

The Israeli Withdrawal From Southern Lebanon In 2000: A Historical Study

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Abstract

The problem of Israel's presence in southern Lebanon and along the Israeli-Lebanese border has been one of the most pressing concerns for the Israeli government since the 1982 invasion, as a result of increasing material and human losses incurred by the Israel forces. The Israeli government for occupying those territories. The goal of security is to keep Israel's northern settlements safe and secure, as well as to protect Israel's northern borders from any threats. This presence became a source of danger to Israel as a result of continuous attacks by the Lebanese resistance, who launched attacks from these territories from the south, as well as widespread public pressure, which, of course, culminated to Israel's defeat.

Introduction

The issue of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is one of the most important stages in the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Israeli policy towards Lebanon in particular, as a result of the events and circumstances that accompanied both Lebanon and (Israel) throughout the period of its occupation of southern Lebanon since the (Israel) invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the conflicts that accompanied that era and the aggravation of the role of the Lebanese resistance, through the Seven-Day War in 1993 and the Grapes of Wrath in 1996, then the attacks of the resistance that did not stop for the duration of the Israeli presence in Lebanon.

The year 2000 was chosen as the beginning and end of the study, as it was the year that witnessed the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. However, we have gone back to the first beginnings that paved the

way for this withdrawal since the first sessions of the Madrid Conference in 1991, since the idea of withdrawal emerged in it because the Lebanese side had agreed to attend the conference. The main objective is to demand that they withdraw (Israel) from Lebanon, but there is a question that arises in this regard. What are the circumstances that made Ehud Barak take the decision to withdraw from southern Lebanon, despite the evasions that the Israeli decision makers continued for many years?

The research included several axes, as well as an introduction and conclusion. Among these axes are the first beginnings of the idea of withdrawal and negotiation, passing through the Israeli offers that it presented to Lebanon in exchange for withdrawal, as well as the conditions that prepared for the withdrawal and then the final withdrawal from Lebanon.

The research relied on a wide range of sources that varied and benefited from the research, foremost of which was the UN Security Council document, which enriched the search with important information about the withdrawal, as well as the documents of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were translated by us, in addition to a number of letters, university theses, books and Arab newspapers. and Lebanese.

Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon

The issue of the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon on the border strip is one of the most important issues that the Israeli government has suffered as a result of the human and material losses it incurred as a result of its occupation of these areas, and to return to the premise of the idea of presence. This presence came for political and security reasons aimed at preserving the security and safety of the residents of the northern settlements Israel and preventing attacks from southern Lebanon, and to prevent Syria from benefiting from southern Lebanon in the event of a future war with Israel (Ibrahim, Issue 620, 2000).

The occupation of the border strip separating Lebanon and Israel was aimed at securing the northern borders of (Israel) since the invasion of 1982, but the focus on withdrawal and discussion about it began since the Madrid Conference of 1991-1993, when the Lebanese delegation participating in this conference demanded guarantees that the UN resolution would be implemented United Nations No. (425) stipulating the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, but the Israeli negotiating side was evasive in the decision to withdraw, as it called for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces in accordance with Resolution (520) of 1982,

and that the Israeli withdrawal be in accordance with a new peace treaty (Hoss, Al-Mustaqbal Magazine, Issue 154. Throughout the Madrid Conference sessions, negotiations were stalled, without reaching a significant result regarding the Israeli withdrawal in the security belt area (Al-Kaoud, 2012: pg. 132).

After the failure of the Madrid Conference negotiations, Israeli policy resorted to taking the military option to launch a war against Lebanon, by launching a war of attrition that came in two phases: the first, the Seven-Day War in 1993, and the second, the Grapes of Wrath in 1996, in which Israel did not achieve its goal of extracting an agreement A peace that accepts the Israeli presence and the Lebanese government's control over the operations of the resistance.

When Benjamin Netanyahu assumed the Israeli prime ministership in 1996, he always stated his desire to withdraw from southern Lebanon, but he was hesitant because the withdrawal might constitute an incentive for the resistance to continue their operations against the northern settlements and the Israeli army. And we must be freed from this burden that weighs us down and pushes us to make unnecessary concessions” (Haidar, 2001: p. 50).

Netanyahu bombarded Lebanon with a series of initiatives he presented to Lebanon, the first of which was known as “Lebanon First,” which was presented to US President Bill Clinton) first, and then on the Lebanese side, as the plan stipulated that the Israeli forces would withdraw from southern Lebanon in exchange for the following: The Lebanese government and the Lebanese army are responsible for security, to prevent the Islamic Resistance from carrying out any operation against Israel, and for Hezbollah to

pledge not to harm and pursue the Israeli army, in addition to dissolving the South Lebanon Army and including its non-officer elements in the Lebanese army (Mansour, 2004: p. 689).

After that, other initiatives followed, such as the "Jezzin First" initiative that was presented to the Lebanese government in 1997, which relied on fragmentation, i.e. (Israel) begins to withdraw from part of Lebanon, which is Jezzine, for example, and then evaluates the Lebanese situation, which will require it to stop resistance operations and maintain security For a period of six months, and the withdrawal will be expanded after that, he then proposed a similar project, which is "South First", which did not differ much from its predecessors except that this project demanded the dissolution of Hezbollah and the disarmament of its elements. The three projects were rejected by the Lebanese government because of the demands they contained With Impossibility (Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi, Issue 257, 2000).

The idea of an Israeli withdrawal from the south began to take its serious course when the pace of military operations between the Israeli forces and Hezbollah escalated without stopping. On February 4, 1997, 73 Israeli soldiers were killed when two CH53 helicopters collided in the sky of the Galilee region, when the unit soldiers were transported. especially to southern Lebanon, that loss that (Israel) considered the worst disaster that (Israel) has been subjected to (Blanford, 2007: p. 48).

The Israeli public opinion was frustrated as a result of the human losses, and it had realized the tragedy experienced by the Israeli soldiers, so the Israeli people demanded the government to leave Lebanon, so it established the (Four Mothers Movement), to

which the wife of Amiram Levin, the commander of the Israeli army, was affiliated, to demand with mothers Dead Soldiers Withdrawal (Al-Mayadeen Documentary, 2000).

Based on what was mentioned, we find that the wife of Amiram Levin, the commander of the Israeli army, joined the mothers of the dead soldiers and demanded with them to withdraw in order to spare the blood of the Israelis.

Defense Minister Itzhak Mordechai put forward a project on withdrawal from the security belt areas on January 2, 1998, and this project stipulates that the withdrawal take place after the dismantling of Hezbollah's infrastructure, and that Hezbollah disarms, and stipulates the implementation of Resolution (425) to conduct direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, without interference from the Syrian side (Sweden: p. 81).

In 1998, Ariel Sharon put forward a project that included a phased withdrawal, so that the Lebanese government and army could bear to fill the void created by the withdrawal, and in the event that the Lebanese government was unable to control security on the border strip, the Israeli army would return to give its hand in that Regions (Sweden: p. 82).

US Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk visited Lebanon in December 1997 as part of his tour of the Middle East, and held a lengthy meeting with the Army Commander, Emile Lahoud, during which they discussed the extent to which Lebanon could provide security in the border areas. After that meeting, Martin Indyk stated: "I can say in light of my long experience that the Israelis would like to withdraw from southern Lebanon as a whole, and all they aim at is to

provide security in northern Israel, and a negotiated and peaceful solution must be provided to solve this point" (Sweed, 1999: p. 47).

Previous Israeli projects aspired to separate the Syrian file from the Lebanese file in the withdrawal negotiations from the Syrian Golan and southern Lebanon, so they wanted to hold negotiations from the Lebanese side alone, as it is simpler than holding joint negotiations with both Syria and Lebanon.

Controversy grew within the Israeli Knesset on the issue of withdrawal, and they differed over the military performance. A member of the Knesset's Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, Yossi Sarid, described the South Lebanon Army as a pillar made of weak, broken reeds. As a result, the Yossi Beilin and Yossi Sarid projects were put forward, which They are similar in their contents, as they include the following: establishing a more advanced defense system on the Lebanese-Israeli borders, dissolving the South Lebanon Army and compensating its members with material compensation, and securing residence for those who want to travel to Europe and Israel (Al-Nahar, Issue 1999: 1998), as well as This included the project to increase the number of the United Nations forces (UNIFIL), and for the Lebanese government to abide by the principles of the 1949 armistice, and to legislate for (Israel) the right to respond to acts of violence that it deems appropriate to respond to, and the project included a warning to the Syrian side to treat it reciprocally in If he interferes in obstructing the withdrawal (Haidar 2001: p. 72)

The two projects did not find a response from the Lebanese government, since the official opinion of the Israeli government itself witnessed a discrepancy between opponents

and supporters of withdrawal, in addition to the escalation of popular and political debate about the mechanism of getting rid of the South Lebanon Army, who were described by the Israeli media as a group of mercenaries who sold their homeland (Al-Nahar, Issue 1987 , 1998).

Southern Lebanon was a real predicament for Israel, so the goal of its occupation of southern Lebanon was to secure the settlements, but that goal did not find a way to be verified on the ground. This, of course, led to an increase in the victims of attacks, among Israeli civilians and soldiers as well. The Israeli public opinion became ready and accepting of withdrawal from the south, as this occupation has no longer any result other than the increasing increase in human and material losses (Israeli Anthology, Nos.40, 1998) the Israeli government had approved The principle of withdrawal from the areas of southern Lebanon during a session held on January 4, 1998, on the condition that they be replaced by Egyptian and Jordanian Arab forces as an alternative to the Israeli army whose mission is to supervise security protection. The Lebanese side rejected this decision because the Lebanese government wanted an unconditional withdrawal (Grejian, 2009: p. 205.)

The Israeli Cabinet issued an official statement taken by the Ministerial Committee for National Security on April 1, 1998, which included Israel's acceptance of Resolution 425 and its approval of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, provided that Lebanon bears responsibility not to use its territory as a base for resistance activities against Israeli settlements (Security Council documents 1998).

The Lebanese side responded with a letter sent by the Lebanese Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Fares Bweiz, on April 22, 1998, to the UN Security Council, stressing the Lebanese government's insistence on implementing Resolution 425 in letter and spirit, as it provides for a complete withdrawal without security or political conditions (Security Council Documents: 1998).

The Israeli elections won by Ehud Barak as prime minister came on May 17, 1999, Ehud, who promised in his electoral program that the complete withdrawal from Lebanon would take place no later than July 2000, but during that period he wanted to prove Israel's deterrent power.) The Israeli forces launched a violent attack on the infrastructure of Lebanon on June 24, 1999. They returned with the most violent air raid, which included attacks on electrical installations, stations and bridges linking the south to Beirut. This led to Beirut entering a state of complete darkness, and the bombing resulted in the killing of ten civilians. Sixty-four others were wounded (Khalaf, 2012: pp. 140-145).

Here comes the question about the reason for Israel's decision to strike the infrastructure as well as the sites of the resistance, and we believe that the reason is the increase in human losses to (Israel) and it wanted to send a veiled message that the Lebanese government does not control the armed factions in the depth of Lebanon, and to create a strife between the Lebanese government and the resistance. .

The response of the Lebanese government came quickly, as the Council of Ministers held an urgent session on June 24, 1999, which resulted in sending an urgent telegram to the Security Council condemning the Israeli attacks. To the United Nations (UNIFIL) to contain that conflict and spare

civilians losses (Maghamis, 2000: p. 675; al-Hasan: p. 140-145).

On May 27, 1999, Ehud Barak announced his intention to withdraw the Israelis from southern Lebanon within a maximum period of one year (Harel, 2008:p18). "There are no guarantees or arrangements for any Israeli withdrawal outside the framework of a just peace that includes Lebanon and Syria together, and that the attacks are nothing but new evidence of Israel's limitless barbarism, and we call on the international community to assume its responsibilities in deterring the brutal aggression" (Al-Hassan: p. 303) .

International contacts continued to try to resume settlement talks on both the Lebanese and the Syrian tracks. On August 2, 1999, a Lebanese delegation headed by Dhafer al-Hassan, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, visited Damascus. After their meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara, the Lebanese position on the peace talks was confirmed. The region (Al-Hassan: p. 363).

The summary of the Syrian-Lebanese meeting was the insistence of the two sides to implement Resolution 425 and their refusal to negotiate on Israeli conditions and restrictions. The Lebanese delegation in Damascus stated that the meeting resulted in focusing on two points: that Lebanon is ready to hold talks with (Israel) if these talks A lasting and just peace was reached, and the Lebanese side insisted on addressing the issue of Lebanon's right to its waters that the Israeli side seized, as well as Lebanon's right to compensation for those affected by the Israeli attacks since 1978, as well as the right of Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon and returning them to their homes. The Lebanese to demand the right of Lebanese

detainees in Israeli prisons and to demand their release (Al-Hassan: p. 363).

A working group was formed from both the Israeli and Lebanese sides in early August 1999, and this team was devoted to following up the progress of the negotiations that had been stalled for a while, and that decision came after the Israeli government and the Israeli public opinion was convinced of the necessity of participating in the settlement process and achieving the withdrawal from southern Lebanon (Shuail, 2000 : p. 117).

The military operations were between hit and run by September of the same year, as a result of Israel increasing its fortifications, and the increase in resistance attempts by carrying out a series of different attacks that killed seven soldiers and wounded seven others on the Qlea'a-Marjayoun road, when Hezbollah detonated a car bomb, in addition to the fighting of the Amal Mujahideen. Several confrontations with the Israeli forces on the Al-Qalaa and Al-Qusayr axis, as the Amal movement succeeded in inflicting a blow on the Israeli infantry force, which led to the destruction of one of the vehicles.

The Israeli-Syrian negotiations had resumed by December 1999, after a four-year hiatus. On December 8, US President Bill Clinton announced the resumption of negotiations after the US Secretary of State's visit to Syria and his meeting with Hafez al-Assad, and Syria's readiness to resume the negotiations that had begun. On December 15, 1999, on the Lebanese level, it disagreed with the Israeli side in the interpretation of the concept of Resolution 425, as Israel considered that its concept is linked to secure borders, and that means making some amendments to the border strip by including some Lebanese villages such as Shebaa - Kfarshouba -

Heibadieh - Rashaya Al-Fakher - Kafr Ihamam) (Sahih, 2007: pg. 63).

The response of the Lebanese government was that it considered these amendments invalid, and categorically rejected the amendment, and condemned (secure borders) because Resolution (425) was not accompanied by amendments to the borders, in addition to the Lebanese government's rejection of the security arrangements proposed by (Israel) to establish monitoring and early warning stations on Lebanese territory. Not to mention the freedom of Israeli warplanes to fly over Lebanese airspace, and the establishment of buffer zones inside Lebanese territory. The Lebanese government rejected all these proposals, and refused to negotiate them. The two rounds did not lead to an agreement despite the participation of Bill Clinton in them (Al-Ali, 2010: p. 126).

The South Lebanon Army withdrew from the Kafr Houna area in the Jezzine district on January 12, 2000 in light of the failure of the negotiations. The resistance took advantage of the weakness reached by the Israeli army and its ally, the South Lebanon Army, so Hezbollah dealt a heavy blow by assassinating the second man in the army. South Lebanon, which is Aqel Hashem, who set up a tight ambush for him, which cost him his life at the village of Dibl on January 30, 2000 (Al-Lahi, 2004: p. 237).

The assassination of Aqel Hashem had a profound effect on the increase in the escape of elements of the South Lebanon Army from its headquarters, so Ehud Barak arranged a meeting with a group of Israeli officials to respond to the resistance, and they took a unanimous decision to respond to the attacks, after they authorized the security cabinet on February 7 of the same year Ehud Barak

reiterated his intention to withdraw from southern Lebanon in July 2000, but did not mention an agreement or settlement with Syria or Lebanon (I.M.F.A, 2000) (Israel) responded to the assassination of Akel Hashem by attempting to assassinate a Hezbollah leader, but the operation It failed on February 4, 2000, and then completed its response on February 7 with a series of air raids that targeted electricity stations in several areas. Despite the Israeli response, the South Lebanon Army continued to retreat, so it withdrew from the strategic location of Sajd, which oversees the region. Apple (Security Council Documents: 2000).

Ehud Barak was worried about the response of the Lebanese resistance by bombing the northern settlements, so he declared a state of emergency in these settlements for two days, and forced more than (300,000) residents to hide in shelters for fear of any sudden bombardment by the resistance (Hegazy, 2013: p. 402).

Ehud Barak had no choice but to leave Lebanon under the pretext of implementing Resolution 425, so Israel began to withdraw from the April Understanding Committee, and called on Lebanon to conduct direct negotiations, and when the Lebanese refusal came, Israel sought to resort to neutral parties, including the forces. The International Organization (UNIFIL) for the purpose of requesting a truce during which its forces would be withdrawn from Lebanon in a calm and orderly manner (Abdullah Al-Hajj Hassan: p. 282) in exchange for Israel dissolving the South Lebanon Army and then withdrawing its forces. The Israeli Minister of Defense came out saying: "Our presence in Lebanon is linked to one goal, which is Security (Israel), we are not interested in this situation, and we do not want more victims. We have studied Resolution (425) and

presented it to legal experts. The resolution clearly indicated that the Lebanese government should control its borders, maintain order and law, and simplify security. Within the Context of (Israel) Withdrawal (I.M.F.A, 2000).

The Israeli delegate to the United Nations, Yehuda Lancry, announced on February 9, 2000, after the failure of those attempts, both political and military, and the high number of resistance attacks, that the Israeli government intends to withdraw from southern Lebanon, and is fully prepared to negotiate to restore peace. On the border areas (Security Council Documents: 2000).

The Arab League Council held its session in Beirut on March 11, 2000, during which the Arab foreign ministers met to review their relations with (Israel) and at that meeting condemned the brutal attacks on Lebanon. Lebanon with Syria in the face of Israel, imagine if you were all in solidarity, what would happen (Al-Hoss, 2000: pg. 160)?

The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ismat Abdel Majid, affirmed the right of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to return to Palestine, and affirmed his full support for the complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon without restrictions or conditions, as well as his affirmation of absolute support for Lebanon in the face of the Israeli occupation's aggressions (Al-Hoss, 2000, p. 104).

The pace of talks increased when (Israel) announced that the United Nations would submit a request to send representatives to it with the aim of demarcating the border with Lebanon. The Lebanese side rejected this request, while confirming: "There is one clear border line with Palestine, which is the same as the 1923 and 1943 line, noting that

the Directorate of Geographical Affairs In the Lebanese army, it owns all the coordinates and information about Lebanon's international borders and will display them when needed (Major General, Issue 8573: 2000), and the Lebanese government demanded that Israel withdraw beyond the international borders (Mahmoud, 2008: p. 177).

Based on what was mentioned, we find that the Israeli position has weakened, so not all of the Israeli prevarications found any benefit at the international or Lebanese levels. Negotiations at the Syrian and Lebanese levels did not reach any benefit, despite the American intervention in an attempt to obtain separate negotiations with each side. The Syrian and Lebanese governments were insistent on negotiating with them together, and their demands were the same, namely, the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian Golan and southern Lebanon.

A meeting was held between the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan) and Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy on April 4, 2000, in which the latter spoke about the Israeli government's decision to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon unconditionally, and that this withdrawal in one batch will end in July of this year himself, and affirmed Israel's determination to cooperate with the United Nations in implementing its resolutions (Security Council Documents, 2000), so the Secretary-General of the Security Council initiated the preparations that fall on the shoulders of the United Nations under resolution (425), and on April 20, 2000 the Security Council welcomed With this message, he supported the Secretary-General to begin preparations for withdrawal (Security Council Documents, 2000).

The Israeli army began to withdraw gradually by handing over some sites to the South Lebanon Army, those sites that were also attacked by the resistance on April 15, 2000, and in the same month, the resistance had liberated the Armati site, killing and wounding ten of the members who were in it. The site, which led to the defeat of the elements of the South Lebanon Army and their escape, thus the village of Armati was liberated (Hassan: pg. 484).

By May of the same year, the United Nations sent its envoy Terry Rod Larsen to Beirut with a group of experts, including an expert in maps, borders, geography and military affairs. Terry Larsen's visit came as a result of (Israel) leaving the Shebaa Farms issue unresolved. The Israeli government agreed to withdraw, but it was categorically refusing to withdraw from the Shebaa Farms, which have an area of 250 square kilometers, those farms adjacent to the Syrian Golan. Therefore, Israel considered the farms to be part of the occupied Syrian Golan since 1967. The Lebanese government insisted that The farms belong to Lebanon, and the withdrawal should include them as well (Al-Kufi, 2021: p. 218).

Larsen sent a message to Kofi Annan regarding the establishment of a tripartite international-Israeli-Lebanese committee as an alternative to the Armistice Commission. 365).

The Lebanese response came by rejecting international intervention, rejecting the presence of international observers, as well as rejecting the evidence that indicates the Lebaneseness of the Shebaa Farms, as this is a question of the sincerity of the governments of Lebanon and Syria. The Amal Movement, Hezbollah and the Lebanese State, the Shebaa Farms is a Lebanese right that does

not accept interpretation or discussion (An-Nahar, Issue 20642: 2000; Pakradouni, 2006: pg. 134).

At the military level, the situation was at its worst, the conflict between the resistance and Israel intensified, then the Israeli forces launched an air attack on civilians on May 3, 2000, wounding many Lebanese, prompting the resistance to fire Katyusha rockets at Kiryat Shmona, and (26) between Dead and Wounded (Security Council Documents, 2000).

The Israeli government responded to that attack by threatening the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, saying: No country on earth accepts firing batches of Katyusha rockets at its city centers. The Israeli threat on May 5, 2000, to bomb two power stations near Beirut (Security Council Documents, 2000)

(Israel) began preparing a set of scenarios for implementing the withdrawal from Lebanon after it reached a dead end of negotiations, that the Israeli forces withdraw and keep the South Lebanon Army under the name of (National Guard), in addition to the Israeli army maintaining positions on the border strip to provide logistical assistance to the South Lebanon Army, In addition, the Israeli government is thinking of withdrawing from the Shiite villages, leaving the South Lebanon Army in the remaining villages, and the strange thing is that none of these projects were actually implemented. The withdrawal took place by surprise, forty-five days before the scheduled date. May, the Israeli army forces began to withdraw from some of their positions, such as the Taiba site in the central sector and Ras al-Bayada in the western sector (Hamada, 2004: p. 83).

The Israeli forces began evacuating their positions on May 16, 2000 amid heavy gunfire, so the resistance took advantage of the state of fear and confusion that the Israeli forces fell under and launched attacks on the remaining sites such as Naksa al-Rayhan, Barashit and Hadatha, causing direct casualties and withdrew from them by only 10% and did not withdraw. From the rest of its farms on the pretext that it is Syrian land, then it completed its withdrawal from the western Bekaa and southern Lebanon regions without any agreement or settlement with Lebanon or with Syria (Security Council Documents, 2000).

The civilian population attacked the Khiam prison, taking advantage of the (Israeli) weakness, on May 22 of the same year and released the detainees there. Then the human movement of the population began to enter the town of Qantara, then Taiba and Al-Qusayr, and then Deir Sirian, and they began to liberate the areas one after the other. The Israeli forces withdrew, leaving their equipment behind, and in the meantime, the South Lebanon Army collapsed, and things went against the expectations of the government and the expectations of the resistance itself. It took 45 minutes to expel the residents from the border areas, according to Goskell's statement (Information Magazine, Issue 93, 2001). The Lebanese government praised With that victory, Emile Lahoud expressed it by saying: "The two weapons of national unity and resistance forced (Israel) to withdraw." He also expressed his regret that Shebaa was not included in this withdrawal (Security Council Documents, 2000).

The Israeli Ministry of Defense issued an official statement on May 24, 2000, ordering the Israeli forces to complete their withdrawal, and to exercise restraint in

completing this withdrawal. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak said: "Israel will respond strongly to any attack on its sovereignty, citizens or soldiers, This was in reference to threats to Hezbollah (I.M.F.A, 2000).

The complete withdrawal took place on May 24, 2000, amid the coverage of their artillery and the crossing of the elements of the South Lebanon Army with the Israeli forces into the Israeli borders, and some elements surrendered themselves to the Lebanese forces (Beydoun, 2000: p. 96).

The Lebanese residents celebrated on May 25 of the same year along the border areas, and flocked to attend Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's sermon, which he called "the spider's web sermon" because he saw that their strength was weaker than the spider's web, and at the governmental level, Parliament held its session in Bint Jbeil in May 31, 2000, and this session opened by reciting Surat Al-Fatihah and standing in honor of the martyrs of Lebanon and the resistance. Both Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament, and Salim El-Hoss, Prime Minister, expressed the joint role of the state and the resistance in this great victory, which they considered a wedding of freedom and liberation from the Israeli occupation (M.M. N.L., 2000).

On June 10, 2000, President Emile Lahoud addressed a presidential memorandum to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, as a final step to close the file of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The cartographers who were working with the UNIFIL drew a good border line separating Lebanon and (Israel) with a length of (79 km). It was called the (Blue Line). On June 18, the Security Council approved that border line as a line of

withdrawal (Al Jouni, 2007: p. 23; Mathbuz 2008: p. 23).

Conclusions

The research concluded that the issue of the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon and the 1982 invasion came for security reasons to maintain the security and safety of the northern settlements and the northern borders of (Israel) shared with Lebanon, and that occupation came to prevent Syria from benefiting from southern Lebanon in the event of a future war. with (Israel).

The research concluded that the Lebanese demands regarding the withdrawal of (Israel) from the south, started since the first sessions of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991-1993, but the Israeli side has always stipulated on the Lebanese government that the withdrawal will take place in exchange for concluding a new and separate peace treaty with (Israel)) Away from the Syrian side, and the Lebanese rejection of this condition was continuous because the Lebanese government was insisting that the withdrawal be unilateral and unconditionally.

The research concluded that the Israeli policy towards Lebanon has changed in the wake of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1993, as (Israel) resorted to the military option by launching two wars of attrition that came in two phases: the first was the Seven-Day War in 1993, and the second was the war of 1996, and it failed (Israel) in both of them in extracting a clear peace agreement with Lebanon, under which the Israeli presence and the Lebanese government's control over the resistance operations and its disarmament are accepted.

The research concluded that all the initiatives of (Israel) regarding the withdrawal from southern Lebanon, such as the initiatives of

(Lebanon First), (Jezzine First), then the initiative of (Yossi Sarid) and others were nothing but political and useless evasions, rejected by the Lebanese side due to its impossible conditions, which the government could not. The Lebanese government has implemented it due to the Lebanese government's adherence to a complete and unconditional withdrawal.

The idea of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon has begun to take its serious course after the escalation of the military operations between the Israeli forces and Hezbollah, which led to an increase in human and material losses. This naturally led to the frustration of the Israeli public opinion and its demand for the government to withdraw from southern Lebanon, especially after the accession of The wife of Amiram Levin, the commander of the Israeli army, to the Four Mothers Movement, which was founded by the mothers of the dead soldiers who demanded the withdrawal.

The research proved that the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's decision to withdraw came for two reasons: The first is the result of the promises he made to withdraw from southern Lebanon during a maximum period of one year during his electoral campaign. In its policy with Lebanon, all that remains is the withdrawal that Ehud Barak decided as an attempt to find out what will happen with the Lebanese side.

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