

Reflections of The Sectarian Conflict In Iraq On The Forced Migration From 2006 To 2019

Qasem Jamil Althubetat¹, Sabreen Mhaimed Abdullah² & Walid Abdel Hadi Al- Oweimer³

¹Petra University, qalthubetat@uop.edu.jo

²sabreenalshmare@yahoo.com

³Mu'tah University, walidwo@hotmail.com

Abstract

This study aimed at investigating sectarianism as it constitutes the most dangerous problem for Iraq's peace and security, and as the issue of sectarianism and the problems that arise from it constitutes a serious scourge that threatens the social structure of any country. For that, the study attempted to clarify the reality of sectarianism in Iraq from the fall of Baghdad in 2003 until now. The study also clarifies the most important outlets, gaps, and causes of sectarianism in Iraq, both internal and external and then it explains the reality of sectarian incursion in Iraq and its reflection on the forced migration of Iraqis inside and outside Iraq after 2006. The researcher adopted the descriptive and analytical approach which is a method for studying scientific phenomena or problems by doing the description in a scientific way and then arriving at logical explanations that have evidence and proofs that give the researcher the ability to set specific frameworks for the problem, and this is used in determining the results of the research.

Keywords: Sectarian, Iraq, Conflict, Forced Migration.

Introduction

Sectarianism constitutes the most dangerous problem for Iraq's peace and security, as it divides the population who are far from the spirit of true religion and religiosity have used it to exploit the members of their sect to achieve their respective political ends and support for their personal material interests, and preservation of their influence and powers in the state at the expense of members of other sects, through sectarian mobilization against the other.¹

Today, the issue of Sunni-Shiite sectarianism is strongly being raised as one of the most important problems that Iraqi society suffers from. After the differences between Sunnis and Shiites were focused on ideological issues, the situation has changed at the present time to make the

difference between them deeper, where these groups now compete over control of state resources, power and influence. As a result a large majority of Iraqi citizens have voluntarily and forcibly migrated from the country.²

Study Background:

The issue of sectarianism and the problems that arise from it are constitute a serious scourge that threatens the social structure of any country, and in this case, Iraq. Although differences are prevalent between human beings, whether in terms of race, gender or color, but the sectarian difference ethnic or religious had the greatest impact in fueling civil wars and arousing discontent

The peoples, the rise of revolutions and coups, and the annihilation of many ethnicities in the face of this expansion of sectarianism, and so-called political Islam that exploited sectarianism well in Iraq, as it came as a secular political alternative, not as a religious alternative, as it was declared, and the Arab mind was forced by the rule of Western hegemony. As a result of the failure of the state, patriotism is one of meeting the needs of the Arab citizens who are in search of an alternative, thus accepting the idea of "theocracy" that establishes political movements to depend on sectarianism in their formation. This has negatively affected the lives of Iraqi citizens, prompting millions of them to emigrate in search of security and peace.

Relevance of the study: This study stems from scientific and practical importance, which is as follows:

1. Practical importance: The study hopes that decision-makers in Iraq in particular will benefit from the results and recommendations that will be reached at the end of our study, to reduce the conflict between the Sunni and Shiite communities, which led to the migration of millions of Iraqis inside and outside Iraq.
2. Scientific importance: The scientific importance of the issue of sectarianism and its impact on immigration in Iraq comes from researchers and those interested in political studies affairs. Hence, this study seeks to fill part of the deficiency that Iraqi and Arab libraries suffer from on this important topic.

Objectives of the study:

The study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

1. Clarify the reality of sectarianism in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad in 2003 until now.
2. Clarify the most important outlets, gaps and causes of sectarianism in Iraq, both internal and external.

3- Explaining the reality of sectarian incursion in Iraq and its reflection on the forced migration of Iraqis inside and outside Iraq after 2006.

Spatial and temporal boundaries:

Spatial boundaries: The spatial boundaries include the geographical area occupied by Iraq as a case study.

Time limits: 2006-2019. The year 2006 was chosen as the beginning of this study because of this year's significant change in the Iraqi political system, as Maliki received the first elected government in Iraq after the fall of the regime in 2003, and the year 2019 was chosen as the end point for the time period, until researchers are guaranteed to obtain the maximum amount of data and information that will enable them to complete this study.

Hypothesis

In light of the study's problem, its importance, objectives, and questions, the study assumes that "there is a direct correlation between the rivalry of Sunni and Shiite forces in Iraq and the emergence of cases of forced migration estimated at millions inside and outside Iraq."

Methodology

Based on the nature of the topic and its research problem, which the study seeks to answer its questions, as well as the objectives and hypotheses that will be tested, the following approaches have been used:

1. The descriptive and analytical approach: "It is a method for studying scientific phenomena or problems by doing the description in a scientific way, and then arriving at logical explanations that have evidence and proofs that give the researcher the ability to set specific frameworks for the problem, and this is used in determining the results of the research."

Approach: It defines the characteristics of the sectarian phenomenon in Iraq and

describes its nature and the quality of relations between its variables, causes and trends in order to arrive at an integrated scientific description and acceptable generalizations.

2. Case study approach: What is meant by the case study approach is to focus on a specific political phenomenon by studying it from all sides in order to delve into and analyze all the parts associated with it.

The focus of this approach will be on studying the Iraqi model as a case study to identify the characteristics and status of the sectarian phenomenon and its direct impact on forced migrations in Iraq.

Contents of the study.

The topic will be dealt with through three demands:

- The first requirement: the sectarian reality in Iraq.
- The second requirement: manifestations of sectarian encroachment in Iraq.
- The third requirement: the effect of sectarianism on the internal and external migrations of Iraqis.
- Findings and recommendations.

The First Requirement: The Sectarian Reality in Iraq.

It cannot be denied that Iraqi society consists of different sects and ethnicities, and these differences have been exploited throughout history by the external actors, as Iraq was the victim of the Turkish-Iranian conflict for several centuries, and then the American occupation came to become the main factor that created an environment with encouraging and pushing effects towards sectarianism and quotas in Iraq. Sectarianism played a major role in the Iraqi crisis in the post-collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. In short, it is considered the mother of the crises from which other crises were born and

branched out. Sectarianism is a sinister and dangerous disease, from which the Iraqi people suffered a lot, and the politicians who are far from their soul exploited it. Religion and true religiosity, as they exploit the members of their sect to achieve their political ends, support their material personal interests, and preserve their influence and powers in the state at the expense of members of other sects.

Iraq is characterized by being a multi-ethnic country, religions and sects that live side by side with each other, and despite the weakness of the national bond that gathers all these components, it was able to transcend the ordeals and crises and highlight the positive side since the establishment of the political system in 1921 until the fall of the regime, thus becoming the most important features of the modern state's political system. It is the consolidation of the state of domination of a certain sect and the deprivation of another.

Iraq has been known throughout the ages as the arena in which the tongues interacted and the various groups coexisted for thousands of years, and it is in this case and knew political sectarianism in a period dating back to the rule of the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Safavid state. The struggle over influence and hegemony over the region was strong between the countries, because both countries were expansive. Iraq was the main battleground between them. Therefore, we find that Iraq was subject at times to the rule of the Ottomans and at other times to the rule of the Safavid Persians. In spite of this, Shiites and Sunnis lived in what is known today as Iraq for a period of more than 1,000 years, and during most of that period the Sunni and Shiite groups were able to live in a peaceful coexistence despite the occasional outbreak of violence, but without dismantling sectarian boundaries.³

We must stop at important milestones in the history of the Iraqi state and the first of those stations comes after the establishment of the

modern Iraqi state. In 1921, when the royal government took power and crowned Prince Faisal bin Al Hussein, it seemed clear that the Ottoman approach remained rooted in the new formation that laid the basis of the political system. Jobs and resources between Sunnis and Shiites after the formation of the Iraqi state in 1921 affected the interdependence between them. It was the first ministry from which the Shiites were excluded, so the only minister was Muhammad Mahdi Bahr al-Ulum.⁴

This can be seen in the People's Pact of March 1935. This very important document, submitted to King Ghazi, who took power after his father, King Faisal, was signed by tribal and religious leaders from the Middle Euphrates and Shiite lawyers in the capital, and demanded better representation of Shiites in the government and called for representation Shiite legislation in the judiciary, in addition to electoral reform and freedom of the press. It is imperative to examine the reasons for this discrimination that was practiced against the Shiites at the time, as Britain had a role in establishing the Sunni government to escape from the Shiites' demands for complete independence, and because they waged a jihad war against the British occupation of Iraq in the First World War, defending the rule of the Turks, and then their leadership The Twentieth Revolution, which cost the British a lot. It is worth noting that the Twentieth Revolution was what forced the British colonial authorities to establish the Iraqi state and grant it independence later, in addition to the hardening of the Shiite religious leadership's positions, the extremism in its demands in inflexible and unenforceable at the time, and the demand for the complete withdrawal of British forces from Iraq, and their rejection of compromises. What is possible, some of the Shiite clerics have also issued fatwas prohibiting the participation of members of their

sect in elections and recruitment and sending their sons and daughters to public schools ... etc. Therefore, the Arab Shiite majority, especially its religious leaders, bear a share of the responsibility for their marginalization during the monarchy.⁵

This equation, which is considered the cause since the establishment of the modern Iraqi state, has remained powerful and dominant on the political, governmental, administrative, military and judicial scene in Iraq and has not changed much despite the succession of governments, the change of ruling systems and ideologies and despite the shifting loyalties and regional budgets in the world and the region.⁶

The percentage of Shiite participation in political life during the monarchy reached 17.7% in the period (1921-1932), then decreased to 15.8% in the period from (1932-1936), and then increased again to 27.7% in the period from 1963. 1941), then to 28.1%, then the highest rate, which was 34.7% in the period (1957-1958). As for the position of prime minister, one Shiite, Salih Jabr, managed to assume this position for the first time in 1947, that is, after 26 years had passed. The situation improves greatly during the Republican era.⁷

Therefore, writers and politicians attribute the emergence of sectarian intolerance among the Shiites in the last century because of their grievances at the hands of Saddam Hussein's regime, and at the hands of the Sunni governments that preceded it since the formation of the Iraqi state in 1921, where the leadership authorities and senior positions in the government, army and internal security forces were concentrated in the hands of Sunni figures, with slight participation by Shiite figures.

Perhaps this is one of the reasons, but not all.⁸

Because Saddam was not sectarian in the broad sense of the word, as he used to allocate sensitive

positions to people he trusted and loyal to his regime, regardless of their ethnic or sectarian affiliation. The sectarian issue rose significantly when the Ba'ath Party took power, although the demographics suggested the possibility that Iraq would be preoccupied with its ethnic and sectarian conflicts. As we showed that Iraq consists of various sects that exceed most Arab countries, in addition to Islam and Christians with their various churches, Turkmen and Armenians find sects that do not exist. Among them outside Iraq are the Yazidis, Sabian-Mandaeans, Baha'is, Assyrians, and Shabaks; This may be due to the fact that the Baath Party had a secular approach, so we find that the discourse of sectarianism did not fall on deaf ears among most Iraqis, and it was not reflected on the ground. It can be said that the root of sectarianism remained dormant, and coexistence and brotherhood remained between the Iraqi sects and ethnicities.⁹

Among the features of the current sectarianism in Iraq is that it is active and works under the banner of patriotism, and it claims concern for the unity of Iraq, its land and people, and the sectarian people openly reject the division of Iraq into states, and they say that all they aspire to is to affirm the group's vision. While pushing their policies and practices to tear apart the unity of Iraq and war its components. The picture was reversed after 2003, and Sunnis became the ones who feel they are the victims of sectarian persecution.¹⁰

As for sectarianism and its causes in Iraq after 2003, it was the biggest challenge facing the Iraqi political system, and this sectarianism had causes that can be divided according to its roles into three main roles:

A- The internal role: It cannot be denied that there are multiple internal reasons that had a role in the exacerbation of the sectarian crisis in Iraq

in 2003, including the sectarian thought in Iraq, as this thought is based on a historical heritage based on an assumed struggle over the right to assume the caliphate and fuel this conflict always conflicting interests for reasons related to political and economic interests in the various historical stages that Iraq went through. The acceleration of events and political changes that contributed to fueling sectarianism, as a result of the stage of the American occupation of Iraq since the fall of Baghdad in 2003¹¹ political transformations manifested in religious sectarian changes that began to form what is known as The "Governing Council," whose members were distributed on a sectarian basis between Sunnis and Shiites, and ethnic between Arabs and Kurds, then continued with the formation of an interim government and then the distribution of positions on a sectarian basis, (then the implementation of the consensual democracy that divided Iraq into three components: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Regardless of the American intentions, divisive or consensual, the efforts of the United States resulted in the application of a kind of political commensalism, starting with the formation of the Governing Council, according to Regulation No. (6) of July 13, 2003. This was issued by the American civil administrator Paul Bremer) as it granted to the Shiites thirteen seats, to the Sunni Arabs five seats, to the Kurds five seats, and two seats to each of the Christians and Turkmen, and thus constituted the point of initiating the establishment of institutional political sectarianism.¹²

The cause of violence on the part of some groups must leave its black imprint on other groups to produce counter-violence in return, and some claim that the causes of this sectarianism are due to the accumulations of the previous regime in terms of the absence of real concepts of belonging according to citizenship rights.¹³

B - The Regional Role. External competition and the escalation of sectarianism in the region over relations with Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq Iran has become a strong and major player in Iraqi politics, given its complex relations with the Shiite Islamic forces in particular. As we passed by, the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the year 1979 of a regime based on the Shiite identity, changed the balance of power in the region and created an ideological umbrella for the disenfranchised Shiite groups according to their opinion, this helped to strengthen the Shiite community in Iraq and its feeling that it possesses a distinct identity, and Iraq is an important region to enter To the Arab region.¹⁴

Through it, proper communication with Iran's allies in the rest of the region's countries is achieved. This role, with political, security, economic, and ideological dimensions, would not have reached its way without the crises that Iraq is going through. The first opportunity for Iran to extend its influence in Iraq after the American occupation came after the 9th of April 2003. The second opportunity came in light of the security crisis that Iraq has been witnessing since the beginning of 2014, after the takeover by the Islamic State Organization in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). From the Iraqi provinces. The Iranian role passed through a new phase when it took a decisive security form in the war against ISIS in Iraq through the presence of Iranian officers, experts and forces directly in the Iraqi arena, as well as by selling weapons and military equipment and providing intelligence to the Iraqi forces. Since the occupation of Iraq in 2003, Iran has deliberately entered Iraqi society as a goal that makes its interference in its political affairs an automatic matter without facing the accusation of interfering in the affairs of a sovereign country, and then after that it has invoked that everything

it does in Iraq is at the request of its government. This policy made Iraq, with its successive governments, obedient to their orientations.¹⁵ This is the depth of sectarian tensions inside Iraq, as well as the depth of the Syrian conflict from sectarian tensions in Iraq and strengthened sectarian solidarity across national borders. Many Iraqi fighters, Sunnis and Shiites alike, joined the ranks of the militias fighting in Syria, whether for or against the Bashar regime. the lion.¹⁶

C- The International Role: Politics has been and continues to play a major role in the spread of sectarianism in society, especially if there is someone who has the maximum capabilities to move that from a position of power from that. National coexistence, whether through its adoption of a sectarian and ethnic quota system that canceled all the components of the national joint, or through the use of some groups and sects against each other, and the policy of the United States of America and its attempt to globalize some of its concepts of human rights and democracy is nothing but a pretext for interference in the affairs of other countries. The role of the United States in spreading the seeds of sectarian strife in Iraq cannot be denied, as the American policy in Iraq was to make it an arena for the struggle with global terrorism, that is, to attract forces and groups and fight them inside Iraq. This sabotaged the role that the United States has played in Iraq since its entry and division of positions on The basis of quotas is the pretext that it wants to spread democracy in Iraq.¹⁷ This was entirely was reflected in the spread of revenge—revenge and tyranny instead of democracy—and this occupation also in favor of a player inside the region, namely Israel, one of its allies. The aim of the occupation of Iraq is to spread the seeds of sectarianism throughout the region to ensure Israeli supremacy through the

organized fragmentation of the Arab world, and to restore their control over the region by controlling Iraq, and to make it a base for launching the war on terror, and a center for attracting militants in Western countries to the land of Arabs and fighting them and liquidating them. So that the European community would be free of their danger and armed actions on the one hand, and make Iraq a viable and profitable market for arms sales.¹⁸

The Second Requirement: Manifestations of Sectarian Encroachment in Iraq.

Sectarianism has become the most important crisis facing Iraq today, which played a prominent role in the events that Iraq has lived through in recent years. The displacement, assassinations, and killing are all behind this scourge that devastated the Iraqi component. Since the fall of the former Baathist regime in 2003, the overriding concern of politicians has become to determine which sect has the most representative component in the new government. The idea of sectarian representation dominated political relations instead of representing citizens, which exacerbated existing divisions rather than mitigating them. Sectarian identities led to conflicts over the status, size, boundaries and strength of each sect. These conflicts had a destabilizing effect, especially as they legitimized the actions of groups that practice violence and claim to represent their sects, and the sectarian identity has become that which represents the individual and not the Iraqi national identity.

1- Militias and armed groups: One of the phenomena that existed in Iraq after its occupation was the emergence of groups carrying arms outside the scope of the state's regular army represented by militias, which are considered the

military wing of a political or religious sect that intervenes in conflicts for the benefit of a political or religious sect, so the members of these militias are trained and supported and directed to implement personal and party interests"¹⁹ and it was one of the manifestations produced by sectarianism, and among the most important of those militias that were accused of fueling sectarian strife and participated in the penetration of the phenomenon of sectarianism, of which we mention:

A. The Mahdi Army: It is the military wing of the Sadrist movement. These militias are spread in the cities of southern and central Iraq, most notably Sadr City in Baghdad, and they were dissolved to be replaced by the Peace Brigades. The militias were also accused of violence during the period 2006-2007.

2. Badr Organization: the military wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, which later defected and is currently led by Hadi Al-Amari, and accused the organization of forming so-called death squads in the Ministry of Interior and that it is armed organizations responsible for kidnapping, torturing and killing Sunnis²⁰

3. AsaibAhl al-Haq: It is a civilian-military organization led by QaisKhazali and accused of carrying out sectarian violence. Muqtada al-Sadr explained the involvement of Asa'ib in violence and killing following the bombing of the al-Askari shrine in 2006.

4. The jihad base in Mesopotamia: After the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the defeat of the Iraqi army, and the end of the military operations, the opportunity for a young man to build a paramilitary organization in Iraq and there are factors that helped in this. The first of which is

the dissolution of the Iraqi army and giving the Shiite component preference, and the second: Iranian expansion through hegemony over Shiite political forces, so that Zarqawi establish himself as the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Zarqawi and those with him believe in an idea that is the basic building block in understanding Zarqawi's strategy and vision, as he confirms the existence of two battles, the first: which is an apparent level exposed with the United States, the distant enemy. And the second battle: a difficult battle with an enemy who wears a friend's uniform, who is the near unbeliever, apostate enemy, whether Sunni or Shiite, and this is the real danger that we face. The Americans are an open and fleeting enemy, but the Shiites are a permanent danger, so he thinks that the right and priority is to fight the near enemy represented by the Shiites. The organization considers the group the most accommodating of Arab and foreign fighters coming to Iraq, and it rejects political action under occupation. The Shiite component and adopted many bombings against them.²¹

5. ISIS: This organization did not come by chance after the occupation of Mosul. Rather, it came as a result of accumulations, including: the expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq and the Sunni community, and its fear of exclusion and marginalization, the state of political vacuum and the absence of a collective project for them, and accused the organization of acts Terrible violence and killing in different regions of Iraq, and many violent bombings were attributed to him, most notably the Our Lady of Deliverance massacre and the Imams Bridge disaster, and then he seized three Iraqi provinces with a Sunni majority, namely Mosul, Anbar and Salah al-Din. The organization is largely inside Iraq.²²

The period 2006-2007 is, as previously mentioned, a period of escalating sectarian

violence, as it plunged the country into a spiral of sectarian warfare, made the state more fragmented, unleashed the will of the militants on their societies, deepened the mutual feeling on both sides that he was the victim, and strengthened the separation in that period between the two sects in Areas that were mixed in the past, and violence became confronted with counter-violence from the other side, and the violence took on a sectarian, political and regional character, especially after the bombing of the military shrine, and it jumped unexpectedly, as the feature of killing over identity emerged in Iraqi society that claimed many lives Both sides, and the Sunnis felt that there was discrimination practiced against them, so the Sunnis remained silent about the violence of the Islamic State in Iraq and other extremist groups, believing that they represented a means to counterbalance the repressive practices of the Iraqi security forces, and this in turn provoked the Shiite component who felt that the Sunnis provided a safe haven for terrorists to attack Shiite civilians, and thus Shiites remained silent about violations by Iraqi security forces in these areas.²³

Killing and injury: The killing and the destruction of human life are among the outputs of sectarianism that prevailed in Iraq after 2003 and carries with it many inhuman goals, including creating a state of panic and fear among civilians, creating a state of chaos and societal instability as well as the political system and sending messages that the political system does not It is based on complete legitimacy. Due to the presence of the opposition that may practice these actions and the demographic change is almost one of the most prominent goals of terrorist organizations here, the change in the demography of Sunnis and Shiites who represent the majority in building Iraqi society by targeting their areas

clearly.²⁴This was accompanied by the increase in the phenomenon of orphan hood and widowhood, and it was followed by the work of many children under the age of adulthood to support their families who lost their breadwinners, and this matter leads to the establishment of a society based on negative phenomena that start from family disintegration and ignorance, poverty and corruption. 2007 amounted to 70,414 (preparing

the dead in Iraq, 2016, SASA Post website) and the United Nations organization, through UNAMI, provided the numbers of deaths from 2008 and the following years, which are shown in the table below (United Nations data, 2016, UNAMI website).

Table I.

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Number	6,787	3,056	2,953	2,771	3,238	7,818	1,417	6,850

The Third Requirement: The Effect of Sectarianism on the Internal and External Migrations of Iraqis.

“I would never think that there is a difference between humans. I am Sunni and my wife is Shiite. I have received threats to compel me to divorce her. Otherwise, death is inevitable. We have left the "Dora" in the heart of Baghdad, an area inhabited in the past by a mixture of both groups but now dominated by Sunnis. I stay with my friends in Al Mansour, which is a Sunni area. I am trying to find another place, but it is difficult to find a place that welcomes both of us...” - Iraqi artist.

This comment made by a young Iraqi artist to a friend reflects the essence of the painful contradiction that afflicts Iraqi society nearly four years after the start of the invasion in 2003, which caused tremendous fluctuations in Iraqi society that led to successive waves of emigration to escape murder and abuse by groups. Sectarianism. The current Iraq is the Iraq of sectarian violence; that violence that has forced millions of Iraqis to flee and leave their homes, either as refugees in neighboring countries or as internally displaced persons within its borders.

The situation in Iraq has worsened during the previous period due to the penetration of violence throughout society, where many individuals are forced either to belong to extremist groups due to the lack of any other option, and either cooperate

with them or are considered against them. If choose not to cooperate, then there is no solution for them except Migrate and flee or face death most of the time. Since the bombing of the Shiite mosque, the Samarra Golden Mosque in February 2006, sudden waves of attacks and revenge operations swept Iraq, which marked the end of the reservation that until that time had been a feature of the Shiite response to the attacks directed against them, but now the violence is common on both sides, while Sunni groups prefer car bombs, extremist Shiite death squads prefer kidnapping, detention, torture, and murder.²⁵

It cannot be said that the violence floating in Iraq is automatic or popular, because according to the opinion of many observers of the Iraqi issue, they are religious poles and fronts, which are: the office of Muqtada al-Sadr and the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq on the Shiite side, the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq and the Sunni Islamic Party on the Sunni side. Hardline leaders on both sides view the current problems of violence and displacement as an extension of historical roots, with Shiite leaders pointing to a history of oppression and persecution faced by Shiites at the hands of Sunnis in Iraq, and as proof of this, an official in the Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council stated, "If Shiites were killed Since the death of the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, in reality we do not see the difference between the behavior of the Umayyads

and bin Saddam or the current extremist Sunni leaders. " A Sadr official said, "In our opinion, the plan is very clear, urging them to exterminate the Shiites in Baghdad and Diyala in order to establish a Taliban state in the Sunni areas."²⁶

As for Sunni militants, the crux of the situation is sectarianism, as they view the new Iraq as a creation of American-Iranian interests, and that it is a place that the Sunnis cannot belong to, while the official of the Muslim Scholars Association in Mosul declared that "the southern federal plan allows the Shiite political alliance to control On oil in the south and leave the Sunnis to isolate the poor. " In addition, the official of the Sunni Endowment Committee in Baghdad stated that the attacks against Sunnis are an organized plan against Sunni Arabs, which leads us to question who is responsible for the bombings in Samarra.²⁷ Militants on both sides use extremist groups to justify their activities, and they use the displaced and the displaced as chess stones that the leaders of these extremist parties use to expand their influence as they seek to expel others from these areas to achieve full control over the resources of these areas. Extremist groups' operations center on using displacement violence against civilians as a tool to assert political power. There is no solution for the Iraqis but to flee to the safer areas, so that the Sunnis go to the Sunni areas and the Shiites go to the Shiite areas, while the Kurds and some Arabs go to the northern governorates and the Christians go to parts of Nineveh Governorate, and most of those who are able leave Iraq and migrate outside it, and the result is strengthening the grip of the groups Extremist extremism over the areas that have been cleared and increase its authority and influence in these areas. It is difficult to estimate the number of displaced and displaced due to sectarian violence in Iraq, given the multiplicity of Iraqi sources, whether Sunni or Shiite, or regional and

international humanitarian organizations, which strive as much as possible to access accurate figures, statistics and data.

According to the guidelines issued by the international organization UN, internally displaced persons are defined as persons or groups who have been forced to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, as a result of or with the aim of avoiding the effects of armed conflicts, situations of widespread violence, violation of human rights, natural or human disasters and these. People have not crossed recognized international borders"(United Nations report, 2016, the International Organization for Migration) As for displacement, it is defined as "a systematic practice carried out by governments, paramilitary forces, or fanatical groups towards ethnic, religious or sectarian groups with the aim of evacuating certain lands and replacing other population groups. Instead, the displacement may be internal or external."²⁸

It can be said that after 2014 Iraq was subjected to the largest wave of displacement in its history, as the International Organization for Migration in Iraq announced that "the rate of displacement from January 1, 2014 to March 31, 2016 in Iraq exceeded 3,418,332 million internally displaced persons, and most of these displaced persons were displaced due to bloody sectarian violence, especially after The Fallujah and Ramadi events are also in Anbar and Mosul, and displaced families are staying in camps that lack the most basic sanitary conditions."²⁹

The security concern remains a source of great concern to many, which disturbs their comfort and threatens their lives and prevents them from living in peace and safety. As the security situation is the main reason for migration outside Iraq and after 2003 immigration became one of the main features in the Iraqi scene as a result of sectarian events and the occupation that Iraq has

gone through. 2005 and following years of externally migrating and internal displacement due to sectarianism and violence that generate from it, and displacement has created many crises in Iraq so that we find many camps that have become a crisis that the Iraqi government suffers from. There are a number of governorates whose people are still displaced from them and have not returned to their areas of residence, or the government must take serious action to return the displaced, as the forcibly displaced suffer from obtaining adequate housing, as they live in camps that do not meet the most basic health conditions and are deprived of education, health and food.³⁰

International sources specializing in the issue of displacement and forced migrations stated that it was the largest mass migration in the shortest period of time, and it started after the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and was colored in sectarian and sectarian colors, although it included hundreds of thousands of Iraqis of all population and age groups, including thousands of intellectuals, writers, scholars and academics, as well as doctors, engineers, and military personnel.

Especially during the period when "killing on identity" was taking place, but the majority of politicians were Baathists who were targeted by the "de-Baathification law," especially after the bombing of the shrines of Imams Ali Al-Hadi and Al-Hasan Al-Askari in Samarra in 2006.

After 2006, internal waves of displacement began, especially for Christians from Basra, Baghdad and Kirkuk, towards Iraqi Kurdistan, and the bulk of them settled in Ainkawa (Christianity), and from there they went abroad, and this migration expanded after ISIS's occupation of Mosul on June 10, 2014, when more than one immigrated. On half of the Iraqi Christians.

Unofficial figures show that before the occupation, their number was about one million Christians, and the population at that time was

about 23 million people. Currently, their number is estimated at less than 350,000, while the population is more than 35 million Iraqis.

The same applies to other cultural groups, as only six thousand Sabeen-Mandaeans remained, while their number was more than 60 thousand in the seventies of the last century, and there are immigrations that included Turkmen, Faili Kurds in particular and Kurds in general, in addition to the Yazidis who were subjected to collective abuse. After ISIS occupied Mosul, their women were taken captive, and the matter included Armenians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Shabaks, Kakaiya, and others.

The Iraqi diaspora today includes about four million Iraqis, and is distributed as follows, with estimated numbers: The United States: 360,000, Britain: 450,000, Sweden: 280,000, Germany: 190,000, the Netherlands: 150,000, and Belgium: 90,000 And Denmark: 150,000, Switzerland: 40,000, former socialist countries: 20,000, and Australia: 50,000. In New Zealand: 25,000, Canada: 70,000, France: 10,000, Norway: 35,000, Finland: 20,000, Egypt: 150,000, Jordan: 400,000, Gulf countries: 40,000, and Yemen (before the civil war): 70,000 Lebanon: 50 thousand, Libya and North Africa in general: 30 thousand, Iran: 300 thousand, and other countries separate 100 thousand.

Among these immigrants are rare Iraqi competencies, as the number of doctors in Britain alone exceeds seven thousand, and there are more than this number in Europe and America.

In a comment by a British man, he said: If the Iraqi doctors decide to leave the country - and they include rare specialists - a real medical crisis will occur in Britain, in addition to the various scientific specialties, as they include a large number of investors and project owners in various fields.

The restoration of these people in whole or in part - meaning their final return or their visit to their

countries, presenting their experiences and transferring their experiences - will be of great benefit to Iraq, and it will be a factor of interaction and an element of tolerance in both directions, especially the culture, knowledge and experience they have acquired. However, this requires political stability, the availability of political will and national consensus, an end to terrorism and violence, and the enactment of laws that prohibit sectarianism and prohibit advocacy of hatred and everything related to racism, intolerance and extremism, especially since the matter needs to end the sectarian and ethnic quota system that is based on clientelism and spoils. This means working to reinforce the unifying Iraqi national identity while respecting sub-identities, introducing the homeland and citizenship to other affiliations, and reviewing the constitution, especially the so-called "components" that were mentioned in the constitution eight times.

The state should be based on a union of free citizens and not a union of components, which brought the country into a state of chaos and political, administrative and financial corruption. Providing objective conditions to benefit from qualified refugees and immigrants enhances their willingness to serve their (original) countries, and to use each of his positions - according to his circumstances and capabilities - in ways that could enhance the development process in Iraq, especially if the perception that the homeland is for everyone prevails, and no one is superior to the law that everyone should rule and everyone should refer to. The law, in the words of Montesquieu: "The parable of death applies to everyone and there is no exception in it."

The Iraqi state - regardless of the government - must pay attention not only to the generation of immigrants or refugees, but to the second and third generation, to draw them back to the homeland and to maintain their relations and to

benefit from their experiences and expertise, and from the sciences they acquired in the diaspora countries, and from the important sites they occupy in the receiving countries and provide incentives Material and moral to them.

We should, here, benefit from the experiences of "others" by forming "lobbies that support the rights of Iraqis and Arabs," and to defend them in the Iraqi diaspora.

The issue of taking back the refugees may become difficult and even illogical with the passage of days, but the matter of benefiting from their presence will be possible through a flexible and attractive policy, and by giving them the appreciation and prestige they deserve, to strengthen their connection with the motherland and establish relations with it and visit it from time to time.

It is imperative to pay attention to these refugees and draw them to the just causes of their homeland and their nation by making them feel that - even with the new vaccinated identities - an extension of a beautiful homeland, civilization, culture and language, and part of a continuous and continuous globalism, the issue will be more sensitive to the intellectuals and the creative ones in particular. The Iraqi state - regardless of the government - must pay attention not only to the generation of immigrants or refugees, but to the second and third generation, to bring them back to the homeland, maintain their relations, and benefit from their experiences and expertise, and from the sciences they acquired in the diaspora.³¹

Findings and recommendations

Through the course of this study is it evident that sectarianism in Iraq was a direct cause of the migration of millions of Iraqis inside Iraq. The Iraqi state is considered fertile soil for sectarianism due to the diversity of its populace across ethnic, religious and linguistic divides. The political elites of Iraq took advantage of these

differences to achieve their own objective by reigniting sectarian identities and subsequent divides and stirring up strife, and this is the reality of the situation in Iraq, where some have been targeting personalities, mosques and Hussainiyat after Occupation to provoke feelings of religiosity and push the masses to hasty reactions, and ignite the instinct for revenge within society. Through research, investigation, and inference, we arrived at the validity of the hypothesis on which the study was based, and the answer to all the research questions, which together contain the above-mentioned answer.

The study has led us to several conclusions, which also require several recommendations. These are accordingly;

1. The Iraqi state throughout its long history contained multiple racial, ethnic and religious components, and despite this, sectarianism that excludes the other did not appear until late after the American occupation of Iraq in 2003.
2. The phenomenon of sectarianism in Iraq has emerged strongly due to several internal, external and regional factors that played a role in the rule of sectarianism as a result of the policies pursued by some political Islam movements.
3. The external factor has a great impact on fueling sectarianism in Iraq, especially the Iranian hegemony over decision-making in Baghdad.
4. The Iraqi political forces, since they took power in Iraq in 2006, have failed to develop a system that can accommodate everyone.
5. Corruption and sectarian quotas are among the main obstacles to the effectiveness of the Iraqi political system after 2006.
6. The terrorist attacks carried out by several armed sectarian groups (Shiite-Sunni) contributed to the migration of millions of Iraqis (inside and outside Iraq), whether Sunnis or Shiites, emptying provinces, cities and villages of their inhabitants in search of security and stability.

Recommendations:

The previous results also necessitated recommendations, the most important of which are:

1. To get out of the spiral of sectarianism, we cannot rely solely on slogans, speeches, and sermons. For this reason, there must be legal prohibitive and deterrent measures that would bring about a radical change in concepts, methods of education and political life.
2. A civil state is the best alternative to a sectarian state that is established. If the state wants to get out of the impasse of sectarianism, then it is necessary to return to civilization as a more appropriate alternative to it.
3. Islamic parties, especially in Iraq, must go beyond their sectarian affiliation and seek to build a unified political project that achieves balance and parity.
4. The Iraqi government needs to take credible steps to build confidence and reassure the various factions about their place in the country through a serious reconciliation plan.

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