaints indicating corruption in Central Java, a face-to-face dialogue has not brought together the Inspectorate, the police, and the prosecutor's office in a joint discussion forum. When a case of alleged corruption occurs within the local government and will be handled by one of the APH, communication is carried out non-formally person to person with APIP officials, and vice versa. So there is no face-to-face dialogue process with the three stakeholders.

Another fact found is that when a complaint of an alleged corruption case is received by one of the APH parties and the case is considered to be only an administrative matter, the APH will delegate the complaint case to APIP through a delegation letter, not in a joint dialogue forum to produce a mutual decision. . On the other hand, it was also found that there was an overflow of cases of alleged corruption from APIP to one of the APIs based on a letter of delegation, not from a joint discussion in a dialogue forum.

b. Building trust (trust-building)

Building trust is a time-consuming process and requires a commitment between stakeholders. Three agencies collaborate with the same authority to handle public complaints indicating corruption. Mutual trust is needed between the Inspectorate, the Police, and the Prosecutor's Office. Empirical facts found that building the value of the mutual trust has not been realized at the implementation level because there is still an assumption that APIP is not yet independent institutionally. On the contrary APIP views that if APH handles the case, it is considered a target for operations.

Thus the results of the study conclude that building trust in the collaborative process between the Inspectorate, the police, and the prosecutor's office cannot be realized optimally considering that each party has a sectoral ego of each party in handling cases of alleged corruption, so that it requires commitment among their respective leaders.

c. Commitment to this collaboration (commitment to process),

In collaboration, commitment from all stakeholders is an essential factor in achieving a successful partnership. Commitment is needed to achieve common goals built based on an agreement. The Cooperation Agreement (PKS) and Work Guidelines signed by the APIP and APH leaders are a form of written commitment that must be built in collaboration. The facts on the ground show that the three stakeholder agencies have not made the commitments at the implementation level. The reality of the commitment is not optimal because there are still interests in each agency and the rotation of officials in APIP and APH, so that commitment must be carried out continuously through communication between stakeholder leaders.

d. Sharing understanding of the vision, mission, and problems (shared experience)

This collaboration, seen from understanding the cooperation agreement, is very understanding, only uniting the perception of vision and mission between stakeholders, which has not been implemented. The unification of this perception is essential so that the collaboration goals can be practical. Still, in reality, when each party receives a public complaint, it will be carried out separately under the pretext of carrying out its authority.

Thus, based on the research, it is found that the stakeholders have not carried out the understanding of the shared vision in the collaborative process of handling public complaints indicating corruption.

e. Intermediate Outcome

The intermediate results from business activities are identified and measured shortly and indicate long-term effects (Islamy, 2018). The collaboration will occur when the goals and benefits of cooperation are concretely realized and when there are "small wins" from the partnership (Warner, 2006). Intermediate

outcomes in the collaboration of public complaints indicating corruption in Central Java have been shown by the coordination of the delegation of cases of public complaints both to APIP and to APH through case overflow and person-to-person communication, although not from a joint forum (face-to-face dialogue) between the three parties. Stakeholders. The delegation of this case only goes one way between the two actors, so the other actors do not know.

Data on case spillovers from APH to APIP or vice versa from APIP to APH are below.

Table 1. Data on Handling Outflow of Corruption Indications from APH to APIP in Central Java Province in 2019 – 2020

No	APH	Number of Case Complaints	Follow-up APIP	LHP APIP (Number and Date)
1.	Central Java High Court	2 case	Conducted audit	The results of the audit have been reported to the Prosecutor.
2.	Central Java Regional Police	2 case	Conducted audit	The audit results have been reported to the Police.

Source: Inspectorate of Central Java Province, 2021

Table 2. Data on Handling Overflow of Corruption Indications from APIP to APH in Central Java Province in 2019 – 2020

No	Number of Case Materials	APH Recipient of overflow from APIP	APH Follow Up
1.	1 case	Central Java Regional Police	Information material was collected and reported to APIP.

Source: Inspectorate of Central Java Province, 2021

Thus, the collaboration process between the three collaboration actors (the Inspectorate, Special Criminal Assistant, and the Special Criminal Directorate) based on the research concluded that it has not been effective as the Ansell and Gash (2008) model collaboration process starting from the face to face dialogue stage, building trust (trust-building), commitment to the process

(commitment to function), shared understanding of the vision and mission and problems (shared understanding), as well as intermediate outcomes.

2. Identification of Collaboration Inhibiting Factors

Several studies on collaborative governance have concluded the factors causing its success and failure. Mattessich, Murray-Close, Monsey (2001) in Astuti (2020, hh.90-91) mentions 19 factors of governance success which are classified into 6 (six) groups, namely (1) environment, (2) membership, (3) process/structure, (4) communication, (5) objectives and (6) resources. Schottle (2014) concludes that solid factors influencing collaborative governance are willingness to compromise, communication, commitment, mutual trust, exchange of information, knowledge sharing, and collective desire to take risks. At the same time, the factors that cause weakness are the emergence of potential conflicts, coordination, control, partnering, and independence. The government of Canada (Macdonald, 2012) mentions three inhibiting factors in collaboration, namely (1) cultural factors, (2) institutional factors, and (3) political factors.

The results of research on collaborative handling of public complaints with indications of corruption in Central Java found 10 (ten) inhibiting factors which were grouped into two aspects, namely aspects of the organizational environment and aspects of the collaboration process, namely:

a. Culture shows that the Inspectorate as APIP does not take a breakthrough to sit down together to discuss complaints in a joint forum. Both APIP and APH still prioritize the dispositions and procedures applicable in their respective agencies. Meanwhile, APH still applies the "cut compass" culture that investigators must handle cases first; if later administrative problems are found, they will be submitted to APIP.

b. Institutional shows that collaboration is hampered because APH, a vertical

institution, is still burdened with performance targets for handling corruption in each party. In APH itself, handling corruption cases are performance target noted by the standing agencies above.

c. Politics shows that the three parties, both the Inspectorate as APIP and Ditkrimsus and Aspidsus as APH, still offer a high sectoral ego to carry out their respective authorities in handling corruption and the interests of their respective agencies.

d. Economic interests, finding that there are still individuals who abuse their authority to investigate corruption for personal/team interests, and the issue of personal integrity concerns individual morals;

e. Regulation found that handling public complaints with indications of corruption was based on different rules. APIP uses Law no. 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government with an administrative approach. Meanwhile, APH uses the Law on Corruption Crimes with a legal process;

f. Coordination found that the cause of the obstacles was because the coordination of the three parties, both APIP and APH, was still weak, there were no regular meetings, and there was no leader or secretariat to handle coordination;

g. Communication, found that communication has not been effective due to lack of coordination. Communication is still done person to person, not in discussion forums.


h. Commitment found that the commitment of the leadership to collaborate is still low, especially for APH officials who are vertical agencies; the frequency of mutation/rotation of officials is quite frequent, making it challenging to build a practical commitment;

i. Trust found that each collaborating party still has not built trust. APH sees that APIP

is less independent because it is subordinate to the governor; on the other hand, APIP sees its position as an internal governor so that cases must be handled administratively first. There are concerns that the case will become legal if handled by APH.

j. Resources found that this collaboration was not supported by existing resources, such as the absence of a joint secretariat, budget allocation for collaboration, human resources sitting in the collaboration secretariat, and no scheduled regular meeting schedule.

Figure 2. Identification of Inhibiting Factors in Handling Public Complaints with Indications of Corruption in Central Java



Source: Research Results

Based on the findings of the 10 (ten) inhibiting factors for collaboration in handling public complaints with indications of corruption in Central Java Province above, these factors are in line with the Government of Canada theory (2008), Schottle, Hagsheno, and Gehbauer (2014) theory, and Mattessich and Monsey (1992). There were also 2 (two) other inhibiting factors, namely the economic interest factor and the regulatory factor, which previous researchers had not discussed as the other inhibiting factors for collaboration.

3. Alternative APIP and APH Collaboration Model

The existing model for handling public complaints with indications of corruption

by APIP and APH consists of 4 (four) variables: initial conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership, and collaboration processes. These four variables are maintained as the primary model for collaborative handling of public complaints indicating APIP and APH corruption in Central Java Province, which researchers propose.

Each variable as a collaboration stage is emphasized in collaboration activities. The following explains the proposed collaborative model for handling public complaints with indications of APIP and APH corruption in Central Java.

1. The institutional dimension is an administrative system that involves many

actors (multi-stakeholders), both from the government and outside the government. The collaboration on public complaints with indications of corruption does not only include elements of the government, namely the Inspectorate, police, and prosecutors, as well as the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Home Affairs as supervisors or those who carry out monitoring and evaluation on the implementation of collaboration in the regions, and include the reporting community and reporting NGOs as stakeholder actors;

2. The value dimension that is the basis for the collaboration process is the actors' values, namely the importance of compromise, commitment, trust, and transparency/information exchange. In addition, this study found that the discounts were not involved, so it became an inhibiting factor in the collaboration process. So these values must be used to be a strengthening factor for collaboration.

3. The process dimension explains how elements and institutions respond to various public problems. The process of handling public complaints indicating corruption is how the face-to-face dialogue process is carried out, how to build the value of commitment and the importance of trust, how to share understanding, and temporary results that have been achieved.

Conclusion

Collaboration on public complaints indicates corruption in Central Java, a top-down policy seen from three dimensions; it has not been effective although it has been running. The institutional dimension is an administrative system that involves many actors (multi-stakeholders), both from the government and outside the government. Collaboration on public complaints with indications of corruption does not only include elements of the government, namely the Inspectorate, the police, and the

prosecutor's office, but also needs to involve the Inspector General of the Ministry of Home Affairs as a supervisor or monitoring evaluation of the implementation of collaboration in the regions, and includes the need for the reporting community and reporting NGOs as stakeholder actors.

The value dimensions that are the basis for the collaboration process are values that are applied by the actors involved, namely the importance of compromise, the value of commitment, the discount of trust, and the deal of transparency/information exchange. . So these values must be applied so that they can be a strengthening factor for collaboration. Meanwhile, the process dimension concludes that the process of face-to-face dialogue, building the value of commitment and trust, and sharing understanding have not been effective, although temporary results are visible.

This study recommends an alternative model by considering the existing stakeholders (APIP and APH) with the new stakeholders (Intjen Ministry of Home Affairs, reporting communities, and reporting NGOs), considering their respective roles. In addition, this proposed model must apply the values that need to be built in the collaborative process, such as commitment, trust, transparency, compromise, and the collaborative governance process itself. The proposed model also considers facilitative leadership, namely the Regional Inspectorate (APIP), as a secretariat that prepares existing resources, including initiating face-to-face meetings and as a facilitator.

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