

Attitude Of Kuwait Mediation From Gulf Crisis

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Abstract:

Attitude mediation is among the top means of international disputes resolution, where the mediator calls on disputing members states to roundtable negotiations to bring about a resolution and reconciliation. In the context of the GCC, the recent crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, the mediating country is Kuwait, who attempted to mitigate the escalation of the crisis that otherwise would have led to a military confrontation against Doha to bring about a regime change. This type of resolution effort is at risk of prolonging the crisis that could escalate and prevent the parties to the dispute in reaching reconciliation. In this case, Kuwait, as the mediating nation is faced with the challenge of preventing the damage that could have been wrought to the existence of the GCC in case it failed its mediating efforts. The matter was compounded by the fact that the dispute went beyond borders with Egypt also boycotting the Turkish troop's presence in Qatar and thus, such a dispute led to a political rift among the GCC counties and their leaders, causing concern to the regimes. This situation posed a threat to the fundamental principles of the states, with the inclusion of those countries that held their neutrality in the dispute.

Keywords: Kuwait, Attitude Mediation, dispute, Gulf crisis, Qatar, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

1. INTRODUCTION

In the most current Gulf crisis, Kuwait's role in mediating the countries in dispute along with the Gulf Crisis Test Mediation efforts have both been deemed to be a peaceful means to settle international disputes. In this case, the mediator takes up the role as an entity that solves disagreements using methods of negotiation and discussions in one table. In addition, mediation has become the charter of many international bodies with the foremost of which are the UN and the League of Arab States. Sometimes, the mediators highlight the interests of some neighboring parties or international community, to pacify the two or several states from entering into a full-blown conflict. Such efforts are focused on settling conflicts at a timely and satisfactory manner for the entire concerned parties and it aims to mitigate

the differences while enabling discussions between the conflicting parties.

Going back to the recent Gulf crisis, where the mediating efforts of Kuwait were directed towards bridging the rift between over half of the GCC states and Qatar, which would have otherwise lead to armed conflict to oust the current regime in Doha. Such efforts by Kuwait were rife with threats reflecting the long-crisis duration and the failure to achieve a settlement among the conflicting nations and this may have led to jeopardizing the position of Kuwait and the GCC's actual existence.

In the above background, the decision lies in the hands of Kuwait as the mediator knowing that there is limited time and that Kuwait's political prestige is at stake and so timely solutions were needed for conflict settlement. This was particularly true as the regional and international presence intensity comprises of several elements that could affect any

solution/agenda suggested by the mediator. This made it an issue of many complications that would need accurate but complex solutions, testing Kuwait's ability to scrutinize the many facets surrounding and within the conflict. Considering the conflict, the parties concerned and the mediation efforts exerted by Kuwait, who is unfamiliar with the political issue, it is logical to view the conflict as rife with complexity and intersection of mutual interests. The setbacks in the current efforts towards mediation set the crisis back to ground zero, with Kuwait facing a challenging that they have not faced since the Iraqi invasion in the 1990s. Such challenge has led to the clash of mediators' agendas and the internal affairs as well as the multiplicity of powers in a way that went beyond the Gulf region and involves Egypt and Turkey, with Turkey making a move to send its military forces in Qatar. This led to a political turmoil in the GCC (Mitroff & Puochant, ???), threatening the peace even in countries holding neutral ground (e.g., Oman and Kuwait).

The Unknown Outcome of Kuwait's Mediation Efforts

The analysis of each country's role and its stance provides an insight into its value and offerings, its interests and role as a part in a conflict or as one that takes on a mediating role. Kuwait is a country located in the middle of three major powers in the Middle East, possessing geographic and population densities significance (i.e., between Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia). These countries have had conflicts and expansion vision, with one targeting Kuwait. Thus, the recent crisis in the Gulf is not merely a geopolitical conflict, but a reminiscent of the Iraqi invasion in the eyes of Kuwait just without the military power. Suspended military power has been replaced by demands but regardless, Kuwait is aware of the threats to its position when it comes to the above three major countries.

Reasons behind the Overlapping Efforts

A notable point is the ability of Kuwait, as a mediator, in pinpointing the crisis components and the causes behind them in an accurate manner. Daily evolution of the recent Gulf crisis makes it difficult to determine the cause of the conflict and the drivers behind it. Additionally, the presentation of suitable views meeting the least requirements of the disputed parties is also significant and this is parallel to the obstacles that the mediator is faced with concerning the causes behind the crisis.

It appears that the crisis enlightened Kuwait as a mediator, that historical disagreements delayed or resolved, depended on the parties' abilities to maintain the interests of one another. In this regard, the presence of any ambiguity or reverse actions in the political interests would lead to a negative setback, which is what seems to be occurring in the current crisis. Moreover, some parties perceive that they have surplus power, while others are temperamental. The crisis and its escalation led the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al Ahmed to announce the collapse of the Gulf House in the second ordinary session of the 15th legislative session of the National Assembly on the 24th of October 2017 after his visit to Saudi Arabia. He stressed at the escalation of the crisis and the eventual damage and destruction to the security of the Gulf countries and its people. Evidently, the mediating efforts of Kuwait succeeded as a significant step as it held the 38th Gulf Summit in Kuwait on the 5th of December 2017, in the face of the low representation of participating countries from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the reduction of the summit duration from two to one day. Kuwait has found itself in the middle of a crisis that is formed by the legacy rife with fear and unease – torn between history and failure. The least loss stemming from the legacy is the culmination of the GCC system which managed to survive the first Gulf War in

the 1980s and the second one in the last decade of the 20th century (Idris, 2000).

The GCC system has undergone several wars and conflicts in history with the aftermath being torn countries and people and sovereign decisions left at direct foreign interventions as exemplified by Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. It is safe to say that Kuwait's motives, versatile attitude and keenness as a mediator will remain. Such role can be easily understood through the investment of the country in the GCC and its view of the council as a realistic and permanent entity, which has maintained its existence since its inception in 1981. There is no system at par to the GCC but at the same time none can ensure its demise or prevent the withdrawal of some countries from it. Several differences can be noted in the GCC countries policies but they are negligible and throughout history, Kuwait has succeeded in resolving issues but this time it is faced with the strong inclination of four Gulf States, namely Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE, aside from Egypt. This issue is viewed by Kuwait as a Gulf issue engulfed by the premise of permanence and national characteristics of Gulf nations and their citizens. Such characteristics drives Kuwait as a mediator to resolve the situation and to support and maintain the Gulf House as mentioned in the Parliament on the 24th of October, 2017, stressing on the crisis and reflecting the importance of the issue to remain within the context.

Historical Mediating Legacy of Kuwait

The source, form and mechanism of mediation generally cannot be exemplified in the practical world as the mediators and parties to the conflict need to understand that the desired political outcome should be just. The role undertaken by Kuwait viewed in the level of diplomacy is important and it has taken on the role to regenerate the success it has achieved throughout history. The policy stems from a long history of playing the mediating role and intervention success when it

comes to resolving issues and disputes among the Gulf countries. Hence, the mediation efforts of Kuwait appear to be dependent on historical heritage which originates from this regard, its authority structure and its robust political system. In relation to this, Kuwait has an active role and huge presence among international, regional and Arab events and such activeness throughout the decades has coincided with the emirate's establishment and emergence. Based on the history of the country, its political and diplomatic development underwent through many stages; this can be traced back four centuries ago when Sheikh Sabah I, the first ruler of Kuwait visited the Ottomans, away from Bani Khalid (Burn, n.d.) following the country's establishment. The Kuwaitis presented themselves as a party seeking peace and not conflict with the region's parties – which led Bani Khalid to interact with the Sheikh of Kuwait to resolve the situation. This eventually led to a good neighbor agreement, through Sabah bin Jabir's son Abdullah, who signed the agreement under the stipulation that Kuwait will not join the opposing force (Qal'aji, 1962; Al-Din, 1987). According to one historian from the West, the visit involved the meeting and agreement of influential people to send an envoy to the Pasha of Basra to relay that Kuwait had no intention of harming anyone.

During the time of the second ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Sabah, the Ottoman authorities requested that the hand over some refugees but he refused although the British stated that the Baghdad government had intentions to attack Kuwait if he failed to do as they requested. He responded that he was ready to fight and protect his guests and this has become the new approach employed by the Kuwaiti authority as it continued its neutral stance when faced with controversial issues and political conflicts between neighboring countries. Moreover, Kuwait's 5th ruler, Sheikh Mohammed Al-Sabah (r.1892-1896) also mediated

between two rival siblings who were at that time vying for rule over Bahrain. The mediation efforts was a success and the ruler arrived in Bahrain to resolve the dispute in 1864 (Al-Nabahani, 1923). It is also notable that after the 1961 independence, Kuwaiti political process adopted a balanced approach to resolving issues between the country and other countries.

For instance, the Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis of 1961 evidenced the maintenance of peace by Kuwait through the shifting of the crisis to the authority of the Security Council and the League of Arab States. Also, at the onset of the Egypt-Saudi Arabia conflict in 1965, which heightened into military threats that would have casted negative light over the region, particularly because Egyptian military was present in Yemen, Kuwait played its mediating role. Specifically, Kuwait Prime Minister Sheikh Sabal Al-Salem succeeded in conducting a meeting with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Added to the above mediating efforts, Kuwait also mediated in the case of Bahrain, with Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, ensuring the referendum of independence went through for the former. Kuwait became the image and reputation of calm and pragmatism at that time when other Gulf States were hostile. Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah was inclined towards referring the issue to the UN for the determination of how the Bahraini people can reach a self-determination decision. This issue also placed Kuwait as having good and satisfactory mediation efforts to agree with Iran, where secret negotiations took place between Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad al-Sabah.

In 1971, a military conflict between East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and India, and Pakistan broke out and Kuwait was among the first countries from the Gulf to acknowledge the independence of Bangladesh and in the same year, Kuwait's foreign minister headed the mission by the

Islamic Conference Organization along with Somalian and Lebanese Foreign Ministers. Also in the 1972 conflict between South and North Yemen, Kuwait mediated to pave the way for dispute resolutions and in 1984, when conflicts arose again, Kuwait again played the role of an impartial neutral mediator, creating an appropriate environment for solving the Oman-Yemen conflict.

Several years after in 1989, Kuwait's mediating efforts came into play during the Senegal-Mauritania conflict, where it deployed the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to activate the mechanisms to resolve the issue and facilitate direct dialogue between the two countries prior to military conflict escalation. Also, during the crisis between Palestine and Jordan in 1970, which was followed by Black September, Kuwait also had a hand in pacifying and defusing the dispute. Furthermore, in 1989, Kuwait mediated in Lebanese affairs along with other parties to establish the Taif agreement, and in the eighties, it was a mediator between Turkey and Bulgaria through the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah. Kuwait efforts of mediation was also highlighted between Saudi Arabia-Libyan dispute, with the two countries having had several differences throughout history, with the highest pinnacle being at the Arab summit in 2010, when Saudi King Abdullah and Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi had an open clash.

Moving on to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Kuwait at no period of time escalated the things between them prior to it, and even in the Iraq-Syria dispute, Kuwait played a mediating role in the crisis to facilitate negotiation between the two countries, political differences. During the Gulf Summit hosted by Kuwait, a single currency was raised and Oman was quite vocal and forceful in rejecting it, but with the mediating efforts from Kuwait, the parties eventually agreed to postpone the case. Prior to the advent of the Arab Spring Revolutions, the conflict between

Egypt and Qatar was a well talked issue in the news and media outlets and Kuwait exerted efforts to resolve the tension between them, and after the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with Qatar standing firm against it, mediating efforts from Kuwait were deployed for resolution. This history of Kuwaiti policy of mediating efforts and effectiveness evidence the role of the country in issue and conflict resolution. However, the question that needs answering is whether the conventional history supports mediating efforts in the middle of an unconventional crisis.

Kuwait's Promising Mediation Efforts Remains at Square One

The fundamental danger that faces Kuwait as a mediating country can be understood by addressing the current crisis ideological challenge for it. The crisis could negatively impact the previous efforts of the mediating country, target its movement course and place it in a tough position. On June 5, intervention from Kuwait was noted albeit the crisis was long before this date. This paper is focused on the role of Kuwait and the potential outcome of the current mediation efforts, without delving into other problems/aspects relating to the issue, whether policy wise or economic wise.

In 2014, following the withdrawal of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain ambassadors from Qatar, Kuwait's mediating efforts were considerably increased and despite the success in the past, this time, some issues remained unresolved. Nevertheless, with the determined and firm recent moves, the mediation effort appears relatively stable and promising, which were promoted by the mediating individuals, including the head of political leadership, the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad. The mediator, in this case, is fully aware that he qualifies as a successful mediator, and has the characteristics for it – such characteristics are enumerated as follows;

1. Kuwait focuses on the dimension of the environment – in that most of the efforts are directed at the four Gulf States through visits despite the other parties involved (Egypt and Turkey), with some others like Comoros cutting off relationships with Qatar. The visits made by Kuwait representative forms a distinct Gulf dimension for the crisis and the country also sent messages to the region's citizens that the crisis will be confined to an issue concerning the Gulf.
2. Emphasis has been placed by Kuwait, over and over, in its speeches that the crisis is between brothers and neighboring countries, which makes it an urgent issue to be resolved.
3. Kuwait has as clear position when it comes to the crisis, consistent asserting that its efforts will remain continuous with the persistence of the crisis despite the conviction that time could be a double-edged sword in that the longer the crisis will persist, the more the complexity will increase and the more the efforts will be for naught. This could the fears and pessimism harbored by Kuwait concerning the Gulf system justifying the concern of achieving successful mediation efforts. Kuwait appears to be incapable of solving the situation but in hindsight, it should overlook the time problem and be prepared instead to resolve the crisis within the framework of the environment. Specific parties should be avoided if solutions/proposals that are meant to solve the issue fail. Kuwait appears to be limiting the impact of the issue on international level and to prevent the Gulf region from being an area of unresolved conflicts, food for fodder among international forces, currently

- deployed in the region (Syria, Yemen and Iraq).
4. The conflict parties are aware of the efforts expended by Kuwait and the lack of authority to impose decisions, which makes them accepting of its intervention, Kuwait has not faced a complex problem with the foreign policy of Doha that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt have all faced.
 5. Kuwait's flexible mediation, its simplicity and timely nature leaves parties autonomies to work on their own agendas, while it takes consideration of all the parties' interests over their positions in the region.

Between a Transitional Scene and a Political Reality

The mediation role's basic elements in the current crisis are significantly linked to prior events and conflicts among disagreeing countries. In other words, differences have always existed throughout history between Qatar and the remaining parties. In January 2010, during the Arab Spring Revolutions in Egypt, a major concern was placed on the systems in the Gulf region, with Qatar supporting the revolution from the onset and Al-Jazeera network was one of the top forums upon which the countries revolutions were publicized despite the opposing stance made by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Following the overthrow by the army of the elected Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Sheikh Tamim of Qatar who succeeded his father in 2013, following the latter's concession of the throne to him, had a visit to Saudi Arabia after which he was told that a policy has to be adopted to the Egyptian issue, one that matches the GCC policies. In this request, Qatar made important indicators and ignored/questioned the requests, refusing to keep silent about the Arab Spring revolutions and counter-revolutions. Following the Riyadh Agreement in 2014,

Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia made a move to recall their ambassadors from Doha owing to the interference of Qatar in their internal affairs, which represented to Kuwaitis and Omanis, a new turn in the crisis course. By April of the same year, a new arose when Qatar ransomed Iraqi militias and the Syrian opposition to set free Qatari hostages, defying Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, particularly concerning Syrian and Iraqi matters. The result was Saudi Arabia's accusation of Qatar's support towards armed terrorist groups, to which Kuwait remained silent in words and in actions, refusing to take Saudi Arabia's side.

On the 23rd of May, 2017, Qatar highlighted the breach of its Qatar News Agency, describing the alleged statements that were attributed to Sheikh Tamem broadcasted in Saudi Arabia to be all false and fabricated – in this event Kuwait remained a mediator and dealt with the issues, particularly the confusion and lack of role from the major powers. Kuwait seemed to be all alone without specific agenda and coordination with major powers, particularly the U.S., as Kuwait may have suspected the latter owing to their ambivalent attitude.

By June 5, 2017, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain showed their support for Egypt (failing to act within the framework of GCC) and announced their cutting off their relationship with Qatar, closing air, sea and land routes to the country. The Qatari visitors and residents in the four countries were given a few days to leave and by June 8, 2017, a list that included 49 individuals, 12 organizations and a group were publicized for their support of terrorism allegedly financed by Qatar. The above countries demands were then claimed and handed over to Kuwait, as the mediator, to be forwarded to Qatar, who declined the demands. The mediating efforts outcomes fall short of being satisfactory, with the roots of some political ideologies arising instead, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood issue,

Qatar's position and its political leaders and elite. Kuwait's awareness of the challenge that it faced was sharp and on the same day that relations were cut off with Qatar, the Amir of Kuwait requested for the matter to be deescalated and turned down coordination with Turkey regardless of the ratification of the Turkish Parliament on June 7, 2017 of a law that included the deployment of 5000 Turkish troops in one of its military bases in Qatar. Kuwaiti mediation efforts which till then have appeared dynamic, flexible and balanced, have failed to present a stable and suitable forum, although it facilitated the 38th Gulf Summit in order for the conflicting parties to come together and reach an acceptable solution to their issues. However, Kuwait was successful in ensuring that the privacy between the parties was established and the crisis remained in the united Gulf House framework.

Qatar as a Bridge for Kuwait's Mediating Efforts

Based on the Qatari policy, the present mediation efforts by Kuwait is a last resort prior the climax of the crisis and based on the statements made by the former, it extended its gratitude and welcome to the latter. Kuwait's statements remain balanced, which had a considerable effect on the development of matters, with Doha inclined towards negotiation. Such inclination provided the wiggle room that Kuwait needed to continue negotiations between the crisis parties and up to that moment, Qatar appeared to be a quiet bridge that Kuwait can leverage to cross for crisis resolution. It is assumed that Kuwait, as a mediator, is well aware that putting pressure on Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama would leave it as the sacrificial goal to be accused of taking Qatar's side, and that would mean the end for Kuwait. This made it seize the opportunity of flexibility and inclination that Qatar presented at the negotiating table. Kuwait's success in contacting the

crisis parties is a promising development. But it is expected that everyone will find themselves inclined towards accepting foreign parties' intervention, without knowing when, where, and what's at stake.

Kuwait's Efforts for the Gulf Summit

Requests for the 38th Gulf Summit relocation was declined by Kuwait and regardless of the aspirations and hopes of the parties sitting on the negotiation table, the charges placed on Doha following the assassination of the Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sanaa placed pressure on Kuwait as the mediator, evidenced by the preparatory foreign ministers' meeting which continued to highlight differences. Escalation of strategic threats and tensions were noted following the announcement of Abu-Dhabi – Riyadh partnership after the Yemeni President was killed. In the face of all conditions, Kuwait insisted to hold the summit and gather the conflicting parties although a few days prior to the summit, Kuwait was unsure as to whether Saudi Arabian, UAE and Bahraini leaders would show up, as result of which, the former nearly canceled on it. In the last moments, speculations abound owing to shifty diplomatic activities but for the first time since 1981, majority of the Gulf leaders failed to attend. The Amir of Kuwait personally welcomed the guests at the airport, which comprised of the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Anwar Gargash, the Deputy Prime Minister of Bahrain, Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Deputy Prime Minister of Oman, and Emir of Qatar. This was considered a good step – bringing all the parties to one single negotiating table. The efforts exerted by Kuwait to be a host to Gulf 23 indicated a political détente state, with the Amir of Kuwait concerned that geopolitical conditions could plunge the fledgling system into crisis and thus, an amendment committee is called for to review the statutes, ensuring that resolution of disputes among the member states take place. Surprisingly, the final statement of the shortest summit to take place, failed to

focus on crisis resolution or discussion and it was noted that the summit was held to retain the unity of among the GCC and hide the cracks within it. It may be concluded that the situation will remain the same in the future, with the crisis looming over the Gulf region.

The Future of Kuwait's Efforts as a Mediator

Prior to the Gulf House collapse warning, a declaration was made by the Amir of Kuwait of the surprising outbreak of the crisis following the Riyadh meeting that took place in 2017. Such declaration was made in September of the same year in a joint press conference with the U.S. President in the White House. The Amir added that a disagreement did not exist between Qatar and the countries during the summit and that successful bid to refrain from military activity could be promising to the Gulf crisis resolution. Regardless of the presence of parties urging for authorizing and disclosure, Kuwaiti mediation efforts would still consider the option of the use of power which the Kuwaiti decision-maker had always taken into account. The question that needs answering is the extent to which the mediator will efficiently keep the mediating efforts going and the answer depends on two major factors; 1) the neutrality of Kuwait as a mediator will fail in achieving fruitful outcome with the efforts unless tangible results will manifest. Kuwait as a mediator is surprised by the developments that somehow lead to zero results. This highlights the ability of Kuwait to continue mediating in the face of the assertion that efforts will continue until the crisis is resolved. 2) Notable new factors should be considered in their influence over the position of Kuwait as a mediator as it is evident that the efforts outcome is not stable at the moment, which may compound the crisis complexity and affect the domestic stability of the GCC countries, with the inclusion of Kuwait and Oman (neutral members). This also highlights what the

future of a prolonged crisis holds – a qualitative/minor change in Kuwait's mediation efforts when assessing the situation as is or an escalation to military intervention/internationalization. Such option is too early to consider although the air and sea penetrations have led to Qatar filing a complaint with the Security Council, with significant ramifications. If the crisis continues to escalate and with Telerson dismissal as the secretary of state, it can be stated that the optimism that existed during the negotiation is currently almost nil. This view is supported by the Qatari Foreign Minister's response to the question of the possibility of resorting to military action, when addressed by reporters in Washington – to which he responded that Qatar still hopes to refrain from resorting to such measures but it is well prepared and can depend on its partners for assistance. The top questions that arise is centered on the role of one Gulf country in the crisis – and the implications behind Telerson's dismissal, which may potentially change the attitude of Trump's administration towards the mediating efforts of Kuwait. Such dismissal will not only affect the crisis parties but will also be a setback for Kuwait's efforts (Bloomberg News and BBC Arabic, March 13, 2018). Commentaries from analyst, politician and journalist circles imply that the Gulf conflict has nothing to do with Telerson's dismissal and its best to ignore that the mediating efforts of Kuwait consider that its future interests will be met without depending on one single solution. The understanding of the future impact of the efforts is significant to understand but it may not survive the dynamic changes in the related events. Kuwait may not depend largely on the media statements stemming from the parties to the conflict. Statements made by Doha, repetitively reveal its willingness to negotiate and were met by the assertions made by the UAE Foreign Minister, Abdullah Bin Zayed that the four countries are inclined to putting an end to

the Gulf crisis. Saudi's Foreign Minister, Al-Jabir also stated that Saudi Arabia is inclined towards negotiating with Qatar, with no military option on the works. These media statements were however not followed by practical actions and although not new, it could lead to crisis escalation. Kuwait's efforts should not be viewed with doubt and suspicion, unlike other efforts from the Gulf countries (e.g., Omani efforts that are not welcome), with Saudi Arabia accusing Muscat of influencing national security and cooperating with Tehran in economic terms. Old disagreements between Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Muscat could influence the dealings of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman, perceiving Oman to be on Qatar's side as it stayed close to the latter since the crisis onset. The differences between the demands of the parties and the conditions for re-establishing relationships via negotiation is increasing, with some parties leveraging issues to lengthen the crisis period to reap political and economic benefits. It can be stated that Kuwaiti mediation acceptance by the entire parties to the crisis is an opening solution albeit not a conclusive one. Such intervention should be accepted for it to result in concessions and compromises, dictations and conditions that are pre-requisites of achieving a solution and settlement. Besides the Gulf Institute framework considers mediation as a path for all parties.

2. CONCLUSION

Throughout the centuries, Kuwait has had the same mediation vision in foreign political efforts, with the mediation nature bound to the abilities of the political system and historical heritage and what it can impartially provide for the conflicting parties. Kuwait's mediation efforts appears to be leading to success reflected in the previous statements of the Kuwaiti Amir, which states that Qatar is inclined towards negotiation and that Gulf crisis resolution will soon be achieved. Nevertheless, the

dynamic changes that resulted in Kuwait to declare that the Gulf House is on the brink of collapse, indicating that the end to the crisis is still elusive. Kuwait has been conducting the most vibrant role and the success of its efforts along with its ability to proceed with them may be determined by two major factors, the first of which is to minimize/neutralize the demands affecting sovereignty and to impose any party the power of trusteeship.

The second factor is the ability of Kuwait to maintain and sustain itself based on realistic considerations largely hinges on the situations flexibility and historical experience. Nevertheless, the efforts have seemed to be fruitless in resolving the crisis and changing attitudes for the better. More importantly, the historical legacy that Kuwait carries will continue to manifest, working under the same ideology, practicality and effectiveness and this is what seems to be implied by the Kuwaiti decision-maker when he stated that history, the people and the next generation of the Gulf will be unforgiving to those who have had their fair contribution towards making the Gulf conflict worsen even through a single word utterance.

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