

# ASIA'S MARITIME PARADIPLOMATIC PRACTICE – A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH

<sup>1</sup>Devanshi Shah

*<sup>1</sup>PhD in International Relations, School of Liberal Studies, Pandit Deendayal Energy University*

## Abstract

The paradiplomatic activities carried out by maritime cities in Asia through diverse practices is the core essence of this paper. Asia's prominence over the global maritime trade has set out an extensive foreign engagement of maritime cities and coastal regions in maritime affairs that deems maritime paradiplomacy as an emerging dimension in Asia. The paper attempts to identify how practice of maritime paradiplomacy among Asian countries is unconventional yet an innovative practice. In an attempt to study Asia's maritime paradiplomatic practice with a specific focus on China, Singapore, Japan and India, the paper addresses multidimensional approach of maritime cities and coastal regions in Asia.

**Keywords:** Paradiplomacy, Asia, Maritime cities, China, Singapore, Japan, India.

## INTRODUCTION

Paradiplomacy of maritime cities and coastal regions is an emerging paradigm among Asia; an epicenter of global maritime trade. The term 'Paradiplomacy' is an abbreviation of 'parallel diplomacy' that involves subnational government and entities in conducting foreign policy. The term coined in 1990 by John Kincaid emphasized on the efficacy of subnational diplomacy as a natural outcome of globalisation. Paradiplomacy that was mainly practiced among western countries through sister-city agreements to increase their foreign engagements became a conducive approach for Asian countries to boost its economic growth and diplomatic outreach. The paradiplomatic activities carried out by maritime cities in Asia through multifaceted approach is the core essence of this paper.

Maritime cities and coastal regions being an integral part of maritime trade and commerce have practiced paradiplomacy to build global trade connectivity and engage in maritime diplomacy at a subnational level in their own distinctive ways to what can be called as 'maritime paradiplomacy'. Maritime paradiplomacy is an innovative approach that substantiates the global engagement of maritime

cities driven by economic integration and maritime cooperation at subnational level. Another perception provided by Adarsh Vijay (2019) asserts that maritime paradiplomacy is a sub-national construct that has redefined role of Indian states in maritime diplomacy which has remained an exclusive domain of the federal government.

Given the core nature of paradiplomacy being a dynamic concept this paper attempts to identify how practice of maritime paradiplomacy among Asian countries has been diverse and innovative. The maritime paradiplomacy in China is inclined towards establishment of special economic zones (SEZ) to increase foreign investment that has observed a phenomenal economic growth in China. The Chinese government gave a political autonomy to its SEZs that encouraged the local governments to extend their maritime paradiplomatic activities in Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific region. The maritime diplomacy in Singapore is exemplified through its city-to-city diplomacy that has augmented its maritime global connectivity. Singapore being the prime hub of maritime trade has built global inter-city networks through sea routes and international financial centers. The Japan's approach towards maritime paradiplomacy is construed based on the

diplomatic tensions between Japan and Russia over the territorial disputes of Kuril Islands. The paper discusses how the subnational diplomatic engagements between Hokkaido and Sakhalin harmonized the relation between Japan and Russia over the due course of time. The maritime paradiplomacy of India is drawn towards development of Gujarat's maritime clusters and maritime tourism on its coastal regions that can foster its economic development and trade investments. In an attempt to study the foreign interaction of maritime cities with a specific focus on China, Singapore, Japan and India, the paper identifies multidimensional approach of maritime paradiplomacy that is discernible within Asia.

### China's Special Economic Zones

In the late 1970s after the decade-long debacle of the Cultural Revolution, which left the economy dormant and the people physically and emotionally drained China was in dire need of systemic change. In 1978, the Chinese economic reforms led China to embark upon an open-door policy to strengthen its national economy. The aim of this policy shift was to rebuild its economy and society that were devastated by the Cultural Revolution. The government subsequently established a number of areas for foreign investment, including the special economic zones, open coastal cities, the economic and technology development zones, the delta open zones, the peninsula open zones, the open border cities, and the high-tech industry development zones. China's shift towards an open-door economic policy ushered in a period of high economic growth in the first half of the 1980s.

In 1980, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong Province were designated as special economic zones (SEZs), followed by Xiamen in Fujian Province. The four SEZs comprised of large areas with an objective to facilitate comprehensive economic development. The four SEZs were deliberately located far from the center of political power in Beijing to minimize both potential risks and political interference. The SEZs were established in order to pursue pragmatic and open economic policies that would serve as a test for innovative policies that, if proven successful, would be implemented more widely across the country. The four SEZs

were located in coastal areas of Guangdong and Fujian, which had a historical linkages near Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, China. The choice of Shenzhen was especially strategic because of its location across a narrow river from Hong Kong, the principal area from which China could learn capitalist modes of economic growth and modern management technologies.

The establishment of these zones boosted massive inflows of foreign investment, primarily from companies in Hong Kong and Taiwan. At the same time, China promoted its socialist market economy concept. The changes brought an entrepreneurial boom that resulted in the emergence of huge numbers of entrepreneurs and venture businesses within China. Since China had just reopened to foreign trade and investment, the SEZs had an almost immediate impact. In 1981, the four zones accounted for 59.8 percent of total FDI in China, with Shenzhen accounting for the lion's share at 50.6 percent. Three years later, the four SEZs still accounted for 26 percent of China's total FDI. By the end of 1985, realized FDI in the four zones totaled US\$1.17 billion, about 20 percent of the national total. By 1986, Shenzhen had already developed rudimentary markets in capital, labor, land, technology, communication, and other factors of production.

Ever since then, China established seven special economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in Fujian Province, Hainan (designated as special economic zone), Shanghai Pudong New Area, and Tianjin Binhai New Area. From 1984 to 1988, China developed 14 coastal cities in Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai to attract foreign investment. In 1984, Deng Xiaoping said: "The special zone is a window, a window of technology, a window of management, a window of knowledge, and a window of foreign policy. From the special zones, technologies can be introduced, knowledge acquired, management learned, and management is also knowledge. SEZs as an open base will not only benefit us in terms of economy and cultivating talents, but will also expand our country's external influence."

In 1985, China further expanded the open coastal areas, extending the open economic zones of the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, and

Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle in south Fujian, Shandong Peninsula, Liaodong Peninsula, Hebei and Guangxi into an open coastal belt. In 1990, the Chinese government decided to open the Pudong New Zone in Shanghai to overseas investment, and opened more cities in the Yangtze River valley. In this way, a chain of open cities extending up the Yangtze River valley, with Shanghai's Pudong as the "dragon head," has been formed. Since 1992, the State Council has opened a number of border cities, and in addition, opened all the capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions. By the end of 1992, China had set up 60 SEZs that included five Special Economic Zones, 15 open coastal cities, eight open riverside cities, 19 open inland cities and 13 open boarder cities. In addition, 15 free trade zones, 32 state-level economic and technological development zones, and 53 new-and high-tech industrial development zones have been established in large and medium-sized cities. As a result, a multi-level, multi-channel, omni-directional and diversified pattern of opening, integrating coastal areas with riverine, border and inland areas had been formed in China. As these open areas adopt different preferential policies, they play the dual roles of Windows in developing the foreign-oriented economy, generating foreign exchanges through exporting products and importing advanced technologies and of radiators in accelerating inland economic development.

The five special economic zones of China are foreign-oriented areas which integrate science and industry with trade, and benefit from preferential policies and special managerial systems. They have summed up their rich experiences in absorbing foreign investment and developing foreign trade for China to open up to the international market. In recent years, the special economic zones have led the country in establishing new systems, upgrading industries and opening wider to the outside world, serving as national models. In addition to the special economic zones mentioned above, other types of SEZs in China include high-tech industrial development zones (HIDZs), free trade zones (FTZs), export-processing zones (EPZs), and others. Each of these zones has a different focus. The establishment of high-tech industrial development zones was to implement the Torch Program initiated by the Ministry of Science and

Technology in the late 1980s. The main objective of the program was to use the technological capacity and resources of research institutes, universities, and large and medium enterprises to develop new and high-tech products and to expedite the commercialization of research and development. For instance, the Shenzhen's new-and high-tech industry became one with best prospects. In 2011, the industrial output value of the Shenzhen Hi-Tech Industrial Park reached 405.4 billion yuan, 40 times its value from when it was founded in 1996. The expanded Shenzhen Hi-Tech Industrial Park will be a world-leading high-tech industrial park, an important base for high-end industries, a key area for innovation and a key node of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Macao Innovation Corridor. The SEZs have made crucial contributions to China's success. By 1992, the concept of openness had been extended to the entire coastal region and to all capital cities of provinces and autonomous regions in the interior, and various types of SEZs had begun to spring up 12 Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China throughout the country. From an economic perspective, Economically, SEZs have contributed significantly to national GDP, employment, exports, and attraction of foreign investment and new technologies, as well as adoption of modern management practices, among others.

The SEZs were given greater political and economic autonomy. They had the legislative authority to develop municipal laws and regulations along the basic lines of national laws and regulations, including local tax rates and structures, and to govern and administer these zones. At that time, in addition to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, only the provincial-level People's Congress and its Standing Committee had such legislative power. Although there is no official definition of a "special economic zone" the term implied refers to a designated area whose economic system and policies are different from the rest of China. The Chinese central government has instituted policies to create a favorable environment for foreign investment in each of the five SEZs. Each zone has in turn enacted its own unique regime of local regulations. Such favorable policies have a number of characteristics that set the SEZs apart from other areas of China. The central government had

tried to decentralize its power and help create an open and conducive legal and policy environment for the SEZs. At the same time, the local governments made a great effort to build a sound business environment. They not only put in place an efficient regulatory and administrative system but also good infrastructure, such as roads, water, electricity, gas, sewerage, telephone, and ports, which in most cases involve heavy government direct investments, especially in the initial stages.

According to Deng Xiaoping, the objective of opening up more cities and establishing more economic-technological development areas in coastal areas was to take advantage of their geographic locations, to build up a favorable business environment to attract foreign investment to these small regions as soon as possible, to promote the development of an export-oriented economy, and to increase the degree of opening up. Moreover, Coastal areas with more advanced transportation systems, industrial bases, technology, managerial capacity, and education are experienced in foreign trade and in economic and technology cooperation with inland areas. Given favorable policies, the coastal areas can promote science and technology, share management experience, boost domestic markets, expand foreign trade, and train the workforce to support and facilitate economic development in their adjacent regions as well as across the country.

China's SEZs increased inflow of foreign capital, technology and business development that enabled China to turn its vast labor resources and space to boost its phenomenal economic growth. China's peculiar way of developing its coastal cities to attract foreign investment is adjacent with the core idea of maritime paradiplomacy. The Chinese model of SEZ encourages a decentralized policy towards where local governments have ease in conducting foreign trade and promotions. This approach sets out an eminent example for other countries in developing their coastal cities as paradiplomatic actors. China's approach towards maritime policy through establishment of SEZs has also strengthened its presence in the South China Sea. The maritime paradiplomacy of China through its politically autonomous SEZ and free market oriented economic policies has reaffirmed its presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

### The Hokkaido-Sakhalin Paradiplomacy

The maritime paradiplomatic relations between Hokkaido and Sakhalin amidst the unresolved territorial disputes over sovereignty of South Kuril island/Northern territories have remained stable for past 70 years. The dispute started during the end of the Second World War when Soviet Union (Russia) seized a group of islands in the Kuril chain that stretches from Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula separating the sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese government has consistently demanded the return of what it refers to as the Northern Territories. The Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, have refused to hand over the islands. This territorial dispute has precluded both countries from signing a peace treaty and fully normalizing bilateral relations. Brad Williams in his book *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute, Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations* (2007) argues that subnational governments can be important actors inducing change in Russo-Japanese relations, and paradiplomatic exchange and cooperation between Sakhalin and Hokkaido can become a catalyst for bridging the regions together and reducing political tension between the nations.

Besides, Hokkaido emerged as an important economic partner for Sakhalin and a vehicle in its attempts to integrate into the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to promoting autonomous development, practitioners of paradiplomacy and other observers in Hokkaido believed that developing cultural and economic ties might create interest groups in Sakhalin cognisant which would help to alleviate local opposition to Russia transferring the South Kuril Islands to Japan and, in the process, contribute to creating an environment at the subnational level conducive to resolving the territorial dispute. Subnational public authorities in Hokkaido and Sakhalin have often worked in collaboration with municipal governments and also with a broad range of private actors such as local business, cultural exchange groups and academic institutions. In May. In 2000, the Hokkaido and the Sakhalin signed an agreement to promote cooperation, such as exchanges, between the two legislatures. Currently there are 14 sister-city and friendship agreements have been concluded between cities, towns and villages in Hokkaido and Sakhalin at municipal

level. In comparison with other Russo-Japanese subnational cooperation's, Hokkaido-Sakhalin subnational government relations are unique because of the close connection with the bilateral territorial dispute, which casts an unavoidable shadow over their relations. Both sub regions play host to several public and private organizations and bodies that are dedicated to resolving the territorial dispute in a manner they perceive as being congruent with their respective national and regional interests, but which is also anathema to the other. Although a few times subnational authorities of Hokkaido have faced the opposition from the central government. But this did not prevent Hokkaido from establishing a friendship agreement with Sakhalin, where the national government recognized Hokkaido's formal link could serve as a vehicle for paradiplomatic connections in the absence of formal bilateral relations at the national level and with diplomatic tensions at various levels.

Hokkaido is currently promoting an initiative known as the Five-Point Cooperative Package to encourage further economic exchanges with the Russian Far East. At the May 2016 summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Japanese government presented an Eight-Bullet-Point Proposal for Economic Cooperation with Russia. Harumi Takahashi, former governor of the Prefecture of Hokkaido, states, "The Five-Point Cooperative Package covers such areas as the promotion of food safety, health, and longevity, along with technology for comfortable living in cold areas items shared with the Japanese government's Eight-Bullet-Point Proposal for Economic Cooperation with Russia. Hokkaido intends to leverage these initiatives in working to step up the pace of exchanges."

Around seventy years have passed since the end of the Second World War, Japan and Russia have yet to conclude a peace treaty. At the Japan-Russia summit meeting late in 2016, Prime Minister Abe and President Putin announced their sincere determination to end this abnormal situation during their generation. However, the biggest issue in this connection is the difference of standpoints with regard to the Northern Territories (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais) in eastern Hokkaido. The two leaders agreed to start talks

aimed at implementation of joint economic activities in fisheries, marine culture, medical care, the environment, and other fields on and around these islands. The circumstances in the border regions are often under-reported because the territorial dispute is seen as an international rather than a local issue. As a result, voices in both Sakhalin and Hokkaido have struggled to reach the international arena. There is no denying that both governments have established strongly regulated and cooperative structures of governance to regulate the territorial dispute, although one may perhaps question the quality of these agreements.

Hokkaido's paradiplomatic activities have experienced few problems in gaining access to Russian decision-making structures at the federal and regional levels. Despite this, they have been unable to form sufficiently powerful coalitions to bring about change in Russian policy on the territorial dispute. Although this does not imply that international institutionalization is irrelevant, it suggests that, in this case, the specific nature of the issue-area may also be important when determining paradiplomatic activities' impact. The maritime paradiplomatic relations between Hokkaido and Sakhalin sheds a light on one of the important aspect of paradiplomacy that the territorial disputes that affects state-to-state relations does not necessarily affect the relations between the subnational governments. Apart from the dispute, Hokkaido-Sakhalin have played a key role in humanizing perception and generating goodwill through various collaborations and friendship agreements.

### Singapore's Global City Network

Singapore's extensive connectivity to regional and global markets has cemented its position as the connecting hub that connects Asia to the world, and the world to Asia. The city-state island strategically located in the maritime Southeast Asia is connected to 600 ports in over 120 countries. Singapore being the financial center is at the core of a web of trades providing seamless global connectivity to the shipping companies. Singapore with its exceptional global network Asian economies has one of the world's top transportation hubs for sea and air cargo. The port of Singapore has been recognized as the world's busiest transshipment

hub. Singapore's container ports are the busiest in the world and Changi International Airport is linked to 300 cities in 70 countries, with more than 6,500 weekly flights. Singapore's global city network through sea routes and economic cooperation has further defined its maritime paradiplomacy in Southeast Asia.

Singapore's cultural and linguistic connections across Asia, highly qualified workforce, and openness to top global talent makes Singapore the preferred location to support the global business community in their expansion in Asia. Moreover, Singapore's policy goal is also focused towards establishing interactive economic relations with a broader range of economies so that the country with its global interconnectivity of cities and states can extract streams of profit from an extraterritorial terrain. Singapore has plethora of state-directed institutions, policies, programs, and projects have emerged to spur on the outward investment process.

The city-states with global networks like Singapore and Hongkong are the results of the post-colonial political dynamics. The colonial powers established urban centers that are intertwined with evolving global economy. Singapore with its colonial history has helped it to engender an openness to constant change, and an outward-oriented and relatively cosmopolitan sensibility. Colonialism also helped to lay the legal, linguistic, and technological foundations for integration into the contemporary global economy. According to S. Rajaratnam, "The Global Cities, unlike earlier cities, are linked intimately with one another. Because they are more alike they reach out to one another through the tentacles of technology. Linked together they form a chain of cities which today shape and direct, in varying degrees of importance, a world-wide system of economics. It is my contention that Singapore is becoming a component of that system - not a major component but a growingly important one."

The global city network of Singapore is interlinked with its growing international financial network. It was in the late 1960's when a number of international financial centers emerged in Asia. These centers are major meeting places for internationally mobile funds. The rapid economic growth in many Asian countries combined with their various stages of economic development has increased the flow of

funds across countries. This in turn has induced internationally renowned banks to establish branches in Asia to facilitate the cross-border flow of funds. Singapore has had a head start on other Asian centers as it was the first to allow a foreign bank to operate an offshore banking unit in 1968. The Asian Currency Unit (ACU) or the Asian Dollar Market that functions as a regional center for Eurodollars in Asia-Pacific, was established in 1968. The initiative removed the withholding tax on interest paid to nonresidents for the placement of foreign currency deposits. Since then, other banks in Singapore have followed also suit by setting up their own ACUs. Since its inception, the growth rate of the ADM has been phenomenal. Much of Singapore's growth as an international financial center in the early years resulted from the rapid growth of its ADM rather than from the growth of its domestic financial system. The ADM is essentially an international money and capital market in foreign currencies. The major currencies are the U.S. dollar, deutsche mark, yen, pound sterling, and Swiss franc. Eventually, Singapore became a leading global financial center followed by Hongkong, Taipei, Bangkok and Labuan. Being the leading financial center in Asia, Singapore enhanced its global city network. The opening up of China, growing prosperity of ASEAN economies and increasing flow of funds from advanced economies like US, Japan and Europe strengthened its vital presence in Asia-Pacific region.

Further, Singapore has also sought to build regional links, positioning itself as the financial gateway into Southeast Asia. In 2018, under the leadership of Singapore the ASEAN Smart City Network was established to create smart urban areas based on three strategic outcomes – a high quality of life, a competitive economy and a sustainable environment. The ASCN is endorsed by the 10 ASEAN member states. It highlights some of the smart city action plans that have been formulated by the 26 pioneer cities in the network. ASCN provides an open platform where ASEAN cities can learn from one another's experiences in adopting smart technology, identify solutions and engage industry and global partners as all work towards the common goal of making urban development sustainable. Moreover, in terms of city-to-city relations Singapore also extended an invitation to Yuriko Koike as the 60th Lee Kuan Yew

Exchange Fellow in 2017. Singapore's city diplomacy was exemplified by the Tokyo Governor who spoke at length on her agenda of global governance visions similar to that of Singapore, such as having sustainability as a core theme for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, and the creation of the Tokyo One-Stop Business Establishment Center for greater ease of doing business for foreigners.

A city-led form of global governance like Singapore requires a strong global city network. In the Asia-Pacific region, Singapore presents a fascinating case of maritime paradiplomacy in terms of global connectivity through inter-city networks and financial centers. The efficacy of Singapore in building global city network sets out a new dimension within the scope of maritime paradiplomacy. For instance, cities like Singapore being the administrative entities assume a broad degree of economic and business autonomy from national governments. They are at position to manage issues of global governance. With mandates bound by municipality than nationhood, cities do not necessarily have to bear the full weight of their nation's history or take into account extensive geopolitical and security considerations. This makes them less susceptible to nationalistic sentiment and are therefore more capable of seeking out their own interests, which often include a push for greater openness.

The maritime paradiplomacy determines Singapore's prominent role in connecting cities together globally that demonstrates its role in building this network. As the organizer of the biannual World Cities Summit, Singapore brings together mayors and city leaders from all around the world to discuss urban solutions to challenges ranging from transport, infrastructure and housing. As cities take on a more active role in global governance, establishing and maintaining a strong network of cities will increase the capacity of cities to provide sustainable and inclusive solutions to global issues.

#### Paradiplomacy of Gujarat in Coastal regions

The state of Gujarat is a gateway of India in flourishing its trade relations with Africa, Middle East and Europe. So far, Gujarat has foreign engagements with 180 countries and accounts 20 percent of India's aggregated

exports. Gujarat has strengthened its paradiplomatic relations through the 'Vibrant Gujarat Global Investor's Summit' that started in 2003 under the leadership of its former chief minister, Narendra Modi. The summit attracted prospective foreign investors in development of coastal regions of Gujarat. The summit led to the establishment of 20 Special Economic Zones in Gujarat. Kandla being the first Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Asia since 1965, was established as a Special Economic Zone under the Special Economic Zone Act 2005. Kandla is situated on the Gulf of Kutch in west coast of Gujarat. The vibrant summit attracted a large flow of foreign investments and business opportunities in the Kandla Special Economic Zone (KASEZ).

Moreover, Prime Minister Modi has called for global investors to consider Indian ports for trade and commerce. Modi during his inauguration speech at Maritime India Summit in 2021 stated that India is very serious about growing in the maritime sector and emerging as a leading Blue Economy of the world. The Summit observed 1.7 lakh registered participants from more than 100 nations making it the biggest virtual summit in the world. The three day summit was attended by ministers from eight nations, around 50 global CEOs and 160 speakers that included 115 international speakers from 24 nations. One of the main objective of this summit is to develop the regions adjacent 78 lighthouses as the maritime tourist landmarks. PM Modi informed that necessary steps are being taken to introduce urban water transport systems in key states and cities such as Kochi, Mumbai, Gujarat and Goa.

A draft report on port-led-industrial development of the coastal economic clusters was prepared under Sagarmala Programme of Ministry of Shipping that identifies two major maritime clusters in Tamil Nadu & Gujarat. These maritime clusters would facilitate ship building & ancillary services, maritime services, promoting marine products and maritime tourism. The Gujarat Maritime Board (GMB) will be setting up India's first international maritime services cluster at GIFT city (Gujarat International Finance Tec-City). GIFT City with its prime infrastructure, banking facilities and renowned institutions will aid in fostering innovation, economic viability, and collaboration and business opportunities for the

Cluster. The Cluster also intends to host an array of maritime industry players, such as key regulators and government agencies to ensure 'Ease of Doing Business'. The Sagarmala programme has proposed innovative projects to enhance maritime tourism in Gujarat such as underwater viewing gallery and restaurant at Beyt Dwarka Island and development National Maritime Heritage Centre proposed at Lothal. Moreover India intends to establish mega ports with world class infrastructure in Vadhavan (Maharashtra), Paradip (Odisha) and Deendayal Port in Kandla (Gujarat).

India has taken a distinctive approach towards maritime paradiplomacy through its establishment of marine tourism industry, maritime clusters and special economic zones. Although the initiatives undertaken by Gujarat state are at a developmental stage but it sets out a roadmap for the onset of India's maritime paradiplomacy of its coastal cities.

### Conclusion

The maritime paradiplomatic practices in Asia has provided a comprehensive approach to maritime cities and coastal regions in conduct of their external relations. From the above study, it can be concluded that the Asian maritime paradiplomatic practice is mainly driven by its economic growth, foreign investments and diplomatic outreach. From China's development of special economic zones, Singapore's global trade connectivity and Gujarat's maritime cluster; the economic integration was the key factor that determined maritime paradiplomacy. The practice of paradiplomacy is a widely accepted phenomenon in China, India, Japan and Singapore despite their distinctive governance structure that does not wholly accommodate federal systems. The countries have indeed designated political autonomy and administrative authority to their maritime cities and subnational entities to engage in maritime paradiplomatic activities. Most of the foreign engagements conducted by maritime cities adheres to State's national interest which makes maritime paradiplomacy an instrumental practice in diplomatic pursuits. The Hokkaido's paradiplomatic engagements towards Sakhalin has nonetheless eased the diplomatic tension between Japan and Russia.

The maritime paradiplomacy is still an emerging practice among the countries. Moreover, the term 'maritime paradiplomacy' lacks a proper definition due to a minimal research on the issue. The paper addresses the notion of maritime paradiplomacy only confined to its practices within Asia. The paper has made a preliminary attempt to identify maritime paradiplomacy and explore its multidimensional approach prominent among maritime cities and coastal region of Asia. Maritime paradiplomacy is an innovative dimension that requires an extensive study and research in the contemporary diplomacy.

### Reference

- [1] Alexander S. Kuznetsov, *Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy*, ed. Markus Kornprobst Corneliu Bjola, *Subnational Governments in International Affairs* (London, New York: Routledge, 2015).
- [2] Adarsh Vijay, "Indian Maritime Paradiplomacy: Connecting Sub-National Nautical Dots," National Maritime Foundation, <https://maritimeindia.org/indian-maritime-paradiplomacy-connecting-sub-national-nautical-dots/>.
- [3] The Worldbank, "Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China," [worldbank.org](http://worldbank.org), <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/294021468213279589/pdf/564470PUB00buil10Box349496B01PUBLIC1.pdf>.
- [4] Jia Baobo and Junya Sano Shigeo Kobayashi, "The "Three Reforms" in China: Progress and Outlook," Japan Research Institute, <https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/>.
- [5] Ibid.
- [6] Worldbank, "Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China".
- [7] Ibid.
- [8] Shigeo Kobayashi, "The "Three Reforms" in China: Progress and Outlook".
- [9] Worldbank, "Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China".
- [10] Ibid.
- [11] Bin Xue Sang, "Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone in China?-an Analysis of the Special Regulations and Policy for Shanghai's Pudong New Area,"



- Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 14, no. 1 (1993).
- [12] FDI China, "Learn All About Special Economic Zones in China," <https://www.fdicchina.com/blog/special-economic-zones-china/>.
- [13] China in Brief, "Opening to the Outside World," <http://www.china.org.cn/e-china/openingup/sez>.
- [14] Worldbank, "Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China".
- [15] John H Matheson, "Globalization with Chinese Characteristics: China's Use of Merger, Acquisition and Investment Policy in Its Economic Development Strategy," *Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution* 15, no. 1 (2007).
- [16] Brief, "Opening to the Outside World".
- [17] Shenzhen Government Online, "Hi-Tech Park in Sz Expands," <http://www.sz.gov.cn/>, [http://www.sz.gov.cn/en\\_szgov/news/latest/content/post\\_7838091.html](http://www.sz.gov.cn/en_szgov/news/latest/content/post_7838091.html).
- [18] Ibid.
- [19] Worldbank, "Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China".
- [20] Sang, "Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone in China?-an Analysis of the Special Regulations and Policy for Shanghai's Pudong New Area."
- [21] Worldbank, "Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China".
- [22] The World Bank, "Cities and Climate Change: An Urgent Agenda," in *Urban Development Series Knowledge Papers* (Washington D.C: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2010).
- [23] Brad Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute, Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
- [24] Georgy Buntlov, "The Kuril Islands/Northern Territories Dispute," ejcs, <https://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/ejcs/vol17/iss3/buntlov.html>.
- [25] Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute*.
- [26] Japan Gov, "Hokkaido: Bridging a Bright Future with Russia," The Government of Japan, <https://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/2017/spring-summer2017/hokkaido.html>.
- [27] Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute*.
- [28] Ibid.
- [29] Gov, "Hokkaido: Bridging a Bright Future with Russia".
- [30] Ibid.
- [31] Buntlov, "The Kuril Islands/Northern Territories Dispute".
- [32] Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute*.
- [33] MPA Singapore, "A Maritime Gateway to Key Asian Markets," Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, <https://www.mpa.gov.sg/web/portal/home/maritime-singapore/introduction-to-maritime-singapore/gateway-to-asia>.
- [34] Ibid.
- [35] Ibid.
- [36] Kris Olds and Henry Yeung, "Pathways to Global City Formation: A View from the Developmental City-State of Singapore," *Review of International Political Economy* (2011).
- [37] Ibid.
- [38] S. Rajaratnam, "Singapore: Global City," National Archives of Singapore, <https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/PressR19720206a.pdf>.
- [39] Ngiam Kee Jin, "Singapore as a Financial Center: New Developments, Challenges, and Prospects," University of Chicago Press, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6907824.pdf>.
- [40] Ibid.
- [41] Ibid.
- [42] Ario Bimo Utomo, "Asean Smart City Network: Thinking Beyond Ceremonial Paradiplomacy," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/asean-smart-city-network-thinking-beyond-ceremonial-paradiplomacy/>.
- [43] www.clc.gov.sg, "Asean Smart Cities Network," Centre for Liveable Cities <https://www.clc.gov.sg/research-publications/publications/books/view/asean-smart-cities-network>.
- [44] Jorel Chan, "Global Governance in an Urban Age: Singapore's City Diplomacy in Sustainability, Innovation and Financial Leadership," Harvard Kennedy School, <https://spj.hkspublications.org/2018/03/04/global-governance-in-an-urban-age-singapores-city-diplomacy-in->

sustainability-innovation-and-financial-leadership/.

- [45] Ibid.
- [46] Official Account of Vibrant Gujarat, "Vibrant Gujarat," Facebook, <https://www.facebook.com/vibrantgujarat/photos/gujarat-is-a-gateway-of-india-for-trade-with-africa-middle-east-europe-it-caters/3070233146424493/>.
- [47] Ibid.
- [48] [www.sezindia.nic.in](http://www.sezindia.nic.in), "Special Economic Zones in India," Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Department of Commerce, <http://sezindia.nic.in/cms/introduction.php>.
- [49] Govt. Of India, "Prime Minister Inaugurates Maritime India Summit-2021 Virtually," <https://pib.gov.in/>, <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1701898>.
- [50] Ibid.
- [51] Narendra Modi, "Pm Inaugurates Maritime India Summit 2021," <https://www.narendramodi.in/prime-minister-narendra-modi-modi-inaugurates-maritime-india-summit-2021-554251>.
- [52] Sagarmala Programme, "Maritime Clusters & Cez to Bolster India's Maritime Sector Growth under Sagarmala," <http://sagarmala.gov.in/sites/default/files/1300.pdf>.
- [53] Indian Transport and Logistic News, "Gujarat Maritime Board to Set up India's First International Maritime Cluster," <https://www.itln.in/>, <https://www.itln.in/gujarat-maritime-board-to-set-up-indias-first-international-maritime-cluster-shipping>.
- [54] Sagarmala, "Projects Funded under Sagarmala," <https://sagarmala.gov.in/projects/projects-funded-under-sagarmala>.
- [55] India, "Prime Minister Inaugurates Maritime India Summit-2021 Virtually".