

The Changing Security Dynamics Shaped The Power Imbalance Between India And Pakistan In The Post-Cold War Era

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Abstract

This study is qualitative in nature and attempts to analyze power imbalance and security dynamics between Pakistan and India in the post-cold war Era. The relationship between the two countries was disrupted right after independence in 1947. Pakistan was struggling to compete with India with its larger territory, economy, population, and military. Initially, Pakistan benefited a lot from the cold war politics and balanced India economically and militarily with the help of the United State. Though, in the post-cold war era, Pakistan's position became detrimental as the United States stopped aid to Pakistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has significantly transformed global politics. This study sheds light on the different policies adopted by both Pakistan and India in the post-cold war era which led to greater power imbalances. This study supports the argument that the position of Pakistan became disadvantageous in the post-cold war era as India aligned its security, economic and foreign policies with the 'new world order' while Pakistan continued its cold war era policies.

Key Words: Security, Power, Imbalance, South Asia, nuclearization, asymmetric warfare

Introduction

The South Asian region is said to be an 'Indo-centric' region due to India's strategic position, its massive population, geographical extent and size, and military and economic preeminence. Despite this imbalance of power in favor of India, Pakistan will never accept the Indian hegemony in south Asia and will continue to use asymmetric warfare to balance India (Raja, 2012). This has caused regional tensions that are reflected in increased defense spending and the nuclearization of rivals (India -Pakistan). Pakistan has used internal and external

measurements to challenge the Indian hegemonic style in the region.

From 1947-2021, there have been three large-scale wars (1947, 1965, and 1971) between India and Pakistan and countless bloody disputes (Sum et al., 2013). Scuffles between both countries have raised global concern for South Asia, as the risks have increased with the nuclearization of both nations in 1998 (Chakrabarti, 2012). Both countries are traversing conflicting strategic routes. As a result, the gulf of misunderstandings is expected to broaden along with security perspectives, which

can adversely influence the evolving dynamics of the whole region.

Since partition in 1947, Pakistan and India had a divergent history that was influenced by religious, cultural, political, and social philosophy. Jawaharlal Nehru appealed that; if the proposal of separation is adopted it will be hard for both nations to consider. In addition, he claimed 'It may be that in this way we shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise' (Hasan, 1966). On contrary, Mohammed Ali Jinnah stressed that both nations follow different cultures, they neither inter-dine nor intermarry, and have different episodes, heroes, and customs (Hay, 1991). So, the security and foreign policy goals of both nations are influenced by innate eternal rivalry, distrust, conflicts, and resentment till the present day.

India-Pakistan relations are characterized by a different form of unbalanced capabilities. In the South Asian region, India occupies a central and strategic geographical position. It accounts for 76 percent of the population, 73 percent of the territory, and 80 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As compared to Pakistan, India is 7 times larger in population and national economy and 4 times larger in regional dimension. With a population of over 1.38 billion and an area of 1.27 million square miles, India is a major power compared to Pakistan with a population of only 220 million and an area of 307,374 square miles (UNDESA, 2020). In addition, India's GDP growth rate is in double digits and its economy is expanding faster than Pakistan's (Khan, 2009). Given the smaller size of Pakistan, it has been struggling to reduce the disparity by making allies with other countries (China and USA) and attaining military aid. In the 1950s with the help of economic and military assistance from the USA, Pakistan achieved equivalence with India. But, by the 1980s, the imbalance of power shifted in India's favor, despite a wider supply of conventional weapons

to Pakistan from North Korea and China and financial support from Saudi Arabia (Kapur, 2005).

And for Pakistan nuclear weapon is the only mean of balancing India's conventional powers without the help of the United States. In the need for self-defense, both nations have become nuclear powers with huge armies which in turn had hindered their mutual relations. The international community worries that, if the hostility between both nations continues to increase then there is the possibility that nuclear war could start (Ghosh, 2003).

Therefore, the main objective of this research paper is to understand the global security climate during and after the cold war. In the post-cold war period, India altered its military-focused policy and shifted its focus toward economic policy and it improved its economic relations with all developed nations without forming a fixed alliance with any specific country (Alam, 2017). This study examines how changing security dynamics lead to power imbalances between India and Pakistan in the 1990s. In the addition, this study also emphasizes policies that are worth adopting by India and Pakistan which in turn affected the Indo-Pak equation. It also identifies the reasons for the imbalance between the two nuclear powers.

Section one provides literature on the India-Pakistan peace process and nuclear proliferation. Section two presents the theoretical framework to conceptualize changing security dynamics and power imbalance between Pakistan and India the in post-cold war era. Section three analyses India's renowned security approach in the New World Order in the 1990s and military-centric security in the post-cold war era. And last, the section presents the conclusion followed by recommendations.

Dynamics of the Concept of Balance of power (BOP)

From the historians before the foundation of the international relation discipline to Kenneth Waltz's theory and modern theories of United States hegemony, the balance of power in academic international relations has been the focus of debate. It is often emphasized that the concept of BOP has been a persistent aspect of international politics, and is thus suitable as a tool for examining historical territories and ancient political systems.

Historically, the balance of power is one of the most fundamental concepts in international relations and international politics (Sheehan, 2004). The concept of BOP has been used for various purposes and in different situations. It provides a theory for international politics provides archers use to elucidate many phenomena all around the world. It is difficult to devise an exact definition to balance power because as Martin Wright says the idea is notoriously full of confusion. According to Innis L. Claude Jr "The trouble with the balance power is not that it has no meaning but that it has too many meanings". Sometimes, it is used to explain the distribution of power in the international system while others used this concept to describe the strategy of a state.

In international relations, the theory of BOP stresses that states can increase their survival rate by inhibiting other state/s they're attaining sufficient military power to control all others (Kegley and Wittkopf, 2006). The theory predicts that a stronger state will try to exploit weak neighboring states as a result it will drive them to the unit and build a defensive alliance. However, the united realists stress that a system of balance of power is stable in comparison to one with dominating state/s, as antagonism or hostility is not beneficial when there is a symmetry of power between opposing coalitions

(Kegley and Wittkopf, 2006). When threatened, the state may seek survival or safety by allying with its enemies of the threatening state, by balancing or by bandwagoning with the threatening state (Walt, 2013). Weak states could use other coalition strategies like chain ganging and buck passing. But the choice of strategy depends upon the polarity of the system (Mears the Heimer, 2010).

According to Paul (2004) balance of power is the condition of power equilibrium among key states while 'balancing' is the foreign policy behavior or state strategy. The balancing behavior can be demonstrated by three important concepts; hard balancing, soft balancing, and asymmetric balancing. Hard balancing is a strategy adopted by states engaged in an intense rivalry like India-Pakistan and USA-USSR. States using this strategy are often involved in enhancing military capabilities or forming alliances and counter alliances (Chambers, 2002). Soft balancing is the strategy in which limited security understandings took place between two states to counter a potential threat from another state (Kizekova, 2013). Asymmetric balancing is a type of balancing behavior in which states with superior conventional military capabilities are balanced by states using subnational actors such as terrorist groups to counter the direct threat. Terrorism is one of the types of asymmetric warfare used to weaken and challenge the sovereignty of established states (Nexon, 2009).

This theory is an essential belief of classical and neorealist theory. Due to anarchism (neorealist idea), states may seek their endurance by increasing and maintaining their power. Weak states use balancing policy to inhibit a potential hegemon, as no authority can come and rescue them when confronted by a hegemon. According to the forefather of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz "balance of power politics prevail wherever two, and only two requirements are met: that the order is anarchic and that it be populated by units

wishing to survive" (Waltz, 2010). States can attain a balance of power either by internal balancing, in which a state utilizes its internal capability to increase economic proficiency, develop clever tactics, and strengthen its military (Waltz, 2010; He, 2009). Another way of balancing is external balancing, where a state uses external methods to escalate its security level by making allies (Mearsheimer, 2010).

Although balancing behavior existed in the international system. The great shift took place in 1971 with the recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by the USA which created an imbalance in the world system and enhanced rivalry among the superpowers. With time, the cold war dynamics came to an end and the resultant aspects of the cold war gave a shift from bi-polarity to unipolarity. With the downfall and disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the USA remained the only superpower in the world (Sakwa, 2013). So, the last decade of the twentieth century and twenty-first century saw the establishment of the USA as the dominant power allowing it to establish a "New World Order" in the unipolar world (Ihonvbere, 1992). There is the possibility of the existence of balancing behavior from some of the states like the European Union (EU), Japan, India, and China. However, these states never perceived the USA as a real threat to their survival.

The Power Imbalance in the Context of India and Pakistan

Pakistan and India are the states formed at the start of the cold war in August 1947. Both countries are geo-graphically and geo-strategically important due to access to warm water. Being a dominant country India retained all vital resources becoming a challenge for Pakistan's security as various clashes exists among them necessitating resolution.

Pakistan made alliances with the United States and other Western countries to protect its autonomy and territorial integrity against India. Pakistan's formal compliance with alliances such as CENTO and SETO was considered the most important achievement of Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1950s. The United States had a close coalition with Pakistan till the end of the Cold War. From 1954 to the 1980s United States provided most of the military aid to Pakistan. Later in the 1960s, China also became a significant part of Pakistan's foreign policy goals, which aided Pakistan in forming its indigenous military capabilities. In December 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resuscitated the Cold War, but the collaboration between Pakistan, China, and United States was too invincible, leading to retreats and disintegrations. In the post-Cold War era, international order changed after the cold war, forcing China and the United States to look for trade and economic partnerships among the major powers of the world, so formal alliances come to an end in the 1990s. During the 1990s Pakistan forms strong relationships with China and conducted a nuclear test, after that it suffered a lot of sanctions from the World mainly the United States.

Since its inception, India followed a policy of non-coalition with the United States and the Soviet Union. During Cold War, the United States maintained its cold relations with India due to its denial to join the West, following a non-allied foreign policy, and tight regulations over US business and investment in India. But in August 1971 India signed a treaty with the Soviet Union "Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Peace, and Cooperation" (Rajan, 1972). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became weak and was not able to provide military and economic assistance to India. Due to emerging threats from China, India is involved in balancing behavior. It signed Strategic Pact with the USA to counter the risk from China (Farooq et al., 2018). In the post-cold war era, India adopted soft

and hard balancing acts against China. The implementation of economic liberalization policies allowed India to form a strong relationship with USA and China in the 1990s. In the twentieth century, BOP stratified and became complex because of the escalation of non-state actors in the relationship between India and Pakistan. However, the act of balancing persist between these two nations since 1947, and both are looking for policy actions to attain more power than the other state.

Pakistan's Persistence with Cold War Policies

In 1991 after the demise of the Soviet Union 1991 world was seeking global cooperation and stressed on economic progress (Goldstein, 2003). This change in the security paradigm was also observed in South Asia, which perceived the prerequisite to transferring its resources from security to improve the social and economic status of people. Instead of forming cooperative relationships to improve the well-being of the nation and to bring harmony and peace to the South Asian region, Pakistan continued military buildup following cold war era policies.

During the cold war, superpowers were inclined to form active alliances to heighten their power balance, but in the post-cold war period, there is no need to form alliances and increase security beyond a certain level. After the cold war, the dependency of the core on the periphery declined, whereas the reliance on the periphery increased on the core. This major change in global politics has influenced Pakistan. In the post-cold war era, the United States appeared as a prominent power. The US who supported Pakistan during the cold war due to its benefits ended its pledges with Pakistan. Throughout the cold war, Pakistan's received a lot of military and economic aid due to its front-line status, in addition, its allies overlooked various narcotics and nuclear activities. With the end of the

international system shifted from bipolarity to uni-polarity or multi-polarity. With this shift, the United States recognized the low strategic significance of developing nations, particularly Pakistan. After the Cold war geostrategic importance of Pakistan has been shattered, which means that compromises made for the sake of alignment on its nuclear policy will come to an end. Due to its new position, the United States has shown disagreements with Pakistan on the nuclear issue, democracy, terrorism, and human rights. The United States stopped aid to pressurize Pakistan to terminate its nuclear program. The \$564 million of aid was frozen from October 1990- September 1991.

As a result, Pakistan attempted to expand its purchase of weapons. For this purpose, it approached France for mirage 2000 and China for a 300 MW nuclear reactor (Bray,1992). As Pakistan didn't terminate its nuclear policy even after all this pressure, the US attempted to label Pakistan as a terrorist country. Under these pressures, the Foreign policy of Pakistan can be seen to be uncertain between an autonomous foreign policy and persistent submissiveness to the international system. Additionally, US economic and strategic shift towards India proved harmful to Pakistan. During this time India altered its military-focused policy towards economic preeminence, as a result, it improved its economic relations with developed states without forming a permanent partnership (Alam, 2017).

The event of 9/11 led to a turning point in the Pak-US relationship. The US restructured its diplomatic approaches and reformed its earlier alliance with Pakistan to attain aid in its battle against terrorism. Pakistan became the main non-NATO ally of the United States. Pakistan's military alliances with the US have been fortified again. (Rajain, 2005).

The US committed to an enduring association with Pakistan to accomplish its security aims. Simultaneously major power increased drone attacks in Pakistan which caused internal insecurity problems. This situation not only caused huge damage to Pakistan's economy by decreasing local business and causing FDI to fly away but also put the country on the grey list of FATF in 2010 (Davis, 2011). In contrast to this, India's economy-centric policy led the country on right track and generated its positive image at the global level.

Neo-liberal Reforms and Policies of Pakistan

In 1980, Pakistan entered into a Fund Facility agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which required Pakistan's government to adopt neo-liberal strategies of trade liberalization, deregulation, and reduction in the fiscal deficit. Pakistan decided to implement structural reform and economic stabilization policies in 1988, to reduce its external debts and financial imbalances. Unfortunately, Pakistan experienced a lot of complications and troubles in the execution of these policies.

The economic crisis became more serious after nuclear testing on 28 May 1998. External debt increased to \$6 billion from \$1.2 billion. Due to the United States threats of economic sanctions Government of Pakistan froze all foreign currency accounts. In turn, the inflow of private remittances also stopped, which caused a loss of more than \$2.5 billion to Pakistan's economy. During this crisis, commercial banks reduced lending to private enterprises and the government. The government's fiscal deficit increased from 6 to 8.5 percent of GDP.

Therefore, the fiscal reforms - that were proposed in 1988 - became the priority of the government. The government of Pakistan decided to relax tariffs by decreasing the maximum tariff

rate from 225% to 65%. This new tariff policy put a substantial burden on consumers and averted resources to rent-seeking activities, which encouraged smuggling and corruption. Some export-promoting policies showed great potential for improvement in trade liberalization. Initially, the pace of privatization was fast with the privatization of 70 units but after some time pace decreased due to transparency requirements and fiscal vulnerability. To stimulate economic growth, reduce inflation, and improve the balance of payments government of Pakistan initiated another set of structural reforms in 1997. The main objective of these reforms was to fortify the competitiveness of Pakistan in world markets.

Pakistan initiated a macroeconomic adjustment program in 1993. This program aimed to adjust macroeconomic imbalances and address structural problems. In the beginning, the program successfully attained stabilization by decreasing the current account deficit and increasing reserves which reduced the budget deficit by 6 percent. But this stabilization was momentary and the benefits of the reforms vanished as the pace of implementation slowed down. The result was increased inflation and trade deficit which in turn deteriorated the inflow of capital.

Although the structural adjustment programs helped in improving the economy by improving the agricultural and energy sector this progress declined due to stagnant productivity coupled with adverse weather conditions. As a corrective measure government devalued the rupee by 7 percent in 1995, but couldn't control the increasing gap of the budget deficit. Again in the fiscal year 1996, the authorities introduced a second package of corrective measures and devalued the rupee by 8.5 percent. During 1996-97, it further deteriorated to 3.1 percent as a result of political instability which shattered the confidence of private investors. The year 1997-98

was gravely affected by the constitutional and East Asian crises.

According to the data of the Finance division, after the cold-war savings and investment gap increased and domestic investment decreased due to a decline in public savings and investment. As a result, Pakistan's external account deteriorated severely. The government couldn't converse this decline in the current account deficit Net export declined.

Role of Institutions within Pakistan in Policymaking

Does the question arise why Pakistan has not changed its policies by changing the global security system in the post-Cold War period? Pakistan had a fragile political system since its inception. At the time of partition, it inmates only one main political party which was in government before the partition. Therefore, the party that came into government in the early years had no/little capability of leading a state. As a result, the fragile political system paved the state's dependence on bureaucracy and repeated martial laws immediately after independence in the 1950s.

Military rules and martial laws further weakened the position of political parties. In addition, the focus of political parties was to protect the interests of elites which undermined the real objective of political parties (Brecher, 1979). Political elites lacking the necessary skills and experience further damaged democracy by controlling the process of policy-making. They used resources for their interest instead of benefiting the public interest. They politicized bureaucracy which played a vital role in the process of policymaking (Rizvi, 1993).

The Cold War provided an appropriate opportunity for the military of Pakistan to strengthen its place in the affairs of the state (Park, 1981) which in turn weakened the political

structure of the country. Other reasons for the resilient footing of the military in policy-making are; the poor performance of democratic governments, Pakistan's geostrategic position, and corrupt elites. During and after the Cold War period, in pursuit of new policies for the nation's security, Pakistani military and political elites are unconsciously harming the sovereignty of the state (Spratt et al., 2005).

India's Renowned Security Approach to New World Order in the 1990s

India's non-aligned policy during the Cold War does not define its entire foreign policy. It is only one of the three parts of the policy (Pant and Super, 2015).and is one of the three relations (the other two beings, the "independent policy" and the "peace area approach") which have been used to define the Government of India's attitudes to the cold war. The term "independent policy" was more frequently employed during the period 1950-1954; the term "peace area approach" was preferred during the period 1950-58 and the term "non-alignment" came more into vogue after 1958. Far from representing three different policies or three different stages of the growth of India's policy these terms simply denote the Government of India's response to the changing character of the cold war before 1960

India's non-aligned policy during the Cold War does not define its entire foreign policy. It is just one of the three parts of the policy (Paint and Super, 2015). The other two are the independent policy (used during 1950-1954) and the peace area policy (employed during 1950-1958). The policy of non-alignment became popular after 1958. These three parts explain the response of the Indian government toward the Cold War.

From 1946 to 50, the cold war was confined to Europe. Asia was free from its severe effects, although a couple of cold spells reached Iraq and Indo-China (Thakur, 1991). At that time

Indian government decided to remain fair in military matters of the bipolar world as Asia particularly India was not affected. Military shortcomings of India required it not to involve rival coalitions and get caught in the issues of Europe (Brecher, 1979). As a result, India paid little attention to problems of balance of power between the two superpowers and passed judgment on each issue according to its benefits by adopting a non-sectarian approach to the different issues between two powers.

Another reason for adopting nonalignment was colonial history. After independence India decided to follow the sovereign route in international politics. India was reluctant to ally with the US because of its probability to bond capitalism with imperialism. On the other hand, due to its colonial history, India attempted to form ties with other independent states (Ganguly, 2010). According to the realist theory, the international system is structured in such a way that it forces countries to accept a specific set of policies (Mandelbaum, 1988; Waltz, 1996). Non-alignment provided a framework under which India could exercise influence and control over Third World (Thornton, 1992).

The choice of non-alignment fitted best with India's commitment to adopt a model of planned economic development. Constraints on FDI and higher tariff rates on imports decreased external interference in the economy of India. The policy of Non-alignment permitted foreign assistance from the Soviet Union. So during the initial era after independence India's economic policy was a combination of unpredictability and self-sustenance (Kale, 2009).

Even though strict nonalignment designates not aligning explicitly to any power bloc, India didn't restrain from doing this if the condition necessitated. During the 1956's Suez affair, Nehru castigated Western interference in Egypt, while staying silent on Soviet intrusion in

Hungary in the same year. Similarly, when the scale of its disastrous war with China became evident, India formed close ties with the US. Initially, the US provided military assistance and the probability of Indo-US engagement increased. Though the US became involved in Vietnam War and this possibility was destroyed.

When the US formed diplomatic relationships with China, provided military aid to Pakistan, and supported Pakistan against nationalists in Bengal, the insecurity of India increased. In these circumstances, India turned to the Soviet Union for support. For India Soviet Union appeared as a vital source of military gear, economic aid, and marketplace for India. During the 1960s and 1970s, India abandoned the stance of Non-alignment. India shared close liaison with the Soviet Union till Soviet Union's downfall in 1991.

For India, the downfall of the Soviet Union was a huge blow, as it became highly reliant on the Soviet Union for military, political, and economic support. Though, the Soviet Union's collapse and the end of the Cold War forced India to reshape its foreign policy.

New World Order and the Indian policies

With the change in the global order and Soviet Union's downfall, India lost a significant provider of political protection, military assistance, and a strong alliance (Hilali, 2001). This combined with a balance of payments deficit (due to oil price shock) and loss of access to Central Asian and European markets forced policymakers in India to revise its foreign, political, and economic policies (Richter, 2004).

India introduced market-based reforms involving, currency devaluation, liberalization policy in the financial sector, removal of restrictions on foreign trade and investment, and the rebuff of anti-Americanism (Chiriyankandath, 2004; Richter, 2004). These

shifts were important as India adopted new international order and as result, India's interactions with the rest of the world changed considerably.

India builds strong relations with the US. Factors that brought these "estranged democracies" closer include India's economic growth and its appeal as an investment harbor, outsourcing, development of Indo-US trade, and common concern of conserving global security and peace battling against international terrorism (Kux, 2002). Since the 1990s India changed its strategy toward the Middle East. In 1992 India developed diplomatic relationships with Israel while supporting the Palestinian. Besides, it formed ties with the Far East and Southeast Asia (Sikri, 2009). During the cold war, India's interaction with these was minute. Later in the 1990s trade relations resulted in increased involvement in the region (Baru, 2006).

India also tried to improve its prickly relationships with Pakistan and china. The post-Cold War epoch provided a prospect for China and India to fortify their bilateral relationship. The remarkable growth of China required India to establish relationships between the two states (Thornton, 1992). Both states solved issues regarding borders and collaborated on global forums regarding several concerns like global climate change and trade. Since 2008, China is India's biggest trade partner. When India gave intimidation from china as the major cause of the nuclear test, relationships between both countries deteriorated.

With Pakistan, India's relationship stayed strained as both countries engaged in several conflicts on the Kashmir issue. India accused Pakistan of fomenting the Kashmir insurrection. Despite enormous efforts of resolving differences, little improvement was realized. How India became an advantageous position in the 1990s in comparison with

Pakistan. Pakistan's economy functioned well till 1990 and it was at the forefront with India during this period. But the post-cold war era has experienced noticeable change with India doing much better and surprising Pakistan. In the post-war period, Pakistan continued to follow a military-centric approach whereas, India followed neoliberal policies and emerged as a global business leader, and a powerful and attractive service sector. India gained tremendously from the integration and development of the global economy.

Causes of Power Asymmetry in Indo-Pak Equation

Neo-realists claimed that countries could balance threats externally by forming alliances or internally by building up their military (Waltz, 1996). Contemporarily, the eventual balance is in terms of nuclear weapons. In this aspect, some courtiers entreat security assurances from the country having nuclear power or from a military alliance with other superpowers, whereas other states decided fortify their position by developing nuclear power. Asymmetric skirmishes comprise states of imbalanced power competencies in terms of demography, resources, size, economic power, population, military capability, and expenditures on defense (Paul and Paul, 1994).

The relationship between Pakistan and India is characterized by different types of asymmetric competencies. In South Asia, India inhabits a significant and strategic geographical location. Consequently, India is considered a major power whereas Pakistan is just like a bargainer (Hussain, 2006). India possesses huge conventional forces as it is geographically large and consists of more than 15,000 km of borders and 6,000 km of coastline (Rajain, 2005). India's economy and population are seven times larger than Pakistan's. In addition, the rate of GDP growth in India is in two digits and its economy

is growing much faster than Pakistan's (Davis, 2011; Khan, 2009).

After independence, the base of India's defense strategy against Pakistan was identical capability. But in 1965 India altered its policy from capability matching to conserving sufficient intimidation or slight lead in its power against Pakistan (Thomas, 1996). From 1972 to 1987, Pakistan's defense condition was extremely weak when it was defeated by India in the Pak-Indo war of 1971 (Thomas, 2004). So, since 1970, India has attained a slight advantage over Pakistan, in terms of both quality and quantity.

Although in the late 1950s Pakistan was assured that its military was potent enough to defy India's hold on Kashmir but Pakistan never had enough capability to attack India. There was a great imbalance between the naval and air forces during the second Indo-Pak combat in 1965. At that time Pakistan's Air Force had twenty-two B-57 light bombers, ninety Sabre F-86F, four C-130 transport aircraft, and ten F104 starfighters (Rahman, 1996). Whereas India had 6 Hunter squadrons, 5 Gnat squadrons, 3 Canberra squadrons, 5 Mystere squadrons, 7 vampire fighter squadrons, 9 Russian MIG-21 and 300 plus helicopters and transport aircraft (Rahman, 1996). Likewise in marine forces, Pakistan had only one cruiser, 3 frigates, and 5 destroyers, while India possessed 2 cruisers, 11 frigates, 6 destroyers, and 1 aircraft carrier (Rahman, 1996). Besides, India attained qualitative and quantitative advantages in ground forces.

Although after the 1971 war conventional martial capability of Pakistan to block India slightly increased, India's ability to reduce blocking capacity has considerably improved due to martial modernization in the 1980s and 1990s (Jones, 2005). In addition, limitations on Pakistan's capability to attain a state-of-the-art system are hampered by its orthodox modernization, hence the unequal

competencies continue to grow between Pakistan and India.

India's increasing military power has made Pakistan more vulnerable to India's invasion. An investigation by Rodney Jones revealed that at the conventional level Pakistan has two major vulnerabilities (Jones, 2005). The primary weakness of Pakistan is that the increasing imbalance in air power between both nations has empowered India to realize a lead over Pakistan. By 1990, Pakistan is at a significant disadvantage in comparison to India, India had contemporary and superior fighting aircraft, and the proportion was 1:3.33 in favor of India (Jones, 2005). This advantage can rebuff control of Pakistan on its airspace and can expose its ground armed forces to regular air strikes. A secondary vulnerability of Pakistan is that it is not favored by its geography.

If India had attacked Pakistan, Pakistan may have potentially been divided into two parts on its longitude axis. Pakistani ground powers could be extended and outgunned by Indian powers, particularly in the desert region near Rahim Yar Khan (Jones, 2005). Truth be told, Pakistan is a small country, and most of its big cities and industrial hubs are unfortunately located near the Indian boundary, where there are no major geological barriers like mountain ranges and waterways to hold up the proceeding forces (Smith and Smith, 1994).

Conclusion

This article investigated the power imbalance between India and Pakistan. And attempted to find how a current imbalance between countries is linked to the period of the 90s when the new world order came after the cold war. By analyzing the reforms adopted by both countries this article connects the mistakes of the 90s with today's imbalance. Today India and Pakistan are the reflections of the strategies adopted and implemented by both countries in the 1990s.

Pakistan continued its Cold War security and foreign policies while India changed its policies regarding the 'new world order in the post-cold war era. In the 1990s India not only took advantage of the new world order but also developed strong ties with the USA. Consequently, India followed a policy of liberalism and opened its market for foreign investment not only boosting the Indian economy but also increasing the gap between both nations i.e Pakistan and India. On the other hand, after the downfall of the Soviet Union USA abandoned Pakistan and terminated military and economic aid to Pakistan. Consequently, the balance of power shifted in the favor of India. However, this overall imbalance of power between Pakistan and India has become the main factor forcing the two countries to show power in one way or another. And Pakistan needs to work on it is weak state compared to India.

Regardless of this power imbalance, Pakistan would never accept the hegemony of India in south Asia and will continue to try to balance against India. So, the region will remain subject to volatility due to increasing imbalances between the antagonistic neighbors. Thus, international agents are required to normalize the relationship between Pakistan and India. This will help both in addressing the problem of the increasing power imbalance between the two nations and will also aid in resolving their outstanding glitches. Nonetheless, the dilemma lingers on with the notion that peace attained in the South Asia case must not be a compromise on the solidarity, sanctity, honor, justice, and territorial integrity of the state. Therefore, the international actors need to look into the power play of geo-political and geo-strategic dynamics in South Asia.

Initially, Pakistan, especially the weak country, sought to decrease the asymmetric capability by allying with external powers (particularly china and the USA) and seeking

peripheral military aid. But in reality, neither the United States nor China completely abetted Pakistan during its skirmishes with India. In addition, the mortifying loss of East Pakistan in 1971 and the peaceful Indian atomic explosion of 1974 added to Pakistan's anxiety. Thus, these conditions forced Pakistan to move from an external balancing policy to an internal balancing. As a result, Pakistan thought about nuclear weapons as the best available solution to ensure its sanctuary and the sole way to defend against strong India. Similarly, India plead with nuclear powers to assure sanctuary against nuclear intimidation after it lost the 1962 war with China and China's nuclear experiment in 1964. But India's request was not successful and that is why it decided to become self-sufficient and developed its nuclear arms for its security. Therefore, the development of nuclear weapons by India has worked to prevent both China and Pakistan.

This investigation enabled us to realize how ideological and material aspects along with external and internal circumstances impacted the security choices of states and the manner of negotiations. Thereafter, economic affairs moved to the center of India's foreign policy, which called for of a steady regional environment and interdependence for economic and social development in India. (2) External powers have altered their policies towards India, perceiving India as a rising power. (3) For Pakistan External support has decreased, thus making it hard for Pakistan to conserve the regional balance of power. And (4) the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had affected the region and enhanced negotiating position of India in comparison to Pakistan.

However, there are impediments to an enduring peace process and renewal of the mutual comprehensive dialogue. These include the dominant role of the military in Pakistan and differences in national identities between both countries. If the Pakistani military continues to

dominate the country and views India as an enemy it will set clear boundaries for each process of communication. Similarly, the contradictory identities will restrain the normalization of relationships between Pakistan and India. Pakistan is still a flimsy and Crisis-stricken state, whereas the process of state-building has been more fruitful in India.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the balance of power elements has been shifting within the framework of South Asia as it is one of the strategic centers of the continent with its geostrategic implications in international politics. The alliance of world powers with India has turned the security and political condition in the South into a critical situation. The balance of conventional power is in India's favor, and Pakistan is countering it with nuclear deterrence. There is a need to listen to each other, identify main issues, keep the debate going and help policymakers to explore these areas so that more accurate decisions can be implemented.

The source of the India-Pakistan conflict lies in the usual imbalance of power between Pakistan and India and Pakistan. The solution either necessitates some change in this imbalance or a change in Pakistan's policy towards band-wagoning. Unless such a change takes place, Pakistan is expected to remain insecure, and this uncertainty will result in the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan. Unless such a change takes place, Pakistan is likely to remain insecure, and this uncertainty will result in the ongoing Indo-Pak conflict.

This research paper suggests that the Indo-Pak relationship will be regarded as a complicated interplay of external and internal factors. Although relations between the two states have become a little bit stable in recent years, normalization of relationships and resolution of disputes do not seem possible in the next few years. Internally, the current democratic transition of Pakistan may pave the way for

resolving long-standing disputes, but national leaders are confronting various internal issues and have no power to follow a peace policy with India. Similarly, there are sturdy internal obstacles to the process of the peace process in India. Externally, the peace process between the two nations will be shaped by their association with China and United States. In addition, analysis has revealed that structural reforms only are not enough for a fruitful peace process. It also demands trained leaders who will be able to overcome the existing ideology and can make audacious decisions.

This analysis has some limitations. (1) This study consist of a small sample size About fifty research articles, blogs, and news articles have been covered. (2)This research has employed a qualitative secondary method of analysis. Future research could be done by using primary sources i.e by conducting interviews and focus group debates with economists and policymakers.

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