

Crisis Leadership In Civic State Building: The Case Of Clan Federalism In Somalia

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ABSTRACT

Leadership in critical situations is one of the most important components for crisis resolution. Under critical or pressing circumstances, crisis leadership becomes paramount to mitigating extenuating demands for immediate solutions. Among the frequently cited traits of crisis leadership are response flexibility, lucid communication, instantaneous decision, cooperative action and alert-result watch. Crisis leadership in the context of civic state building, as in the case of clan federalism in Somalia, is an example of its persistent importance to resolving the pervasive problems of incompatible social structure of the Somali community and clan-based federalism due to a host of issues. The latter includes an absence of powerful central government, dispersed interests of clans, conflicting personal interests of leaders, the misconception of the term federalism in Somali politics, containment and regime-change policy against states by the federal government, and finally lack of application of the uncompleted constitution. This study, employing a qualitative approach of analyzing and interpreting focus-group interview-responses, seeks to understand the backdrop of dissenting clan-federalism in Somalia and the role of crisis leadership in mitigating and influencing the crisis situations and civic state-building agenda in order to facilitate the extenuating circumstances of resolving this long-drawn crisis in the country. In this way, the pertinent capacity-building knowledge and problem-solving skills of crisis leadership management can be acquired and improved to overcome the Somalia political dilemma in mission-plagued civic-state building for stable economic

development and country growth in the public interest. What and how such management can abate the political transition-reconstruction of a peaceful government for economic-wealth generation in Somalia would be a welcomed relief for characterizing its clan-inherited culture of governance.

Keywords: crisis leadership, clan-federalism, civic-state building, transition-construction politics, clan-inherited culture of governance

I. Introduction

A crisis tends to bring out either the most excellent quality or the worst attribute in an individual, thus highlighting if he or she is a capable leader and isn't (Martin, 2020); and under crisis-driven situations, leadership is the critical component or agent for crisis resolution (Kim, 2021). Since the study of crisis leadership has become more urgent in the new millennium because leaders worldwide are increasingly confronting varying degrees of organizational crisis (Prewitt, Weil, & McClure, 2011), Bavik et al. (2021) propose that crisis leadership should be regarded as a significant domain within leadership study. In crises, according to Aldrich (2012) and Comfort et al. (2010), organizations are supposed to deal with them and their recovery effectively, suggesting

that this is where the crucial role of crisis leadership is paramount. Moreover, the ongoing global crisis makes leadership-crisis study inevitable because crisis leaders are confronting life-death threatening circumstances all the time that require them to reconfigure better organized conflict-resolution administration systems (Mcnulty et al., 2018).

Overcoming existing challenges confronting crisis leadership is the ability to understand that prevention is the best method, and this responsibility is within the scope of crisis leadership (Wilen, 2006). To ensure resilience in the face of crisis, leaders are expected to establish a culture and mechanism enable them to anticipate imminent threats and respond accordingly as soon as the crisis occurs and, if possible, to covert such threats into

opportunities (Fragouli, 2020). In some African nations such as Nigeria, federalism is seen as a powerful mechanism for administering diverse societies but ethnic and religious crises continue to hamper its success. Studies contend that ethno-religious crises in Nigeria not only impede the relevance of federalism to cultivate national unity and security but they also debilitate the existence of federalism (Michael, 2012). Major studies on Somali federalism stress that neither clan federalism is not designed to enhance the prospects of state rebuilding from a political perspective nor does it promote inclusiveness to end clan conflicts and possible secession. These studies have shown that there is a need for reform in the current federal system in terms of political inclusion and constitutional reviewing in order to create a more conducive atmosphere for political competition, and redefining clear exercisable power between the central government and regional states (Abubakar, 2016). According to Mohamoud (2015), he had asserted that the concept of federalism demands a mature political leadership and the

will of the Somali people, since the country had experienced 31 years of a unitary state with extensive crises among clans and between the state and civilians.

Although researchers of major crisis leadership agree that studying the subject area is important yet most of the studies are only impressionistic (Boin & Hart, 2010). And, according to Dinh et al. (2014), studies on this subject are scattered despite the important influence of critical leadership role in any crisis situation. Even though crisis leadership has become a strong component of crisis management studies, much of the published scholarship is fundamentally observational and the lack of more empirical research remains a persistent challenge (Jaques, 2012). Schoenberg (2005) had depicted crisis leadership as one of the foremost imperative consideration in crisis management. And, in the same vein, Wooten & James (2008) had observed that, even though earlier crisis management researchers have investigated the significance of crisis management, no research has elaborated the knowledge,

skills, or capacities vital to lead an organization through crises stages. Similarly, Saltz (2017) had stressed that there are abundant investigations on crisis and crisis management but little is known about crisis leadership; the few studies conducted have focused on private sector organizations while there is a continuing call and need for studying public sector leadership particularly in the context of a country like Somalia.

The associated limitations, according to Bavik et al. (2021), are attributed to the challenge of comprehending and then applying the particularistic roles, traits, behaviors, and leadership procedures that constitute crisis leadership. In the study of Demiroz & Kapucu (2012), they have identified the traits of crisis leadership as cooperation, flexibility in the decision award, adaptation, and effective communication with the public. But Schoenberg (2005) had argued that a crisis leadership model comprises personal attributes such as integrity, intelligence, vision, and courage that measure a leader's trustworthiness and thus enables the crisis leader to

influence his/her followers during the crisis. In essence, leadership during crisis requires reasonable decision-making directed by an ethical approach (Snyder et al, 2006), and three such approaches are virtue ethics (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001), an ethic of justice, and an ethic of care (Simola, 2003). Moreover, Bauman (2011) had concluded, from previous studies on these issues, that an ethic of care approach is most effective for managing major crises.

The present research aims to fill the identified knowledge gaps of crisis leadership, civic state-building, and clan federalism to make several contributions to bridge the knowledge-research gap. Firstly, this research expands the limited study on the understanding of crisis leadership (Bavik et al. 2021), and how it influences civic state-building in a clan federal system of Somalia. This is important because, as a significant component of civic state-building, crisis leadership resolution is paramount for building a clan federal-setting in Somalia. Secondly, the study examines how crisis leadership can

play a crucial role in the reconstructing the public sector for better governance, an issue which, at the moment, has limited research input (Saltz, 2017). This aspect would help provide a basis for understanding crisis leadership in governmental and political settings in order to enhance the understanding of the concept of crisis leadership in public institutions that is rarely investigated (Wooten & James, 2008). Thirdly, as there is glaring limited systematic research on crisis leadership itself, this study would be able to highlight the essential aspects of knowledge, skills, and capacities an effective crisis leadership can contribute to rebuilding a clan-divided and politically disintegrated Somalia into a state-integrated clan-federal system in the public interest.

II. Review of Literature

Crisis Leadership

Crisis leadership is defined as a process in which leaders act to prepare for unexpected crises, particularly in dealing with the salient nature of the crises and its disruptive events and circumstances (Bundy et al., 2017;

Firestone, 2020; James et al., 2011). However, some researchers like Bavik et al. (2021) have differentiated between crisis leadership and crisis management; the former focuses specifically on the processes of how a crisis influences leaders, how leaders exert influence on the cognitive, affective and behaviors of different stakeholders during the duration of the crises, and why some leaders are more effective than others under siege of crisis situations. However, crisis leadership is more than just a set of behavioral skills; it also includes the fundamental aspiration, character, and values of an individual (Kouzes & Posner, 2002) and his or her ability to critically think through the challenges posed by the crises (Lalonde & Roux-Dufort, 2013).

Leadership crisis has been assessed from various perspectives. For example, the core attributes of crisis leadership, from a nursing perspective, consist of six attributes: (a) clear, fast and frank communication; (b) a high degree of collaboration; (c) sharing of information; (d) decision-making and fair prioritization; (e) building trust;

and (f) competency (Kim, 2021). From a facility management perspective, this study has identified five crisis leadership competencies: emergency preparedness, crisis communication, emotional intelligence, leadership skills and problem-solving. In this context, the study has established that, in Thailand, emergency preparedness, and crisis communication were the top two leadership competencies during crisis management. Nevertheless, the study is skeptical about the universality of these competencies and proposes future research that may apply its theoretical framework to research similar phenomenon in other countries to understand their respective local context of leadership competencies application, particularly possible differences in handling natural hazards, man-made hazards or terrorism (Wisittigars & Siengthai, 2019). Another crisis leadership model by Flynn (2004) suggests that crisis leadership involves a combination of four external factors such as information gathering, external conscience, preparation, experience, and a wide array of personal and

leadership attributes, built upon a foundation of communications reinforced by authenticity and influence.

Among the various theories of leadership, situational leadership has been commonly used and is best suited for crisis management (Prabhakar & Yaseen, 2016). Thus, situational leadership is a useful model for crisis leadership. This is especially so in the African continent where a diversity of calls echoes the dire need for change agents and quality leadership with skills-set and reform tools to engineer and bring about change and sustainable political order (Ojalere, 2015).

Effective crisis leadership is regarded as an important competency element of crisis management since crises are common and inevitable in contemporary world, thus highlighting its timely importance as an ongoing topic of applied research (Bhaduri, 2019; Balwant, 2020; Firestone, 2020). In this regard, although there are studies addressing a menu of crisis scenarios, yet there is a paucity of research on the skills and expertise

essential to succeed as a crisis leader (Flynn, 2004).

Somalia's catastrophic crisis of civil war, political discords, socio-economic disruptions, and failed state features are all results of the culmination of a series of political miscalculations and misjudgments on the part of Somali leadership and external actors (Menkhaus, 2014). The most serious problem Somalia has faced since its independence is political leadership. There is an urgent need for a policy of national dialogue and reconciliation, imminent changes in the leadership, having misread and neglected several international incidences of the Somalia leadership that had provided any opportunity to save the nation in the past (Abdi, 1981).

Civic State-Building

Political scientists generally conceive the state as a set of centralized institutions with the power to make binding decisions for the population of a given territory through its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Therefore, building such an institution has historically entailed four main

processes: expanding and consolidating exclusive control over a territory and its population, maintaining domestic order and policing, extracting resources, and eventually democratizing state institutions (Ayoob, 1995). State-building has long been a priority for African nations in the post-colonial era. However, no empirical study of the repercussions of state-building strategies has yet been conducted. As a result, this study argues that state-building initiatives in Africa do not increase political stability and may even worsen it (Bandyopadhyay & Green, 2013). The distinction between ethnic and civic interpretations of nationhood and statehood has obvious normative implications. On the one hand, universalism, an inclusive definition of citizenship, human rights, liberalism, constitutional patriotism, and rationality have all been linked to a civic understanding of the government. On the other hand, ethnic interpretation of civic government and membership of national groups are based on ascribed characteristics such as similar descent, language, or religion. And the topic of how

favorable ethno-federations are to the development of civic state-building programs falls within this normative interpretation of political reality (Brubaker, 1992).

Despite the challenges of globalization, the role of the state in Africa still remains critical. It is difficult to imagine a society with a functioning economy and a democratic government, envisioning the widespread ethnic conflicts and the crisis of state-building in the region without a state. The failure of state-building in Africa is largely attributable to the nature of the state as the African state tends to be highly centralized, authoritarian, self-serving, or serving the interests of the “state class,” which includes the ruling political authorities, the central bureaucracy, and its regional functionaries, the upper echelons of the military, and members of the dominant political party, if one exists. Even where there are nation-states, different levels of conflict are experienced as ethnic, religious, and cultural homogeneity did not prevent clan conflict in Somalia. However, the

development of a centralized unitary state has not been successful even though African leaders of the era of decolonization have argued that federalism is a divisive arrangement that would lead to secession and this has resulted in a centralizing strategy of state-building to be widely adopted in the continent (Mengisteab, 2014).

Even though ethnicity has been exploited by state-builders, pre-modern and modern, if ethnicity is not explicitly considered, it is still difficult to fully understand the process and impact of state-building in Africa. Ethnic identity is a fluid and dynamic phenomenon that can wax and wane from time to time. It has the potential for manipulation and dynamism, but these do not justify the avoidance of the concept. On the contrary, understanding how the state's institutions are expanded and centralized requires an analysis of the conditions that link ethnic groups to political change (Enloe, 2015). For instance, Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic nation and this has created significant obstacles for state-building. There have been many disputes, quarrels, and

conflicts during the construction of the state which led the political entrepreneurs of Ethiopia's various communities to pursue different ways of dealing with diversity. The dominant Amhara had pursued a policy of assimilation (1889–1991); since the 1960s, the Eritreans and some Oromo politicians have chosen the path of secessionism; and since the mid-1970s the Tigrerians had opted for the "accommodationist" alternative. This study argues that the "accommodationist" path has discredited the "assimilationist" and "secessionist" options (Abbay, 2004).

There is a dichotomy between the dominant European-based concept of the state and the Somali conceptions of communitarianism in which the clan is a part (Zoppi, 2018). Attempts to impose a centralized governing structure have caused the central government to have less control over the people. Governmental functions should be strictly limited since Somalia calls for a new approach to state-building that tries to work from the bottom-up (Kaplan, 2010). For decades, external efforts at institution

building in Somalia have failed to revive a functional central government. Somalis prefer negotiated arrangements to formal-legal rules and they are quite good at it. Much of the things that are considered successful by the Somali community are actually the routinization and recognition of informal governance rather than anything resembling a Weberian State Bureaucracy (Menkhaus, 2014). Nonetheless, the top-down state-building project in Somalia has faced many pressures over the past two decades and it is allegedly unjustifiable to repeat such a major shortcoming. The state-building process of Somalia is not working and needs a major overhaul due to the absence of empirical and analytical models that could determine the short, medium, and long-term prospects for state-building in Somalia (Mohamoud, 2015).

There are two competing schools of thought about Somalia's state-building and international assistance, the "Marshall Plan" and the "Social Contract". The Marshall Plan approach faces an obstacle. One of the

most unequivocal findings in Political Science is that institution-building takes a very long time – at least a generation in the best of circumstances, and the circumstances in Somalia are anything but ideal. "Priming the pump" of Europe's post-war economy via the Marshall Plan worked because those governments were already strong institutions. But the social contract approach also has its weaknesses when applied to Somalia. Finally, the study proposes a third option - a transitional strategy- that includes more support to municipalities as the source of the most practical, legitimate, and effective formal governance in Somalia. This strategy has the potential to help curb terrorism and crime (Menkhaus, 2014). Historically, the changes in the 1970s on the way the Somali state was organized and modernized created two challenges. Firstly, it was about overcoming the conceptual opposition of clan and civil identity. And secondly, it was about promoting the concept of inclusive identity using a broader African identity. In this regard, therefore, the Somalia conflict has confirmed the role of five interrelated

issues of identity participation comprising clan and religion, democracy and political system, distribution, legitimacy, and state-building and governance penetration (Ibrahim, 2014).

Clan Federalism

In recent years, there has been significant progress in the study of federalism and decentralization in Africa, but little has been done systematically. This study compares the commonalities in the origins and operations of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa as Africa's three federal states. Each country uses 'holding together' federalism to accommodate ethnic pluralism. Each country, especially Ethiopia and South Africa, has also experienced several inward-pull key forces such as dominant governing parties, top-down state administration, and high degrees of fiscal centralism. The consequences of Africa's centralized federalism can be seen as both positive and negative. It has arguably had the salutary effect of stabilizing ethnic strife, which is perhaps all the remarkable given the fact that actual sub-national autonomy

has been quite limited in practice (Dickovick, 2014). According to Turton (2006), ethnic federalism is not popular in Africa, but it is successful and popular in the very few European countries that have undergone some sort of ethnic federalism. However, one of the most important effects of ethnic federalism is that it may prevent or reduce ethnic tensions in the country, and it encourages the different ethnic groups to live together peacefully. Nevertheless, for others, this “experiment” can go out of hand and may lead to ethnic wars and eventual disintegration. (Teshome & Záhořík, 2008).

Although federalism can be seen as the most powerful form of decentralization yet it is not the only possible response to diversity. And even where it is applied, it often involves other measures such as human rights law. The word "federalism" itself is often controversial because of its misconception. In many places, "federalism" is regarded as the first step in secession and historical, and current secessionist movements of some federal countries have proven the

rationality of this concept (Javier & Fuentes, 2016). The main argument put forward is that, contrary to the state-centered concept which dominates the literature, federalism is not an objective nor a rational choice for managing diversity; but it is the result of disputes between central state elites and sub-state claimants. Within this framework, the rule of the central state, the suppression of sub-unit claims, and the general reluctance to confront the reality of ethnicity are major obstacles to the application and success of federal solutions in Africa. And this is why the practice of federalism has not had much success in countries where it has been implemented ((Teshome & Záhořík, 2008).

Understanding Somalia's federalism is not a simple matter of political power distribution. To make federalism work, the state and its local branches must work together to create a safer future for the people. The main challenge of the Federalism project is to turn people into stakeholders by redirecting choices from short-term security arrangements provided by clans to

long-term opportunities offered by the state with federal local-level governance (Zoppi, 2018). Despite the complexity of the federal system in Somalia, it will also be difficult for the people of Somalia to trust the unified system of government again. Therefore, the intention of forming the federal government of Somalia should be to provide a fair representation of regions and tribes, but the current prospects of Somalia and its historical evolution are portraying that contradictions and internal differences may not meet the federal arrangements or the conditions of an acceptable unified state (Mohamoud, 2015). Although Somalis are victims of the social construction of the infamous ethnic paradigm in Africa, they perceive themselves, and are perceived, as a homogeneous group. Since Somalia is ethnically compact, social differentiation has its pivotal point in the politicization of genealogical affiliation and the distribution of wealth, both of which correspond to the logic of the clan. However, the nascent institutions will have to contend for the citizen's confidence in the clan and balance the

temporary protection offered by the clan system with the permanent one of the state. The Somali federation looks weak, while the country hesitates between debilitated decentralization and chaotic balkanization (Zoppi, 2013).

Ethnic and clan politics work in a similar way in the African context, both based on tribal affiliation. When cultural patriotism is emphasized over civic identity and a republican state founded on respect for human rights, federalism and national stability need an alternative framework. Clan politics and Somalia's clan-democratic model are deemed to challenge the concept of federalism. The idea that elections and votes were influenced by clan allegiance, clan politics became a factor of conflict and not a solution. (Ibrahim, 2014). The fate of federalism in Somalia is related to the development of a civil society and the definition of the citizens that make up this civil society before dealing with legal and institutional aspects of the matter. Somalia's federal government will not be trusted by its people until there is more time for the country's

own terms of state-building. Foreign actors, by trying to expedite the process and use a top-down approach, will not be able to help the country succeed (Zoppi, 2018).

III. Methodology

This study uses qualitative research methodology to explore leadership crisis in civic state-building based on the case of clan federalism in Somalia. The technique of data collection was based on interviews conducted with respondents and notes taken were recorded for subsequent transcription. This meticulous approach strengthens the understanding and interpretation of the meaning and intentions underlying human interaction (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Moreover, the face-to-face interviews ensure that questions in the semi-structured interview-guide were clearly explained and easily understood by the interviewees comprising public personalities. For the purpose of this study, seventeen (17) respondents were interviewed (see APPENDIX I on Demographic Profile of Respondents) to secure the information needed to achieve the

research objectives. Interview settings were convenient to members participating. A high sense of confidentiality was observed. The interviews were guided by semi-structured questions to elicit the needed response. The method of analysis for the data generated by this study involves the thematic analysis because it offers an avenue for both interpretation and involvement of the researcher in the analysis. The focuses were on identification of codes and themes (Joffe, 2012; Li Ping 2008; Rabiee, 2017).

IV. Data Analysis and Results

Crisis Leadership

The respondents were generally insistent on the existence of a leadership crisis in Somalia since the 1960s when the country had gained its independence, and that the military regime which has oppressed the people and rejected peaceful transition of power, had worsened the situation. They reverberated a consensus opinion that there is indeed a crisis leadership in the country, but the political crisis leadership is the most horrible one.

From the information of the majority of respondents, it was clear that the main reason of the Somali state collapse in 1991 was the leadership crisis, and that Somalia is in need of a situational leader. On the one hand, the responses of interviewees R3, R5, R6, and R15 suggest that Somalia requires what they term as “a benevolent dictatorship” (a dictator who sometimes concentrates power alone). On the other hand, other interview respondents R4, R7, R9, and R12 have expressed concern about the return to a strong dictatorship that will lead again to clan and political violence. However, both are concerned about the need to rebuild the country and its politics, economy, and security.

Furthermore, based on the critical analysis of the respondents, unsuitable authorities for the leadership of the country, absence of leadership criteria that distinguishes the noble from the corrupted, lack of bringing perpetrators to justice, armed clans domination of key government seats, lack of will and crisis leadership scheme, and absence of a social contract and national leadership

strategy have exacerbated the already disastrous situation in the country. They also vocalize that poor leadership exists in all areas of society such as the clan traditional leadership, business, religion, and social affairs. Interestingly, however, they unanimously agree that native and international leadership experts are needed to advice and support the political leadership of the country. But some of them have reiterated that advisors of the leaders who are facilitated by the international community must be selected based on family lineage and friendship, not competence and experience. And this ironically suggests a contradiction that will undermine the success of any leader and its leadership agenda for country reconstruction.

Lastly, most of the respondents, including government officials, have reiterated that some of the main leadership crises in Somalia today are misreading of politics, self-interest, and application of neither Somali traditional-based leadership frameworks nor the conventional ones, and difficulty in participation of

suitable leaders in politics. People who were in the country during the conflict and did not flee the country, they opined, do not get a chance to participate in the political power-sharing due to inability to pay bribes; and yet Diaspora, who have been away from the country for the last 30 years, hold the highest positions in the country.

Civic State-building

There was an overwhelming pessimism and futile hopelessness expressed on the inefficacy and contradictions of current approaches to state-building in Somalia. According to the responses of R6, R10, R12, and R15, Somali society is a victim of exported state-building approaches and constitutions which are incompatible with the beliefs and traditions of the society. Suspicion and disharmony that resulted from long years of war have led to mistrust among clans and neighbors and today the wound is raised without regard to the fluid inside the wound. Compounding such pessimism is the consensus response about the role of the international community that is

fueling inter-clan and inter-political tensions. The respondents argued that although the international community seems to help Somalia in the state-building process, its negative impact is much more than its positive benefits, highlighting the following instances: funding the peace-keeping AMISOM project, pressuring political leaders to negotiate, protecting own self-interests, and in so doing, its own international conflicting interests tend to affect the process of Somalia state-building. And a tell-tale sign, among the consensus responses, is the prolonged reluctance of the international community to rebuild the country's national army and keeping foreign forces in the country.

Importantly, the findings suggest that the overall improvement in the state-building process calls for concerted steps to be taken in order to reconstruct an effective state and recover the social cohesion lost nearly four decades ago. Most of the interviewed respondents have proposed that the leadership of the country be held by the educated, privileged, loyal and visionary leaders through one person-one vote elections,

the teachings of true Islam and the native or indigenous culture of Somalia. The latter should be part of the state-building process without ignoring the clan diversity, and the powerful state should be established with all its government institutions before dividing the country into small states by the name of federal states. This opinion underlines the fact that people are loyal to clans instead of the state because they see the state as a burden to them instead of being a contributor to their daily lives. In addition, the responses of interviewees R1, R2, R5, and R15 suggest that civic and patriotism education to the community, fair service delivery, and decentralized power of federal and state level are imperative to rebuilding the country. In essence, the interview results clearly suggest that the Somali state-building process is a state of contradictions: those involved are using a mixture of clan identity of 4.5 and regional states representation which are opposed to each other, and that the process is repeating the same approach that destroyed the country which is the clannism. Moreover, the current process of state-building is

retrogressive, that is, taking the country back to the pre-colonial system, in which each clan had its own sultan and sultanate named after him.

Clan Federalism

According to the interview responses of interviewees R1, R3, R6, R7, R13, and R14, clan federalism is a major challenge that hinders the society of Somalia to move forward in the post-conflict era. They agreed that clan federalism nurtured clan tensions and revived the stigma and suffering of the civil war, leading to a possible secession of regional states in terms of how badly it has damaged the relationship between the federal government and regional states. Many of the interviewees insisted that the major obstacles to an effective federal system are incompatibility of the social structure of the Somali community and the current clan-based federalism, absence of powerful federal government, dispersed interests of clans, conflicting personal interests of leaders, misconception of the federalism by the leaders, containment and regime-change policy by the federal government and, finally, the

lack of application of the uncompleted constitution.

However, the responses of interviewees R2, R3, R6, and R11 together asserted that the best way to improve a functioning federal system for Somalia is to give the public a chance to vote for the leaders they prefer, and replace the name of 'President' currently used by state leaders to 'Regional Governors', including the expulsion of neighboring forces from the country, redefining the form of federalism the country within the to-be-defined parameters of the incomplete constitution, establishing an effective constitutional court that interprets the constitution and judges the conflicting parties, engaging clan and political reconciliation, and reducing the excessive power of regional states by guaranteeing them from abuse by the center of power. In essence, the findings reiterate a recurring phenomenon, that is, the most painful part of this clan federalism is the lack of empathy and co-ownership among the community as Somali citizens today identify themselves first with a clan state rather

than the national state, disregarding the rest irrespective of situational or event consequences. This implies the absence, even the loss, of any sense of nationalism and co-ownership.

Although most interviewees were disappointed with the current format of federalism, some have proposed that federalism is in its teething stage, as they put it; and this situation should be given a chance to gestate and develop. They suggested educating people about the system, dividing power between federal government and states, demarcating state borders, finding a solution for the nomadic people who cross borders, and advocating a fair resource-sharing framework. Interestingly, the interview respondents R5, R8, R11, and R14 have repeatedly uttered that the nature of Somali society is not to respect and abide by any law, including The Holy religion of Islam which they believe in, but to live and always live by negotiations and compromise on an equity-share basis of responsible citizenship and national identity – a potent element of latent Somali culture largely neglected, even

ignored, institutionally in both the private and public sectors of the country.

Although interviewed people did not agree on one type of political system, they do suggest certain characteristics of the political system they would like the country leaders to adopt and practice. And this is manifested in a shared vision of a state with consensus principles and community-based culture that adapts national agenda orientation and reduces foreign intervention especially in employing small portions of donated funds for administrative expenses to influence decisions. In essence, there is a clarion call for responsible accountability for all.

V. Discussion

In examining crisis leadership in civic state-building, this study focuses on the case of clan federalism in Somalia by exploring how these concepts are linked to the current political and economic status of Somalia. Insofar as this crisis leadership is concerned, it is not a matter that emerged during the collapse of the Somali state but it has

already existed since post-colonial states in the 1960s; and it was the military coup who had oppressed the community and rejected peaceful transition of power that had aggravated and worsened the situation. The findings also support previous studies which show that the challenge of leadership in several countries in Africa over the past several decades of independence has been a matter of tremendous public concern (Eborka, 2015). In this regard, leadership crisis has been and is present in all sectors of society - cultural, religious, business, and social; but political leadership crisis is the most horrendous, affecting every other sectors. The political leadership, according to Abdi (1981) earlier, and given the current findings, is still the most serious problem Somalia has faced and is facing since its independence.

Since the main reason for Somalia's state failure and collapse was the leadership crisis, what it needs today is a crisis-solution that advocates the importance and emergence of a situational leader, reiterating previous studies whose findings had highlighted

similar opinions in different contextual country references on effective management of crisis leadership through application of situation-crisis leadership competencies (Bhaduri, 2019; Balwant, 2020; Firestone, 2020). Nevertheless, this study shows that, despite a significant disparity among different societies on the style of leadership, the Somali leadership transitional situation is characterized by what is commonly known as 'a benevolent dictator' - defined as someone who wields power alone but is able to build the country by enhancing its politics, economy, and security. However, opinions are divided on this perspective because there are others who believe and vocally denounce that the return to a strong dictatorship will lead again to clan and political violence!

Overall, the findings agree with the findings of a previous study by Olalere (2015) in the context of the African continent, that there is a wide range call on the need for change agents and quality leadership with needed skills and tools to reform the country. This, among others, would help Somalia

whose main leadership crises are misreading of politics, self-interest, application of neither Somali traditional-based leadership frameworks nor the conventional ones, the difficulty of participation of suitable leaders in politics especially, as mentioned previously, qualified candidates in the country during the conflict who did not flee the country do not get a chance in running for senior political positions due to excessive bribery against the prolonged 30-year Diaspora leadership in the highest position in the country. And, in concert with the previous study by Menkhaus (2007) who contended that Somalia's catastrophic crisis of civil war, political disagreements, and failed state features are all results of the culmination of a series of political miscalculations and misjudgments on the part of Somali leadership and external actors, this study has also uncovered an overwhelming pessimism and hopelessness in the current approaches to civic state-building progress in Somalia where conflicting internal and external intervention persist. In essence, this study supports the conclusion by

Menkhaus (2014) that exported state-building approaches and constitutions that are incompatible with the beliefs and traditions of the society and suspicion and disharmony that resulted from long years of war have led to mistrust among clans and neighbors.

Furthermore, for several decades and over a diversity of massive opinions, the obvious result-outcome of external efforts at institution building in Somalia have failed to revive a functional central government. As mentioned previously above, the role of the international community in funding the peace-keeping AMISOM project has contradicting impact on Somalia's state-building process - pressuring political leaders to negotiate while fueling inter-clan and inter-political tensions to conserve as its own interest. For instance, its reluctance to rebuild the country's national army but to maintain its foreign forces in the country – a similar finding by Mohamoud (2015) who had insisted that the top-down state-building project in Somalia has faced many pressures over the past two decades, with allegedly unjustifiable

major shortcomings repeatedly recurring.

On the whole, the findings confirm that the state-building process of Somalia is currently a state of confusion, comprising a mixture of the tribal and constituent models which are naturally incompatible and compounded by a recurring process that repeats an identical past approach based on 'clannism' is destroying the country. Moreover, the findings also supported a previous research (Ingiriis, nd) that modern Somalis are returning to a pre-colonial kingdom where each clan had its own clan sultan who ruled a clan state of its own with a sultanate named after him. But, at the same time, an apparent overall improvement in the state-building process calls for concerted steps to be taken to enable the country to promote the educated, privileged, loyal and visionary individuals to lead through a system of one person-one vote election, based on the true Islam principles, with the indigenous culture of Somalia as a part of the state-building process without ignoring clan diversity. In addition, a powerful state should be established

with all its government institutions before dividing the country into small states known as federal states. This study therefore contradicts previous studies that state that there are only three approaches for Somalia's state-building process premised on the marshal plan, social contract and transitional strategy (Menkhaus, 2014). Nevertheless, it reinforces the research advocacy of Zoppi (2018) who had stressed that Somalia's federal government will not be trusted by its people until there is more time for the country's own terms of state-building, instead of reliance on foreign actors who advocated the unsuccessful process and use a top-down approach. Also, establishing that people are loyal to clans instead of the state, perceived to be a burden to them and not a contributor to their daily lives, it is contended that the federalism project is to turn people into stakeholders by redirecting choices from short-term security arrangements provided by clans to long-term opportunities offered by the state with federal-local level governance. The findings suggested civic and patriotism education be promoted to the

community, with fair service delivery, and decentralized power of federal and state level administration.

The overall investigation on clan federalism shows that the latter is a major challenge that hinders the society of Somalia to move forward in the post-conflict era because it continues to nurture clan tensions and reinforce the stigma and suffering of the civil war. And consequently, this has led to a possible secession of regional states in terms of how badly it has damaged the relationship between the federal government and regional states. This observation is reflective of the previous findings by Bonda (2011) on Ethiopian ethnic federalism and has highlighted ethnic federalist projects that exacerbated the rise of ethnographic classification as a result of dividing people rather than uniting them, thus perpetuating a negative impact on the creation of civic countrywide citizenship for the successful development of Ethiopia.

This study has further found that the major barriers to an effective federal system of Somalia are incompatibility of the social structure of the Somali

community and the current clan-based federalism, an absence of powerful central government, a range of dispersed clan interests, a pervasive and conflicting personal interests of leaders, a misconception of the term federalism in Somali politics, a containment and regime policy change against states by the federal government, and a lack of application of the incomplete constitution. It also highlighted the most painful part of clan federalism as the absence of empathy and co-ownership among the Somali citizens who identify themselves with a clan state, not the national state, ignoring everything else including the sense of nationalism and co-ownership. This observation confirms the work of Ibrahim (2014) who had asserted about clan politics and Somalia's clan-democratic model challenging the concept and validity of federalism. In this context, the idea that elections and votes are largely influenced by clan allegiance and that clan politics has remained a factor of conflict and never a solution.

In addition, the findings that clan federalism has caused tremendous

frustration and disappointment among Somali society also confirms the study of how the people of Somalia are increasingly worried about the susceptibility of regional states within the failed state to external influences, often leading critics to refer to some regional states as protectorates (Ingiriis, n.d.). However, as federalism in Somalia is still in its teething stage, the general opinion is that it should be given a chance to develop and succeed by educating people about the system, dividing power between federal government and states, demarcating state borders, finding a solution for nomadic people who cross the borders, and establishing a fair resource-sharing framework.

Most significantly, in the context of the nature of Somali nomadic culture, it has led the society not to respect and abide by any law including The Holy religion of Islam which they believe in, but rather to live, and have always lived, by negotiations, compromise and on an equal share basis. And this culture is institutionally ignored in both the private and public sectors of the country. The findings in this study

confirms the previous research by Menkhaus, (2014) that the Somalis prefer negotiated arrangements to formal-legal rules and they are quite good at it. In fact, much of the things considered successful by the Somali community are actually the routinization and recognition of informal governance rather than anything resembling a Weberian State Bureaucracy. For example, the legal and constitutional disagreement over current election issues was finally decided based on a political agreement.

VI. Limitations and Future Research Direction

The feedback-data collected from only 17 selected key informants in Somalia can be extended to include a more precise criteria-set sampling choice of public opinion from the youthful graduate and professional representations. The qualitative findings can be triangulated in a tabulated form, with secondary quantitative data to reinforce the results interpretation instead of relying mainly on cited author-sources of past

research studies. The current focus on only one leadership style of crisis leadership examined should be extended to include other leadership styles to ascertain how authentic leadership, smart leadership, or charismatic leadership can help in reconstructing Somalia's political stability. Finally, in future studies on strategic solution-driven crisis leadership management, the role of religious and private-sector leadership should be reviewed and their contribution to nation-building be evaluated.

VII. Conclusion

This study reviews the paucity of existing literature on crisis leadership in the context of civic state building and clan federalism. Crisis leadership is not a new phenomenon to Somalia; there is an overwhelming pessimism and hopelessness over the current approaches to state-building in Somalia. And the state-building process is dominated by imported systems with little or no compatibility with the culture, beliefs and traditions of the country. Moreover, the negative

impact of international community intervention is much more than its positive contribution to Somalia state-building. However, the true practices of Islam and the indigenous culture of Somalia should be an integral part of the state-building process without neglecting clan diversity. Therefore, the major obstacle of restoring Somali state is today's clan federalism as it nurtures clan tensions, revives the stigma of civil war, leads to possible secession, and poor inter-state and intra-state relations. Therefore, there is a dire need for reforming both leadership and institutions in the country to restore and inculcate a sustained sense of nationalism and co-ownership badly damaged by the current federal model. Thus, a preferred strategic solution for Somalia is the development of a powerful state that uses its authority wisely and does not oppress people with its power, while using the small donations of the international community for target development-agenda instead of corrupt administrative expenses. There is, however, no agreement on a political system that can effectively serve the country but a consensus one that

combines characteristics of indigenous-community based culture and principle-accountability driven national agenda orientation in the public interest of compromised clan-diversity consensual acceptance.

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APPENDIX I

Demographic Profile of Respondents

Interview Respondents	Bio Data	Coding
Chairman of Formal Education Institution	Male, 30 Years, Master & Public Servant	R1
Senior Researcher	Male, 54 Years, PhD, Advisor & Public figure	R2
Minister	Male, 35 Years, Master & Politician	R3

Humanitarian Officer	Male, 30 Years, Master & Civil Society	R4
University Rector	Male, 47 Years, Master, Academic & Public figure	R5
Youth Club Leader	Male, 30 Years, Master & Public figure	R6
University Rector & Religious Scholar	Male, 39 Years, PhD candidate & Religious affairs expert	R7
Women Association Leader	Female, 25 Years, Bachelor & Civil society	R8
Humanitarian Expert	Female, 27 Years, Master & Public figure	R9
CEO of Business Corporation	Male, 39 Years, PhD candidate & Political Commentator	R10
Youth Association Leader	Female, 23 Years, Bachelor & Public Servant	R11
Ministry Director	Female, 26 Years, Bachelor & Public Servant	R12
Member Of Parliament	Female, 30 Years, Bachelor & Politician	R13
Hotel Manager	Female, 26 Years, Bachelor & Political commentator	R14

Political & Peace-building Expert	Male, 32 Years, PhD candidate & Political Writer & commentator	R15
Clan Chief	Male, 67 Years, Informal Education, Clan Chief	R16
Clan Chief	Male, 72 Years, Informal Education, Clan Chief	R17