

Vulnerable Governance And Role Of Law Enforcement Agencies (Leas) In Post 9/11 Period

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ABSTRACT:

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan had to change its foreign policy. Pakistan had to become US's ally and put herself in the front which was called 'War on Terror'. This obviously directed that Pakistan would have to change its foreign policy for Afghanistan and Kashmir as well. This change in policy was neither received well by the Taliban and their supporters nor in Afghanistan and Middle East. This entire scenario resulted in the changing of Pakistan's geostrategic environment and the country was vulnerable to the great power itself. It was not something very hard to figure out that the country is in no shape to take on the US as Pakistan lacks resources, and military support. The military insecurity was particularly very troubling for Pakistan as it was the major reason. Bunch of loyalties turned out to be more unverifiable and hard to access than any time in recent memory. Pakistan was exposed to threats both internally and externally. The militants expanded their activities and have attacked all the major cities of Pakistan especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since then. Terrorism is one of the main threats that Pakistan faces even today and has become a great challenge for the army, the society and the system itself. Terrorism is damaging the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. Here we will critically analyze the Vulnerable Governance and role of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in Post 9/11 period. We will critically analyze the role of Frontier Corps, and Rangers and Police in post 9/11 era from multi-dimensional aspects.

Keywords: Law Enforcement Agencies, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Non State Actors, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, National Internal Security Policy, National Counter Terrorism Authority, Police, Frontier Corps, Rangers.

INTRODUCTION:

Pakistan is facing governance issues since its inception. Infrastructure in Pakistan is a standout amongst the most inadequately overseen organizations in the state. It is portrayed as not well prepared, inadequately equipped, profoundly politicized and constantly degenerate. It has performed well in specific operations yet by and large that is an uncommon marvel. Apparently, the essential purpose behind this

situation is tireless administrative inability to put resources into use and restraining modernization and development. Ironically, regardless of incessant inner emergencies in the nation since its initiation in 1947, going from ethnic encounters and partisan fights to sharp ascent in criminal movement and developing rebellions, this aspect was never given key attention by the establishments— both military and civil. Subsequently, poor police performance in

counter-militancy operations and counter-insurgency is not astounding. In the meantime, the way that police succeeded in 1990s in testing some religious extremist groups in Punjab and vanquished an uprising like circumstance in Karachi, be that as it may, demonstrates that in circumstances where political backing was available and backing was provided, police exhibited its capability to perform. Pakistan's North-Western part has gone under appealing weight of terrorism and militant organizations working in the zone, since the 9/11 incident and the subsequent US/NATO army operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan is lacking legislation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and adjoining KP helped Pakistani Taliban and other extremist outfits to grow their area of operations in the locale. Pakistani army operated in the region and led to more precariousness, and restricted resistance in FATA has now transformed into a developing Pashtun local rebels. As obvious from the creating turmoil in the Swat region of KP, intelligence services operations can just give a breathing space to state and it is police and law enforcement institutions that can really help the state to re-set up its jurisdiction in the territory. A convenient police activity can be more powerful in suppressing revolts.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Pakistan has suffered countless problems because of the terrorism which lead to its instability. A lot of bloodshed has been seen since then in the major cities of Pakistan. Khyber Pakhtunkhawa is particularly considered unsafe because of militants expanded activities there. Thousands of official, men, women, children and security personnel have lost their lives due to these expanded activities (Khan, 2012). Pakistan has also suffered a great loss in terms of infrastructure, socio-economic and strategic assets. All of this mushrooms because terrorists'

retaliation against Pakistan joining US's band wagon. In this new situation, Pakistan's geostrategic surroundings changed and the nation's security got to be helpless before the colossal force (Hussain, 2012). In case of progress, the security of the nation was with an existential threat which was clear and present (Rashid, 2008). It was a conspicuous matter since Pakistan was not in a position to confront the potential danger from the United States, as the nation needed most assets of force, especially military fortitude. Military instability had been especially piercing and presented Pakistan to a wide range of dangers from inside and without (Khan, 2013). Notwithstanding, the occasions put the nation in a perilous circumstance and postured multi-dimensional inner dangers to the nation. Terrorists extended their terrorist exercises to the settled zones of Pakistan, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa and all real urban areas have turned into the prime focus of terrorist activities from that point forward (Haq, 2016).

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This mammoth surge of terrorism is representing an incredible test for the condition of Pakistan, its general public and framework including military and law implementation offices. These faceless and stateless terrorists are introducing an immediate risk to the uprightness, security and power of Pakistan. In such manner, activists have been a threat to Pakistani society all through the post 2001 period. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) had once given prolific selecting ground to troopers pursuing jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Afghan Crisis used incredible effect on the history, legislative issues, economy, society and standpoint of the general population of FATA. The terrorist exercises extended complex when the leftovers of Taliban and Al-Qaeda entered in FATA. They set up 157 preparing camps along

the tribal locale and had more than 400 bolster areas in the tribal regions (Grimmett, 2012).

DISCUSSION

It cannot be denied that the terrorists have indeed achieved a skill to show themselves as ambiguous and have also achieved sophistication in terms of ideas due to their networked structure. The instability of Pakistan in this context has allowed foreign factors and Non State Actors (NSAs) to harm Pakistan and display it as a failed state. The expanding level of violence does not really aid the situation and has become a challenge for the police which is highly incompetent in their abilities and is far more ill-trained and ill-equipped as compared to the Army. The police itself is not safe from the highly motivated militant activities which is an irony in itself (Christine, 2014). The suicide bombers have been the main concern as no effective strategy has been proposed to counter it. Pakistan has been a victim of terrorism. It is not very hard to figure out the assault of Army Public School that took place on 16th December, 2014 at Peshawar where 141 armless students were killed. To counter the tsunami of terrorism, Pakistan came up with a policy and the Law Enforcement Agencies have been made responsible to capture militants. After this tragic incident, a 20 point National Action Plan (NAP) was introduced in order to counter terrorism. The Peshawar incident changed the thinking of security officials and has drawn a fine line between the militants and the nation. The security establishment is conducting costly military operations in FATA involving over 200,000 security personnel including 120,000 regular army.

THE PAKISTAN FRONTIER CORPS VERSUS VULNERABLE GOVERNANCE

Once the situation has balanced out to some degree, the army will again assume the administration of FC with more obligations,

however the increased imperfections, lack of encouraging elements and a condition of low inspiration taking vast-scale abandonments, but rather it has likewise seen a few braced positions FC to be effectively attacked by extremist radical sanctuaries. There have additionally been situations where the FC troops have declined to wage war against their relatives and companions in the tribes (FATA).

Incidents like these have not just harmed the integrity and validity of the FC as a security force, additionally prompted affirmations of troops FC who are in agreement with radical wings working against coalition troops in Afghanistan. Without any better option, in any case, the US (United States) and Pakistan are taking a shot at significant advanced mechanisms that would transform FC being a solitary police into a military wing that is appropriately trained and ready to complete huge operations on counter-insurgency. This reform accommodates the US government to back the re-gear of the FC as well provision of army teachers. Also, the Pakistani government is thinking about a proposition to enhance the states of FC administration work force to match authorities serving in the customary forces. The future may see the arrangements of FC formally being a piece of the normal armed force as a result of Kargil strife in Kashmir in 1999.

The first line of guard of Pakistan against radical strengths in its approximately administered western boondocks district is not a regular security force of Pakistan, but rather an abandoned paramilitary. A remainder of the British pioneer period, Frontier Corps has been kept up and positioned in Baluchistan and NWFP region by the legislature since autonomy (Ashraf, 2015).

In spite of the fact that the FC is a security institution and summoned by officers from the consistent Army, the oversight of FC-NWFP and

FC-Baluchistan rests with the MOI. The FC developments in the two areas have separate managerial and independent organizations with each directed by a serving official from the intelligence services. While FC-NWFP is headquartered at Peshawar, FC-Baluchistan is situated in Quetta. The Pakistan government credits the accompanying parts to FC-Baluchistan and FC-NWFP:

- **FC-NWFP:** Maintenance measures, support of lawfulness and order control along the fringes with Afghanistan and in the federally managed tribal regions (FATA) of the KP.
- **FC-Baluchistan:** Maintenance measures, upkeep of 'law and order' conditions and monitoring of drugs along the Baluchistan fringe.

Notwithstanding the doled out parts, the FC has been progressively required in the War against Extremism which has overwhelmed Pakistan's border locales in the consequence of the U.S.-led attack of Afghanistan. This errand, however not inside the operational capacities and doled out part of the FC, has struggled to change it into conspicuousness around the world.

FUTURE OF FC (FRONTIER CORPS)

In spite of the various failures that have presented FC strategies against the fanatic extremists in FATA, numerous analysts keep on assessing the strength of FC which is greatly an improved chance than the armed force in protecting the tribal regions. In his announcement to the US Foreign Committee, John D. Negroponte mentioned that the State of Pakistan has dispatched a project to build the mechanism of the FC, whose locals have one of a kind preferences working in the tribal regions due to their phonetic and ethnic ties. The US is supporting this advancement and is providing

training and preparing the FC to reform state's capability to protect its fringes and give protection to the indigenous civil populace (Shah, 2016).

Late reports show that Washington is arranging a huge increment in current army in order to assist the FC and its endeavors to protect the tribal belt incorporating a proposition by U.S. Unique Operations Command to prepare and arm tribal pioneers to battle al-Qaeda and the Taliban with a \$750m guide-bundle for the territory throughout the following 5 years. More vitally, the calls inside Washington democratic institutions for better supervision of how Pakistan uses U.S. aid could prompt this guide coming to the FC as opposed to it, being redirected for various motives either by the army or the state.

The FC was never in such a great amount during its long presence as it is today. Albeit a few experts see the U.S. plan to change the FC into an intense counter-uprising power with suspicion, the truth is that neither the Pakistan nor the U.S. have some other alternative accessible than to depend on the FC. What is most indispensable, notwithstanding, is the way that any arrangement to upgrade the battling capability of the FC must not be embraced in disengagement from the financial improvement of the displaced people of FATA. While an intense military forwardness in the district may give transitory alleviation, and a long haul arrangement requires that the domains now constituting FATA be completely coordinated with whatever is left of Pakistan instead of keeping on being represented by obsolete laws and regarded as a semi-self-sufficient area.

PAKISTAN RANGERS' ROLE AGAINST TERRORISM

The Rangers were formulated under Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959 for the "assurance of

and upkeep of 'law & order' in the outskirt territories". They were deployed in Sindh surprisingly under Article 147 of the Constitution in 1989 by none other than the former Minister, Qaim Ali Shah, under Benazir Bhutto's first government. Once more, it was his government which vested the Rangers with police powers without precedent for 2009. The Anti-Terrorism Act [ATA], 1997 was changed in 2014 permitting, inter alia, the Rangers deployed under Section 4 of the Act to keep a suspect for 90 days. A widely inclusive Protection of Pakistan Act was passed that likewise gave extra powers to the Rangers and other law implementers to utilize power against a suspect on a "sensible ground of suspicion". In the interim period, the 21st Constitutional Amendment was passed creating military courts (Ahmad, 2016).

RANGERS' ROLE IN PEACE SUPPORT IN KARACHI

Corps Commander Karachi Lt Gen Naveed Mukhtar went by Pakistan Rangers Sindh Headquarters where he said the paramilitary's section was the "spine" of the operation against extremism in the region. While seizing for payoff, coercive dangers to the trading group were common in Karachi and entrepreneurs were moving their stakes in Bangladesh and various nations. Ex COAS, Gen Ashfaq Kiyani took the notification of critical circumstance and on solicitation of state and trading group. The Security forces were conveyed with extra powers. The Rangers assumed a significant part in keeping up peace and tried the guilty parties with no segregation and devised political association. Business people group specifically and masses all in all took help and commended the part of officers in Sindh. Gen Rangers Sindh Ejaz Chaudry went by Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, on this event business group consistently acclaimed the officers in keeping up peace in the city and requested augmentation in

its stay with extra-ordinary orders for another year (Ahmad, 2016).

On June 26, 2016 Gen Raheel, went to Headquarters Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), at Karachi. COAS was informed in point of interest by DG Rangers Major General Bilal Akbar about progressing operations, the overall security circumstance and the way forward for Karachi operation. COAS recognized the penances and accomplishments of Sindh Rangers which have achieved critical change in the tranquil situation in the city. Conversing with the troops, the COAS said that determination, bravery and integrity of Sindh Rangers, to free the city from the militants and offenders, have earned them greatest admiration from the general population of Karachi. He emphasized that no matter how you look at it, operation concentrates on the whole system of criminals, their abettors and agents, and will proceed till we accomplish our goal of peace and re-establish commonality in all parts of Karachi. Each help including information-sharing and resources backing the troops will be given to the Rangers to fulfill their mission. The US General Vincent R. Stewart commended the counter rebellion operations in the western regions of Pakistan by the Pak army. He likewise lauded the Karachi operations by the Rangers, contending they all diminished viciousness in the nation.

Pakistan's officials must harness both military and civil institutions. To effectively achieve this goal a diverse and strong strategy is needed to incorporate all civil and military institutions on counter terrorism, education reforms and changing public narratives. There must be a practical implementation of such measures with necessary improvements (Ullah, 2019).

CHALLENGES FOR POLICE TO COUNTER TERRORISM

- Dearth of coordination between army and police-oriented intelligence organizations (Military Intelligence, Inter-Services Intelligence, and even Intelligence Bureau under army regulations). Trust deficiency amongst army and civil offices additionally assume a part in this connection.
- Poor information accumulation ability regarding crimes and hoodlums including terrorist associations is a critical obstacle. In numerous incidents, outlawed separatist associations proceeded with their resources and sometimes needed criminals and fanatics who changed their outlooks (swiftly joining bunches that were not under government investigation after they were outlawed) and the police stayed confused. Here the police was additionally disabled the same number of militant groups were creating "opportunity contenders" for Afghanistan and Kashmir and had working relations with components in the intelligences administrations, and consequently numerous police authorities were hesitant to follow such components believing that they may be the stakes of some "other state foundations."
- In late years, SIG (Special Investigations Group) under the FIA (Federal Investigation Agency) was entrusted to a) a cross examination of terrorists, b) distinguish and capture most wanted extremists, c) recognize fanatics' aids, and d) coordinate with federal government in exploring significant wanted militants. However the working quality of this organization is shockingly low and inadequate - 37 agents bolstered by 13 specialists, under the command of a Deputy Inspector General of Police (Perito, 2014).
- KP police was not provided sufficient resources in spite of their determined solicitations in 2006-07 when it was evident to one and all that Pakistani Taliban were centered around growing their impact in different KP areas (particularly Kohat, Hangu, D.I. Khan and in particular Swat). The Swat case is much all the more disturbing. As indicated by the district police official in Swat, Mr. Bangash, around seven hundred policemen out of an aggregate quantity of 1737, abandoned when Maulana Fazlullah of Swat alarmed provincial police to give up their employments or face the fierceness of Taliban. Twenty counter measures for Swat police were offered accordingly by the regional and federal governance. In any case, now we have seen positive reforms and changes in police after the PTI drove the government in KP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). In any case, the police are not equipped for battling terrorism in its present structure, despite the fact that they are on the front line in the war against terrorism (Ullah, 2016).

WAY OUT FOR POLICE TO COUNTER TERRORISM

- As per Police Ordinance 2016 of KP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), supplanting the Police Order 2002 ought to be trailed by all territories as it seems to be "outlook change from bureaucratic to just a democratic framework (PIPS Report, 2012).
- Police is supposed to be made depoliticized and autonomous-there ought to be no political obstruction as it

is in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Inspector General (IG) Police in KP has stated there is no political obstruction by the political parties and he has been given a free hand to perform his obligations. Umar Cheema, a bold investigative columnist imparted his own particular connection to IG of KP Police saying that there was 'No Political' impedance with the KP Police (Rana, 2014).

- With a specific end-goal to depoliticize the Police, the Chief of the Police Department or institution must have a protected residency. In a utopian world, the Central Government ought to send a rundown of all qualified Police officers to the Regional Governments where the Public Safety Commission may waitlist three names for appointment as IG and the Provincial Government, i.e., the Chief Ministers and their cupboards may elect one of them. From that point, the IGs must have a safe tenure of 2/3 years (Special Report, 2010).
 - The IGs ought to pick their groups of representatives. All territorial and regional Police Chiefs must hold their own decisions. This is the place the KP Police is demonstrating the way. Furthermore it has sanctioned this thing into a legal framework named as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Ordinance 2016 (Vitali, 2014).
 - The IGs, as leaders of the divisions, must have authoritative, operational and monetary self-rule in genuine sense. This ought to be liable to stringent responsibility and reviews.
 - Nobody, not even the Supreme Court, can meddle with the examination of a criminal case by the Police. In any case,
- each suspect, each challan and all demonstrations of exclusion and commission in the investigative area are liable to legal examination. The case record is examined by the trial courts and the investigative courts. Along these lines, no lawmaker or organization ought to ever meddle in the procedure of examination, that is, the establishment on which the mainstay of equity needs to stand in the long run. Be that as it may, for that to happen, we require a Police that is bold and loyal to the federation. Without respectability, the equity frameworks are empty. If Police is exploitative then why accuse the judges to let off the offenders against whom an appropriate case has not been readied by the Police? Accordingly, interior and exterior 'nab strategies ought to be solid and autonomous Police Complaints Authorities must be set up by the Parliament in this regard.
 - National Police Bureau in Islamabad must be overhauled as an ingenious research organization for thoughts and exploration for enhancing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts of the police in Pakistan. The fantastic work done by this establishment in building up the 2008 operation against terrorism is significant example (Suddle, 2001).
 - Counter-extremism accord and counter-revolt set-ups for middle and junior cops in renowned worldwide law-enforcement organizations can be significant for Pakistan.
 - For successful counter-insurgency measures in KP, police can profit by current policing outlook i.e., "Intelligence oriented monitoring". In

this strategy, the interface with the nonmilitary personnel populace is led to pick up information, which is utilized to take off criminal (and terrorism elements) resources. This requires more covert work than other strategic frameworks and requires building up systems of operations. As talked about earlier, regional police (with the same ethnic, social and semantic foundation) is most appropriate to grow such systems in uprising tainted locales.

CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS

The government officials and arm forces of this country need to work together in order to brought back the peace of this territory. Pakistan is totally extremism-free nation. It has dependably censured “war on terror” by having faith in peace and serenity all through the world. It made firm and extreme move at whatever point it needs to manage the tranquil condition of communities. It has constantly assisted developments on every single worldwide stage particularly after 9/11. Pakistan is one of the main nations that provide larger part of the troops to UN peace keeping institutions which is the reasonable proof of seriousness of Pakistan for universal peace. Also, the International Community must attempt to concur upon the government plan to control extremist terrorism. The obvious refinement should be set up and keep up to work intently in the war against terrorism. The difficulties of the country are not over yet. Regardless, we need to make incredible penances as our sufferings that have been brought on by offenses, wrongdoings and impulsive strategies received by our progressive governments, won't end at any point in the near future. We are prepared for this however our energy and force to thrashing militancy and a wide range of social indecencies must likewise be responded by the legislature with down-to-earth policies. Every accessible resource must be exterminated to reduce the

sufferings of the country. This is the only solution to achieve success against terrorism and can shape Pakistan as our forefathers had dreamt of. Harmony will get spreader in all the areas of Pakistan in the upcoming years with prosperity.

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